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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
If I must make war, I prefer it to be against a coalition. 
Napoleon 
Now that I have led a coalition, I have much less respect for 
Napoleon. 
Mm'shall Foeh 
This study is about multinationality and defence. Defence is 
here understood as covering both the armed forces and the 
defence industry that produces their equipment. 
Multinationality refers to two or more countries pooling their 
resources, often to achieve what would have been beyond the 
reach of one of them. 
Multinationality is nothing new, the quotations at the top 
of this page may serve as pertinent reminders of that. 
Nevertheless, multinationality is now placed at the top of the 
agenda in the transformation processes underway in all the 
countries belonging to NATO. One of the reasons is that 
events in the last decade have resulted in a well of new 
information on the advantages and pitfalls of multinationality. 
In the ten years between 1990 and 2000, mOre than 25 
military operations were undertaken jointly by the US and one 
or more of its European allies.' Coalitions have become an 
intrinsic elenlent in Western warfare. Infonned opinion on 
I .lames P. Thomas, The Military Challenges O(Tfdllsatlal1tic Coalitions, 
London: 1155, 2000, Adelphi Paper 333, p. 9. 
both sides of the Atlantic agrees that coalitions are the shape 
of things to C0I11e. Likewise, a COIlsensus prevails that, until 
now, too little has been undertaken by NATO's members to 
ensure that coalitions can be formed quickly and managed 
smoothly. The failure to do so has been further aggravated by 
the growing transatlantic gap in terms of sophisticated 
equipment, reducing the allies' ability to work tOgether. 
Indeed, as one writer has stated, all things being equal, 
national contingencies are far more effective than 
multinational ones.' If that is so, why the increasing emphasis 
placed on multinationality by politicians, defence economists 
and scholars? Two factors are at play here; one is political 
legitimacy, the other costs. 
\Vhereas a single country sending soldiers off to a conflict 
unavoidably will be suspected of acting out of purely national 
interests, a coalition is less likely to be accused of the same. 
During the Cold War, the need to defend the West against 
attacks did not lend itself easily to questions over legitimacy. 
Today, this is less the case. Actions outside the Alliance 
member area will easily give rise to questions over legitimacy. 
This is particularly the case if the action in question seems 
snited more to the strategic interest of one of the coalition 
members. The dominant US role in the coalition that attacked 
and subsequently occupied Iraq springs to mind, but other 
\Vestern countries have been confronted with similar 
accusations. Such accusations are politically costly. One way 
to pre-empt these accusations is to assemble the broadest 
possible coalition. 
Economic costS are the other factor listed. European 
defence budgets were sharply reduced during the 1990s; a 
trend that has only been reversed recently in a few of the 
countries. Much of this increase has been channelled into 
modern weaponry such as precision-guided missiles and 
2 Ruche! Anne LlItz Ellehulls1 lvl111tbT<ltiollal Solutions /fCrSlfS 11llra-Alfimzce 
Specialisation, Copenhagen: DUPI Report 2002/5, p. 8. 
information technology. These are only part of the radical 
technological change in weapons and the way operations are 
conducted, labelled the Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA 
for short. These novelties come at a prohibitive price. But 
what may be beyond one country can be within the reach of 
two or more. Thus, countries are exploring new ways of either 
pooling their resources at all stages from research and 
development through procurement to the establishment of 
units with the most modern equipment. 
The soldier's kit is of cardinal importance if casualties are 
to be kept low. If they are not, whatever support a coalition 
enjoyed at home and abroad will be undermincd. A challenge 
to any coalition, and this challenge is so fundamental that it 
merits to be mentioned here in the introduction, is the need to 
maintain cohesion. Just how difficult that can be was 
poi!~nantly underlined in General Wesley Clark's recollections 
of NATO's Operation Allied Force: 
I talked to everybody. J talked to diplomats, NATO political 
leaders, narjonai political leaders, and national chiefs of 
defence. There was a constant round of telephone cails, 
pushing and shoving and bargaining and cajoling, trying to 
raise the threshold for NATO attacks.) 
Cohesion problems sometimes originate in the fact that 
multinationality will involve a transfer of decision-making to 
other forums than those under strict national control. 
National decision-making will be strongly influenced by other 
allies, in other words it will be less "national". This limitation 
on national sovereignty is deeply ingnlined in all the problems 
related to multinationality. How cOllntries try to mitigate the 
; The il1(Cfyicw can be found at http://\\'\\'\V.phs.orgfwghb/D;]gt~s!fr()nr-.lin£L 
shows IkosO\'(J/intL'f\'iL'ws/cbrk.html. For orher analyses of the prohlematic 
relationship between politicians and commanders, sce Derek S. Reveron, 
"Coalition \V'arfarc: The Commander's Role'\ De/rllse & Seclfrit'l' Analysis, 
\'01. 'j 8, no. 1, 2002, pp. 107-21; and Roger H. Palin, lvIulti1J<.1tio;w/ . 
Militan' Forces: Problems and Prospects, llSS: Adelphi Paper 194,1995. 
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loss of sovereignty by creating a web of guidelines, 
reservations and guarantees to make the loss of sovereignty 
more palatable, is central to the analysis presented in this 
report. 
One might be tempted to ask the question whether these 
challenges represent anything new? After all, NATO is by 
definition a coalition of states, planning has always been co-
ordinated under the auspices of the Alliance. But 
mulrinationality has now above all become a far more 
complex phenomenon than in the past. During the Cold War, 
Allied forces would be integrated at corps or air-force wing 
level."! The degree of nlultinationality varied, with the armies 
lagging behind the integration displayed in the navy and air 
force. Today, integration goes much further down, to 
battalion or air-squadron levels. The agreement reached at the 
NATO Summit in Prague in late September 2002 that NATO 
should establish a NATO Response Force composed of niche 
capacities offered by the member countries is an important 
.I 
step. 
The importance attributed to multinationality has triggered 
a wide range of transformations. Efforts are undertaken by 
clusters of countries to pool their research and development 
(R&D) resources and initiate joint procurement programmes; 
costs have increased and made it difficult to achieve the set 
targets unless projects include more than one country sharing 
the burden. This development raises a number of issues: what 
are the effects of joint command and control over the 
multinational units on the national scope of decision-making, 
how will the relationship between smaller and larger countries 
-1 Thomas, The Military Challellges o{Tral1sC1tial1tic C()dIi/ioIlS, p. ]0. 
i Scc Grzegorz Holdanowicz, "USA presses NATO to provide increased 
readiness forces",.!alle's Defcnce \Vcekl}', 2 October 1001, p. 4. NATO 
Secretary General Lord Robenson underlined that the new force, once 
established, would be "complementing but not duplicating or replacing 
other national and multinational capabilities for rapid military action". 
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within multinational units be affected, and finally how may 
this alter transatlantic relations? 
All the questions raised here have an impact on the combat 
efficiency of the multinational units. This is clearly the 1110st 
important issue. And it is an issue that deserves to be put more 
at the forefront of the debate than it has been in the past when 
multinational units were often formed as an expression of 
good neighbourliness (e.g. the Franco-German Corps) or for 
the diffusion of Western practice (Multinational Corps North-
East). Now focus has turned towards military relevance. In 
other words ro the principle that the countries in the coalition 
contribute skills or equipment the other participants value as 
an asset that will make a difference to combat efficiency. If 
not, the superpower may choose to "go it alone" and thus 
avoid having to take the concerns and needs of the smaller 
• • partners Into account. 
The predicament of the smaller partner 
The problems posed by multinational cooperation will appear 
very different to a larger power than to a smaller.' The 
analysis presented here will be biased towards the roles 
allotted to the smaller partners, and smaller should here be 
taken quantitatively as based on the size of the contingent 
participating in a multinational formation. Although there are 
examples where the contingents do not differ much iIl size, as 
a rule smaller countries send smaller Ilumbers. And this is 
easily a problem since similarity in size might provide a shield 
" This Concern is strongly present in ,Michelc Zanini and ./ennifer 1\401'risOIl 
Taw, The Arm}' and MU/finalimw! Force Compatibility, Sanea 1vlonic:1: 
Ibnd, :WOO. For an older .1I1d 1110re general presentation of US concerns 
OYel' Norwegian security and defence politics, see Richard A. Birzinger, 
DC11l11ilrk, Norway, aNd NATO; COl1straints alUl Clhl/lcHges, Santa .Monica: 
Rand,1989. 
- Sce Roben S. Jordan, Alliance Stmtegy and Napies, London: Pimer 
Publishers, 1990, especially ch. 4, "The American component of NATO's 
maritimc nuclear capacity", pp. 119-49. 
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for the small against constantly being overruled by the larger 
partner. "JVlight" is intentional since similarity is no guarantee 
against being relegated to the role of a minion. The larger 
countries have n1Qre experience in lTIultinationality, they have 
a larger pool of officers to fill command and control 
functions. Smaller countries will often lack these skills. That is 
unless they have pooled their men in peacetime and thus been 
able to gain the necessary experience in commanding large 
units. 
Quite another area is equipment. Here the smaller partner 
will often be forced to follow the preferences of the larger, 
since interoperablc cquipn1cnt is a precondition for 
cooperatiou. Moreover, the bigger partner is in an 
advantageol1S position when it comes to bargaining for a 
better price than the small will ever be. Numerous 
procurement deals have been signed whereby one small 
country has either bundled together with others of equal 
starure, or joined a larger ally to cut prices. But the underlying 
di fference in size emerges as a problem here as well. A smaller 
country may find it difficult to defend its interest in 
procurement matters when faced with the priorities of the 
larger memhers. 
This puts the smaller countries in a predicament since their 
relevance as partners, and thus the influence they will be able 
to exert over operations, will largely depend on the assets they 
bring with them. If these assets are small, already available, or 
in the worst case irrelevant, they cannot be exchanged for 
influence. Larger countries will usually have a greater variety 
of capacities to rely upon; top of the class is the US as the only 
country capable of undertaking large-scale operations on its 
own. Smaller cOllntries have less. This study will assess what 
the smaller countries do to increase their relevance, and how 
coalitions can enable them to "punch above their weight" and 
exert influence over decision-making. This is the reason why 
smaller countries want to joint. The former Norwegian 
Defence IVlinister Johan Jorgen Hoist once expressed it thus: 
Thev obtain access to deliberations from which thev \vould be 
. . . 
excluded in the absence of alignment, and they assume 
responsibility for the management of interests Jnd 
relationships that otherwise would prove elusive or beyond 
their influence. Alignment may increase the political clout that 
smaller countries can bring to bear in bilateral negotiations 
with adversaries or third parties, and it can help stiffen the 
back against intimidarion.-~ 
Another benefit is the fact that multi nationality makes it 
possible for smaller countries to maintain military capabilities 
they would have been unable to maintain on their own. This 
was the main reason why the Dutch agreed with Germany to 
establish the German-Netherlands Corps in 1995. Based on 
the experience of commanding the corps, Dutch officers are 
eligible for similar posts when a coalition is established. 
But if the Dutch morive for joining was capacity-based, the 
German was predominantly political.' The German 
government has used multinationality to avoid suspicions of 
nationalistic aspirations. The decision to set up NATO Corps 
North-East stationed in Szczecin together with Poland and 
Denmark should be seen from this angle. Multinationality is 
also a means to prevent the renationalisarion of the armed 
forces, i.e. to ensure that they can not be turned into tools of 
chauvinist politicians. This was the main reason for accepting 
Germany as a member of NATO in 1955 and Spain in 1982, 
and remains a valid explanation for the multinational units 
~ Johan jorgen Ho-1st, "Lillipurs and Gullivcr: Small States in Great~P()WCf 
Alliance", in GregofY Flynn (cd.), NATO's Nortbem Allies. The National 
Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, The Nethcrl,7Ilds and N01way, 
Torowa NJ.: Rowman & AlIanhcad, 1985, p. 261. 
., Martin FallSt, lktriebswirtschaji-liche Probleme mlfltillatioualcr 
Tnt/lpelltcile, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Vcriag, 2002, footnote 144, p. 
57. 
established with the participation of former Warsaw Pact 
members and NATO countries in the 19905. But at the same 
time multinationality opens up channels for information and 
influence. Germany may be referred to as the prime example. 
No other European country is so deeply involved in 
multinational units; to quote one observer, it pernlirs 
Germany to play on "three pianos - the national, the 
E cl I A I ."J<i 4 uropean an t le t antIc. ' 
Yet, a few more comments are merited on how difference in 
motives for joining may cause problems. One may assume that 
if the motives differ, the willingness to deploy the units in 
conflict will vary ;lS well. In any given crisis, the variolls 
members of a coalition will have different degrees of national 
interest at stake that will determine the strength and nature of 
their participation. Multinational units harbour the danger 
that one of the participants might choose to opt Out. The 
Belgian Parliament for instance has decided that Belgian 
servicenlen cannot take part in any operations in former 
Belgian colonies. The question then remains whether the 
multinational units will remain operational without Belgian 
participation? The Belgian reservation is a clear-cut case 
where the conditions for opting out are spelt out. The other 
countries may then have to consider the possibility of Belgium 
opting out. 
Far more difficult, and probably more prevalent, are the 
cases where these reservations are not spelt out beforehand. A 
country often mentioned as a possible case is Denmark. 
Danish politicians have repeatedly criticised Turkey over its 
poor human rights record. The question therefore emerges 
whether Denmark would assist Turkey in case of a crisis in 
IiJ Igor rvlitrofanoff, ,. L 'Eurocorps: mode d'emp!oi ", DdfcJlse llatioJlare, vol. 
48,·1992, no. 12, pp. 29-36, the quotation is taken from p. 30. For a survey 
of Germany's multifarious multinational milimry involvements, sce 
Fran~oise Manfrass-Sirjacqucs, "Allemagne: une mutation en profondeur", 
in Parrier Buffotor, Lt Dd(el1sc en Europe, NOltl1elles re.71itcs, Houuciles 
ambitions, Paris: La documentation Fran~aise, 2001, pp. 21-38. 
Turkish ](urdistan, either in the form of national uprising 
ernbracing Kurdish areas in adjacent countries, or an attack 
from Iraqi or Iranian territories. If not, for instance the 
Multinational Corps North-East would be prevented from 
going. Alternatively, Denmark may choose to support the 
mission while at the same time imposing a strict set of 
reservations. If so, the range of tasks the Corps would be 
permitted to undertake may be so narrow as to question its 
viability. 
Denmark is not unique. Disagreements between the 
contributors, especially Greece and Turkey, to ARRC (Allied 
Rapid Reaction Corps) have made both German and British 
observers wonder whether it will only be able to undertake 
peacekeeping missions in low-intensity conflicts." One may 
assume that a country will not participate in missions 
perceived as contradicting explicit national priorities." But 
this is foreseeable and poses less of a problem than the case if 
countries that might refrain from sending soldiers because the 
mission is perceived as too small or unimportant to warrant 
participation in what might cause a high number of casualties. 
This shows that multinationality is not only a matter of 
doctrine and increasing compatibility, but also represents a 
cultural watershed for many small members that have 
remained focused on territorial defence and may now find 
themselves engaged in armed conflict far away at short notice. 
Ir Coiin McInnes, The British Armyl.11/d NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, 
London: London Defence Studies, vol. "15, -1993, pp. 16,46; and Deurscher 
Bunclesrag, \Vissenschaftliche Dicnsre, Fachbereich II - Aus\vurriges, 
Inrernarionales Rechr, \X1ircschafrliche Zusammenarbeit, Deutsche 
Integration, Verteidigung: Erfabnmgel1, Probieme 1t11d Persl)ektil'cl1 
111ilitariscber Zltsammenarbeit i11 bi- IX::.tl!. mu/tindtiona/cl1 Gros5verhande11 
sei! 1990 in EHropa, Rcg.-Nr: \X1F II - 202/95, Ausarbcitung no. 26/96, 
Bonn 1995, p. 23 and 46. 
Il The Germ.ln debate on whether the country may send troops to Iraq 
under 11n UN-mandate should be taken as ;l sign that this threshold may be 
lowered in time, especially if the COStS in terms of loss of political relevance 
and in the case of Iraq economic conrracts is perceived as toO high. 
For larger countries with a history of expeditionary warfare, 
this is of course not a novelty. A key challenge is therefore to 
create mechanisms that allow one country to opt out without 
rendering the remainder impotent. 
So far, the problems confronting small countries have been 
focused on. Nevertheless, there are certain advantages 
attached to smallness that must not be overlooked." A smaller 
partner is less likely to harbour any ideas of grandeur and ipso 
facto leadership. What is sometimes euphemistically referred 
to as cultural differences when analysing French or Spanish 
attitudes to multinationality, may be taken as referring to 
cooperation problems stemming from their assumption that 
leadership will be transferred to them due to their size and 
military traditions. Two countries with these attitudes inside 
the same units is not a recipe for success. A smaller country is 
more likely to accept that the greater partners assume 
leadership commensurate with their contribution. \1(1hen it 
comes to multinationality, smallness may thus be synonymous 
with flexibility and pragmatism." 
The predicament of Norway 
The analysis presented here is not only hiased towards the role 
of the smaller countries, but towards that of Norway in 
particular. During the Cold War, Norway was in a 
strategically important position as one of the gatekeepers of 
the Atlantic. This made it possible for Norway to gain 
attention and play an important role in NATO." 
1\ In the extensive analysis of multinational force formations by Martin 
Fausr, smallness is always synonymous with disadvantage, cf. Fallst, 
Betricbsluirtscha(tliche Problcme 1111tltinatio1wler Tnt/J/,el1tei/e. 
H This point has frequently come up during interviews with Norwegian, 
German and US officers in rhe course of writing this study. 
i\ See Ro[f Tilrnnes and KjNil Skogrand, Fryktclls Iikeuekt. Atombo11liJell, 
NOl'ge og Vcrden 1945-1970, Oslo: Tiden, 2001; and Rolf Tamnes, 
IIJtegratiol1 and screening: The two (aces o( Norwegimz alliance policy, 
19~5-1986, Oslo: FBFS, 1986. 
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Reinforcement units were earmarked for operations in 
Norway in C<lse of a Soviet attack. Large Allied exercises were 
conducted at regular intervals. 
After 1989 this changed fundamentally. The improved 
relationship between the USA and Russia changed NATO 
fundamentally. Attention was transferred to security threats 
outside Europe. The fact that there was no longer the need to 
prepare for a massive attack from the east meant that less 
Allied attention was directed towards Norway. This was 
expressed in a reduced number of Allied exercises, a drop in 
the number of reinforcement units, and in the disbanding of 
Allied headquarters in Norway. Parallel to this development, 
the EU starred to chart out a future military role for itself. 
Here, Norway is a mere bystander. As a non-member, its 
ability to influence developments is at best limited. 
The increased emphasis within NATO on the demand that 
members should rely more closely On multinational units and 
develop the niche capacities these units need, has not been 
received without apprehension in Norway. The governments, 
irrespective of party colour, have tried to adapt to NATO's 
policies while at the same time retaining a national crisis-
management capacity. The relationship with Russia is not 
without problems despite the general improvement in political 
and economic relations. The Norwegian interpretation of the 
Svalbard Treaty of 1920 is challenged, as is the Norwegian 
interpretation of the legal status of the 200-mile zone and the 
continental shelf around Svalbard. The delimitation line 
between the two countries' economic zones in the Barents Sea 
has not yet been agreed, while at the same time the vast energy 
resources in the sea bed in this area remain untapped. Should 
a disagreement arise, it would be imperative for Norway to 
have military capabilities to cope with the challenges. The 
shared border with Russia, the vast sea areas under 
Norwegian jurisdiction and their large fishery and energy 
resources, all imply that Norway has to face a range of tasks 
that requires a variety of national military assets. This puts 
Norway in a special position compared to other European 
countries like for instance Belgium or the Netherlands. 
Most of the reasons compelling Norway to explore the 
potentia Is for multinational force formations differ little from 
what is the case in other European countries. In addition, 
there is another factor that weighs strongly in favour of 
multinational solutions. Should a major crisis occur in the 
north, however unlikely that seems today, Norway would be 
dependent on Allied support. The end of the Cold War meant 
that the strategic importance of Norway to NATO was 
drastically reduced. Participation in nlultinational units, and 
Allied training and exercises in Norway are undertaken to 
prepare for such support and hence to counteract the loss of 
. I ,. strategIc re evance. 
Progress and structure 
In the next chapter, a closer description of different forms of 
multinational force formations will be given. Common to all is 
the need to ensure cohesion. A precondition for cohesion is a 
common perception of the problems that have to be 
confronted and how they can be solved most efficiently. 
However, even when this is achieved the cohesion of the 
trOOps will be undermined if the equipment they bring along is 
nOt compatible. Compatibility has been a main concern for 
NATO since the beginning, and as will be shown considerable 
I'· These points have been repeatedly emphasised in official publications on 
the restructuring of Norwegian defence, c.g. SLme!d. no. 22 (1997-98), 
HOl'cdretllillgslilljer (or ForslIm'ets l!irksomhet og Iltl'iklillg i tidcll 1999-
1002, esp. 3.3.2 "Poliriske og militxre end ringer i NATO"; Sr.rneld. no. 38 
(1998-99), Tilpasl1ing at' FOl'sl'aret tif deltage/se i ilztenrasjollaie 
ojJerasjol1C1', esp. 2.4. '·!vU.lscrringer med deltagelse i inrernasjonaie 
operasjoner"; St.prp. no. 45 (2000-2001), Ol1lieggil1ge11 au Forsuaret i 
periodel1 2002-2005, esp. 4.3.2. "Alliert og internasjonalr 
forsvarssamarbeid"; and more indirecrly in St.mdd. no. 12 (2000-2001), 
Om Norge og Elll'Opa [fed IImgal1gcu tif et u)'tt Lir/Jlludl'e, esp. 9.5. "EU's 
rredjelandsforbindelscr - en stadig mer inregrerr del av FUSP". 
OUE SI:,::: FrI'.':.' )'l.LL? 19 
progress has been achieved. But in recent years, a new array of 
sophisticated technology has changed the way in which troops 
can operate. Not all countries will be able to apply this 
technology to the same extent. This will have a negative 
impact on compatibility. 
In chapter 3, attention reverts to the question of how 
multinationality affects the smalier partner, as exemplified by 
Norway. During the Cold War, the country's geostrategic 
location was an asset that could be used by the Norwegian 
authorities to gain support for their concerns. At the same 
time, cooperation with other Allied countries developed. 
International peacekeeping was another "rena involving 
cooperation with troops from other countries. In a Nordic 
context, peacekeeping gained growing importance, as a field 
where all the countries irrespective of their security policy 
differences could p{)ol their resources. This will be outlined in 
the final part of this chapter. 
The main topic of chapter 4 is burden sharing. During the 
Cold War, numerons attempts were made to redistribute the 
costs of Alliance membership. The American side claimed that 
the Europeans were engaged not so much in burden-sharing as 
in burden-shedding. Numerous books and articles have been 
written on this topic, the quantity is a reflection of the 
intensity and animosity that came to characterise the debate. 
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of terrorism 
as a new threat, much of what had been written was rendered 
obsolete. Yet, the basic problem of how to design a burclen-
sharing scheme that is perceived as fair by all participants 
remains valid. 
But the burden that is to be divided has changed. Whereas 
NATO forces during the Cold War were focused on the 
defence of Western Europe against a well-known attacker, the 
enemy is nOw very Jifferenr and he is confronted in countries 
outside Europe. This has raised a host of new questions, both 
concerning the skills and capacities needed for NATO to 
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remain militarily relevant, and the role smaller countries can 
play in the new force structures. This will be the topic of 
chapter 5. One might add that this task, which is complicated 
enough, would have been somewhat simpler if NATO had 
been left alone to dominate the stage. Militarily, this is very 
much the case, politically less so. In the course of the 19905, 
the European Union has assumed an increasingly distinct 
security role that has been seen by many on both sides of the 
Atlantic as a challenge to NATO. Attention here will not be 
on the political dimensions of this development but on the 
consequences this may have for burden-sharing. 
The study will end with a discussion over smallness and 
influence in military alliances. Based on the conclusions drawn 
here and on recent literature, an attempt will be made to 
answer when and how a smaller partner can matter. 
A final word of warning is apposite. This study will not 
contain any clear-cut recipe for what multinational formations 
should look like, or the most adequate strategy for small 
countries in such formations. As will be shown On the 
following pages, multinationality is a multifarious concept, 
varying according to the mission and the countries included. 
But once established, all the countries have to face how the 
formations can be run as smoothly as possible without 
compromising military efficiency. Yet, at the same time, each 
country is eager to retain as much national control and 
influence as possible. It is this balancing act that will be 
mapped out here. 
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Chapter 1 
Muhinationality: An Outline 
In this chapter, different aspects of !11ultinationality will be 
outlined. It will focus on the organisational modes of military 
units with particular attention to command functions, as well 
as on how multinationality affects national defence planning. 
A dilemma for all the countries involved is that 
l11ultinationality might boost military power, but it creates a 
web of interdependence that reduces the scope for national 
decision-making. This dilemma is particularly acute for 
smaller countries. Due to their limited resources, they wil! 
more often than not be the junior partner and thus be mOre 
on the receiving end of the decisions. Although this is nothing 
new, these problems have been considerably aggravated by the 
so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (henceforth RMA). 
This is where we start. 
The revolution in military affairs 
The concept "revolution in military affairs" has been defined 
by Andrew Marshal!, a specialist on military transformation, 
as: 
a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the 
innovative application of new technologies, which combined 
with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational 
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and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the 
character and conduct of milimry operations. If 
The new technologies 1\13rsh311 had in mind were above all 
those that facilitated the collection and distribution of 
information to soldiers in the battlefield as well as between the 
soldier and the decision-makers. Ideally, RMA makes it 
possible to transfer precise information in real time; and all 
the agents will be able to act within the same informational 
framework. This had already been pointed Out by Martin Van 
Creveld in his seminal book The Tral1sj{Jr11l<1tiOI1 of War.'" 
The key constituent of this transformation is, according to 
Van Creveld, information, its quality and its usage.'" 
Van Creveld could not have envisioned the rapid advances 
made in the application of computers to military operations. 
His focus was on the quality and usage of information. Much 
attention has been given to the hardware aspect of RMA. This 
is understandable not least since the choice of one system over 
another has a strong impact on interoperability. But the 
revolutionary quality is not so much the transmission of 
information, as how it is used. Even if the technology used is 
the most advanced and sophisticated available, the capacity to 
process the information, i.e. interpret and disseminate it, and 
then issne adequate instructions will remain the weakest link 
even in the case of one nation going to war with son1e of its 
own troops, i.e. when there are no linguistic or cultural 
barriers that must be crossed, and when cohesion may be 
I~ Andrew !vlarshall, RCl1oilltioll ill Militar), Affairs, Pentagon Paper, 
\X1ashington D.e.: Srran:gic Assessment Center, 22 August ]997, p. 'I. For 
an answer to \vhat RMA is and is not, sec Glenn C. BUl'han, "Force 
Projection: One-and~a~Half Cheers for the RMA", in Thierrr Gongora and 
Harald "on Rickhoff (eels.), TOluord .1 Reuolllfioll ;11 Military Allairs? 
Delellsc .1/1.1 Sewri!), al the DOIl'11 ol the Tl{'(,l1iy"First CCHtUfY, \X1esrport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 139-58. 
I~ l'vLutin Van Crcveld, The Trmls(Onlwlioll o( \\'far, New York: Free Press, 
J 99 J. 
,., Il "d 9 )[ . "' p. . 
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assumed to be stronger than in multinational formations 
where language proficiency is poor. It n13Y be of some cOIl1fort 
that even in nationally homogenous units, the application of 
new technology does not always yield the expected results. 
This was the conclusion drawn by a US Department of 
Defense's expert panel after assessing the impact of 
information technology on the US armed forces; according to 
their findings the capacity to digest the information received 
d . d' 1 '11 an act u pen It was 15m3.-
Ideallv, the information should endow the decision-makers 
in the comnland-chain with "dominant battle awareness", 
meaning that they will not only know what is actually going 
on at the very moment it occurs (real-time), but also increase 
their ability "to anticipate and counter all opposing moves. "" 
This is where one of the key problems of multinationality 
emerges: speed. For decision-making to be sufficiently rapid to 
be anticipatory in the sense understood above, the 
interpretation of the infotmation available must be relatively 
unanimous among the decision-makers. They must understand 
the quality of the information, its limitations, and they must 
have a clear undetstanding of the resources available and 
whether they are capable of countering "all opposing moves", 
or in other words they must have the ability to react flexibly. 
The change towards flexibility and speed has nowhere been 
more pronounced than in the case of the US military. Current 
conflicts require mobility, flexibility and sophisticated 
weaponry to support the men on the gtound. A precursor of 
this change was Vietnam, the Iraqi war of 2003 is another apt 
illustration. 
One of the lessons learned from the recent war in Iraq and 
its aftermath has been the value of network centric warfare 
(NCW), understood as the rapid exchange of information 
",j Kim Burger, "US must train 'thinking' troops",}dl1e'S Dt!{eJlcc \Vlle!.:I)" 13 
August 2003, p. 4. 
,-i Frederick \'\l, Kagan, "\Var and AfrennJrh", Polic)' Rt.'l'ic/l', IlO. 20, 2003. 
24 F:)R8V ... 1RSSTUDTEF. 312004 
between the soldier in the battlefield and his commander, and 
between regional headquarters and national authorities at 
home" r ... J to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of 
command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, 
increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronisation"." Iraq proved to be the war without a front. 
Arthur Cebrowski, former vice-admiral and director of the US 
Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation, 
observed that Iraq was the war without a traditional 
battlefield, with military actions conducted by small units 
relying on a constant flow of communication with 
headquarters. "You can't do a non-contiguous battlefield if 
vou are not networked", Cebrowski concluded." 
The United States has been the undisputed lead nation in 
this field. The US armed forces conceptual strategy for 
military transformation, The joint Vision 2010, and even 
more the revampedToint Vision 2020 underlines the 
importance of RMA for future warfare." RMA is seen as a 
major tool in the achievement of complete control of the war 
theatre, in the words of the text "full spectrum dominance". 
Although doubts have emerged over the extent to which RMA 
has transformed the US forces, in addition to the problematic 
impact it has on command, two further aspects are of 
relevance for this study. One is the fact that the European 
allies have so far lagged behind the US in the application of 
RMA innovations; there are political, institutional and 
economic reasons for this that will be discussed below. The 
~.! David S. Albcrts, John J. Garstka, ;,lOd Frederick P. Stein, Network Ct'1ltric 
\V,urare: Det'c/ofJil1g and Lel'eragillg Illforl1l11tioll SUjJeriorit)', \,,\lashington 
DC: DOD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999, p. 2. 
:1 "\'Xlhat went right?",jallc's DelcHce W/cekly, 30 April 2003, p. 21. "Non-
contiguous" rrfers to simultaneous attJcks executed by small, mobile 
groups. This is a common element in what is referred to as 'asymmetrical 
warfare'. See Christopher Coker, Asymmetrical \\'lar, IFS Info, no. 112001, 
Oslo: Instirurt for forsvarsstudier, 2001. 
!4 .lOtH! Vision 2020, \V'ashingron D.e.: US Government Printing Office, 
.June 2000. 
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second aspect concerns the problems created by differing 
technological levels for the national contingents making up 
the multinational units and how these differences can at best 
be ameliorated if not eliminated. Other differences cOntribute 
to what has been labelled "friction" in multinational units, i.e. 
linguistic and cultural barriers, national legal differences 
concerning the use of military means.'; This friction impedes 
cohesion. Different measures are undertaken to reduce the 
scope of this friction: e.g. joint exercises and education 
exchange. These measures will be discussed later. Here, 
attention will be turned to the hardware origins of friction, in 
other words the problems caused by equipment differences. 
Standardisation 
As mentioned in the introduction, for multinationality to be 
military effective soldiers must form a cohesive unit. This is 
impossible unless the equipment they carry with them into the 
battlefield at least is compatible, i.e. that the equipment 
although different, functions similarly without any negative 
effects. Cohesion would be boosred if the equipment were 
interoperable. liztero/Jerability has been defined as the ability 
of systems, units Or forces to provide services to, and accept 
information from other systems, units Or forces, and to use the 
information communicated to enable them to operate 
effectively together." Communication is not just a question of 
common language of command, but having computers that 
can exchange information without the need for cumbersome 
and time-consuming reprogramming. An even higher level is 
2; Friction is a concept deriving from Clausewitz' Vom Kriege, where it is 
defined as sudden and unexpected problems: '~Es ist allts im Kriege sthr 
einfach, aber das einfachstc ist schwicrig. Diese Schwierigkeiren haufen sich 
llnd bringe cine Frikrion hen'or, die si ch nicmand richtig vorstellt, clef den 
Krieg nichr gesehcn hat.", Carl \'011 Clausewitz, \'om Kriegc, Boon: 
Dummlcrs Veriag, 1990, p. 26l. 
2!. Joint Staff (1999), DoD Dictiollary of Alilitdr)' and Rdated Terms, 
\X!ashingron D.e.: Department of Dcfense. 
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reached when the equipment used is interchangeable. This is 
often the case in the NATO navies, where standardisation has 
made considerably more progress than has been the case on 
the army side, and this even includes multinational units like 
the German-French Brigade established in 1988 or the 
Eurocorps dating from 1993. In some cases, cOl1lmonality of 
the equipment is achieved. This is the case when the different 
participants use identical weaponry, computer programmes 
etc. In these cases, the friction caused by having different 
nations working together, will be minimal, nOt least because 
the operatOrs will use identical training manuals, often having 
been through the same schooling. 
The problems caused by insufficient standardisation have 
been well-known in NATO since the beginning of the 
Alliance. Consistent efforts have been made to level 
differences, but since procurement is a national responsibility 
success has been patchy. This is a problem since the 
technological differences between allies impede 
interopetability.2C This was one of the main conclusions drawn 
after NATO's campaign in Kosovo. Among the most serious 
was the lack of interoperable, high-volume secure 
communications. This hampered the ability to share 
information and process intelligence. The failure to do that 
created hostile feelings within the coalition, with some 
members claiming that vital information was being withheld. 
France openly criticised what they perceived as an indefensible 
US policy in this field. In the French white paper written after 
Operation Allied Force had been completed, the need to 
launch satellites for intelligence gathering thus enabling 
European forces to operate independently of US support, was 
underlined. The British lessons-learned report drew a similar 
conclusion. This points to the centrality of interoperable 
2~ For a full survey, sec John E. Peters et al., European Co1ttrilmtiolls to 
OI}(~rati()1I Allied ForcC'. implicatioJ1s {or Transatlalltic Cooperation, Project 
Air Force, Santa Ivlonica: RAND, 2001, pp. 56-69. 
communications. Achieving that has both a technical and a 
poJicy aspect. Technically, it is priIl1arily an economic and 
industrial question: what to acquire, at what price, and from 
whom. Policy-wise, the interoperability of communications is 
more tangled since it concerns which countries should be 
given access to information. This has not only been an issue of 
French dissatisfaction, but also of new NATO members. 
Poland and the Czech Republic failed for long to implement 
the necessary security procedures and were thus barred from 
receiving sensitive information long after their membership 
had been finalised. 
The Prague Capabilities Commitment agreed to by NATO 
in 2002 is an attempt to list the specific capabilities that 
should be developed to increase interoperability and t11US 
narrow the gap. But this is a costly task. To overcome the gap, 
the European allies are forced to explore new ways of pooling 
their research & development resources as well as industrial 
production capacity. This will inevitalby mean that even the 
countries with a large defence industry will find it difficult to 
maintain a large-scale defence industry serving national needs. 
One solution is to specialise. 
Specialisation 
Specialisation is often mentioned as one of the strategies that 
can be applied by the countries both to concentrate on areas 
where they have a comparative advantage, and thereby to 
spend the defence budgets more wisely. There has always been 
a degree of role specialisation within the Alliance. According 
to the decisions made at the Prague Summit, specialisation will 
be a cornerstone in the reforms of the Alliance in the years 
ahead. This will be discussed in greater deraillater.'s For the 
smaller countries, how far specialisation should be carried has 
been subjected to heated debates. Denmark is a case in point. 
>~ See, p. 144. 
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With the eastward expansion of NATO into the Baltic region, 
the need for a defence primed to resist an attacker 
disappeared. Instead, the Danish armed forces are in a process 
of developing niche capacities that make them into relevant 
partners for international missions." In a research report 
commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Defence, the 
conclusions are overwhelmingly in favour of developing niche 
capacities and disbanding the ideal of a balanced defence.'" 
According to the report, for a small country the alternative to 
assuming the role as supplier of a special capacity, may be no 
capacity at all. Due to the size of defence budgets and the 
number of Inen, the larger can afford to maintain a \vidcr 
range of capacities whereas the smaller are forced to choose. 
Once the choice is made, a reversal may he very difficult to 
achieve. The economic costs of reverting to a wider range of 
defence capacities may well be staggering, but so will the 
political consequences for a small country if it backtracks on 
its commitment to develop niche capacities. The result will be 
reduced willinguess to take into account the interests and 
concerns of the smaller countries. 
Another problem is that smaller countries might want to 
resist pressure fnr specialisation fearing that this might corner 
them with a responsibility for less attractive areas or capacities 
that they do not strictly need for other purposes. But it may 
increase their influence. A case in point was the decision by 
the Netherlands and Luxemburg to join Belgium and 
Germany in purchasing Airbus 4001vl transport planes. The 
Dutch plane was placed under German command and Belgium 
assumed responsibility for the one financed by Luxembourg. 
By purchasing the planes, the countries now have a capacity 
that allows them to exert influence. If operations will involve 
~" See the interview \virh IVlajor General Leif Simonscn, Commander Tactical 
Air Command Denmark, l.mc 's Defel1ce W/eekly, 18 December 2002, p. 32. 
He concludes that "Expeditionary operations are our raisnn d'2tre; if you 
cannot cope with that, you don't belong in the service." 
'" Ellchuus, MultiHa/io1lal So/uti()11s versus 1I1tnl-A/liallcc SfJecirJlisatioJl. 
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their planes, they will have to be consulted and present their 
conditions before a decision is reached. Similar considerations 
have certainly played an important part in the Danish decision 
of November 2003, to buy three Hercules transport planes 
from Hoeing. 
If specialisation means that capacities necessary for national 
crisis management arc rescinded, the country's dependence on 
its allies increases; but so does its vulnerability to military 
pressure. During the Cold War, when Alliance cohesion was 
strong this was less of a problem. Today, when the members 
are more likely to pursue their national interests, paying less 
attention to the impact on Alliance unity, relying on assistance 
from allies may be perilous. This does not imply that 
specialisation should be rejected. Norway's situation 
undoubtedly makes this problem more acure than what is the 
case in, say, the case of Denmark, bur the opposition to 
extensive specialisation in other, larger, countries deviates 
little from the arguments presented here." 
For larger countries, specialisation might also be an 
unattractive option since it will mean an end to independence, 
albeit a costly and possibly technologically obsolete 
independence. That being said, the incentives should not be 
overlooked. The most obvious, concerning cost, has already 
been mentioned. In addition, specialisation might lead to 
increased demand. If a member concentrates its resources into 
the development of a special kind of equipment, and does this 
cheaper and better than its partners, it will gain a foothold in 
markets that might otherwise have been closed. If successful, 
the enterprises will be left with a healthy profit. It will also 
mean that other countries become dependent on their 
products, and dependence means influence. This is 
,\I For a survcy of the German debate in the wake of Defence Minister 
Struck's January 2004 Buodeswehr reform proposal, sec Jens Kriiger and 
Giinrher Lachmann, "Strucks \X'elrstreitmacht", W'elt am SOl1lltag, 18 
January 2004. 
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particularly attractive for a small counrry constantly on the 
lookout for ways of diminishing the drawbacks that comes 
with size. But as earlier mentioned, specialisation carries with 
it increased dependence on other countries for capacities that 
have been disbanded. 
A country with a large industrial base and a 
correspondingly large research and development sector will 
find it easier to develop new products meeting new needs than 
a smaller one. Research also indicates that the degree of state 
patronage plays an important role. E France is the prime 
example of an armaments sector consisting of huge industrial 
conglomerates that have thrived on etatist protectionism with 
correspondingly large problems once this protection was 
removed. Moreover, the degree to which the enterprise 
produces goods not only destined for the defence sector, i.e. 
dual-use goods, is an important indicator. If dual-commodities 
loom large in the production, these enterprises tend to be 
more flexible in their adaptation to new needs." This has been 
a particularly prominent feature in the development of new 
products for the defence sector resulting from RMA, e.g. 
computer technology. Here, the size of the country, or indeed 
the firm, plays a lesser role. 
Scientific and industrial cooperation 
Since its inception, NATO initiated several large, 
multinational projects aimed at modernising members' 
equipment as well as developing new capabilities. 
Cooperation between the countries was regarded as desirable. 
The idea was that by joining efforts, costs would go down and 
national differences could more easily be levelled. Cost 
\! See Claude Serfati (ed.), The Restructuring of Ellropean Defence Industry: 
Dynamics of Change, Luxembourg: European Commission, DirectOrare 
General for Research, 2001, 
;] Sec Jordi !vlollas-Galbrr, "Coping with dual-use: a challenge for European 
reseilrch policy", jOllrJI,d of C0111111011 Market Studies, 2002, 40 (1), pp. 
155-65. 
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concerns also played a role when two or more countries 
decided in favour of joint procurement of new products. 
Acquisition remained ,1 national responsibility. But NATO 
played a coordinating role through the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and its subordinate 
organs. In fact, NATO contained a plethora of coordination 
committees covering every stage from the identification of 
problems, to research and development. Common to all of 
them was that every member had a seat, a direct channel for 
information and influence. 
NATO provided financial assistance for scientific and 
technological cooperation between the memhers. In 19.57, the 
NATO Committee on Science and Technology was 
estahlished. At regular intervals, NATO colloquia were 
arranged to let scientists present their findings. Norwegian 
scientists participated regularly. NATO funded research 
projects conducted in Norway. The member countries 
contributed financially to the committee. The Norwegian 
share was small, in the order of 1 and 2 per cent of all 
contributions. This did not impair Norwegian scientists' 
chances of benefiting from the scholarships handed out. 
It is necessary to dwell upon the role played by scientific 
innovation for "orway. As a small country, it would often 
find that Alliance bureaucratic procedures were cumbersome, 
and that there was considerable conservatism within NATO 
and thus reluctance to accept new ideas." Participation in 
projects launched by the Alliance provided access to new 
technology and the possibility of participating in technological 
development that might otherwise have been beyond reach 
due to insufficient domestic technological know-how and 
funds. The impact on the development of a Norwegian nOn-
J.I Sce Olav Njolstad ilnd Ola\' \Vickcn, f\.U111lSkdjJ s()m ud/Jcn. Po,-suarets 
POl'sknil1gsinstitutt 1946-1975 (Knowledge as \Veapon. The Nonvegian 
Defence Research Establishment "1946-1975), Oslo: T ano~Ascheh(lllg, '1.997, 
pp. 363-70. 
military high-tech industry has been considerable. An 
alternative would then have been to ilnporr the technology in 
question at high costs. The decision taken in the late 1970s to 
develop a satellite-based radio positioning/navigation system 
known as NAVSTARlGPS is a case in point. For Norway, this 
was a project of the utmost importance. But due to the 
prohibitive costS involved, domestic plans had been sralled for 
years. In the end, the project was financed almost entirely by 
the US." Numerous other projects received US funding. The 
sums varied greatly from year to year. In the 1960s especially, 
US and NATO allocations often made up more than a third of 
the total budget of the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, the main centre for armaments development in 
the country.3b 
In 1970, NATO set up the Committee on the Challenges of 
Modern Society. The basic idea was that this forum should 
look into new societal problems traditionally outside the focus 
of the Science Committee. Among these were environmental 
disasters such as floods and earthquakes, pollution, labour 
conditions, and the influence of science on decision making. 
As is evident from this brief listing, the military component 
was difficult to identify. But the list shows an interest in issues 
of clear relevance to security in the wider sense. Norway 
participated in several projects. Results varied from success to 
total failure with the original plans scrapped. Here, a detailed 
account of the different projects will not be given, but some of 
the problems emerging from multinational procurement and 
industrial cooperation for Norway will be pointed Out. 
The positive consequences are more easily and rapidly 
summed up than the negative ones. Cooperation has 
constituted a channel for innovation for the enterprises 
E St.meld. no. 11 (1979-80), Om samarbeidet i Atl£1nlerhaus!Jaktcns 
orgmlisasjo}1 i 1978, pp. 23-24. 
)" The highest share \\'as reached in 1965 with 65.5 per cent, cf. Njolsrad 
and \\licken, KWl11skap S01l1 t'dpel1, p. 503. 
involved. It has often led to spin-off projects not necessarily 
related to defence cOntracts. F Judging from the material 
available, it seems as if Norwegian participation has been 
confined to the role of sub-contractor to the larger enterprises. 
The small size of Norwegian defence enterprises accounts for 
this. 
Cooperatiol1 verslls national protection 
The lack of cross-country industrial cooperation has 
repeatedly been singled out as a major culprit of inefficient 
spending." Pressure for liberalising this sector has been 
forthcoming both from defence experts, industry ,lnd 
politicians. A brief outline of the problems may explain why 
this has become such a topical issue. 
Political protection of national defence industries has 
resulted in duplication of R&D efforts with several countries 
channelling resources to solve relatively similar problems. The 
enterprises need not pay attention to what their colleagues in 
other countries do as long as they can rely on their own 
defence sector to purchase the final product. \'(Iith demand 
largely defined by national needs, production cycles will be far 
shorter than if the market were larger. Shorter production 
cycles mean higher unit costs. Keith Hartley, a renowned 
defence economist, has calculated that if European 
procurement were done purely according to market criteria, 
i.e. without paying any heed to national industry, savings 
would range between 10 and 17 per cent of total defence 
expenditure." Needless to say these sums represent a sizeable 
)- Ivar Stokkc, "!vJulrinasjonaie forsvarskontraktc['\ Norsk Militrert 
Tidsskri(t, no. 12, pp. 487-89. 
t~ There is a wealth of iircrarure on this mpic, nevertheless, Keirh Harder 
and Stephcn I\'iartin, "Evaluating Colbborarivc Programmes", Defence 
Ecollomics, no. 4, 1993, pp. 195-211, remains a methodological milestone. 
1" Keirh Hartley, "A Single European !vIarket for Defcnse Procurement", 
University of York, unpublished briefing, October 2000. 
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and welcome source of additional funding, were they ever to 
n1aterialise. 
Smaller countries are confronted with yet another problem 
originating in size. In most, if not all major contracts for 
import of armaments, considerable attention is given to offset 
agreements. The Norwegian Parliament has decided that "In 
·1 f'· I· I""'TI specla cases, () ,set reqUIrements can Je WCllvec. 1ese 
requirements specify how mllch the seller will purchase from 
the buyer to offset the total costs. Offset agreements may also 
specify that the seller llse part of the sum paid on investments 
in the country importing the armaments. Offset is often 
decisive when foreign companies cOlnpete for a contract. A 
generous offset agreement may also come in handy for a 
government facing parliamentary opposition to a costly 
procurement agreement. Bur once signed, the offset part is not 
always implemented as agreed. In Denmark, unfulfilled 
counter-purchase obligations had reached a total of DKK 6.3 
billion in 2003." There, the goveroment decided to set up a 
state fund that would coordinate the different offset contracts 
and provide assistance for the foreign companies in their quest 
for a Danish partner firm. These efforts proved to be in vain. 
In 2003, the government decided to close the fund." 
Failure to adhere to the contract is not the only problem of 
offset agreements. Armaments producers may also be in a 
position to leave a strong imprint on the offset agreements, 
not always to the liking of the importing country. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable determination in many 
of the smaller countries to maintain offset agreements in some 
"1 Sr.prp. no. 55 (2001-2002), Gje11l1ol1l(oril1gspro/Josisjollcll-ut(yllellde 
i'.111111U!1" 101' ol1lleggil1gm dl' Forsl'l-1ret i fJeriodcll 2002-2005. 
,jl Max StougJard, "!vlodkobsaftaler s:trammes", ]),lImldspostcn, 8 
September 2003. 
-!! Thomas Dodd, "Denmark forced to scrap arms-\'cnture fund",1mlc's 
Defence \Veekl)', ] 3 August 2003, p. 20. 
form." Offset agreements may be instrumental in keeping 
national industrial know-ho\v alive, but this comes at a price. 
Both in Norway and Denmark, economists and politicians 
have claimed that offset is expensive, leading to a final price 
between 3 and 7 per cent higher than would have been the 
case if the purchases had been made with no strings attached. 
Few have disputed these figures; indeed, the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance proffered them ,1S an argument in favour 
of moving away from offset agreements in the future. H But 
this was countered by pointing to the strategic implication of 
offset for Norwegian industry. It enabled Norwegian 
producers to gain access to know-how and foreign markets. 
Moreover, offset agreements made it possible to retain a 
domestic pool of experts that could be drawn upon when 
procurement was planned and foreign contracts negotiated.<5 
\V'ithout the technical know-how domestic experts could bring 
to the negotiating table, the smaller country would have been 
in a far weaker bargaining position. This should be borne in 
mind when reading estimates such as the one referred to by 
Keith Hardey above. 
Offset is by no means an arrangement peculiar to smaller 
countries. Most countries apply them, with the US as the 
notable exception, The American policy towards offset 
agreements is negative and US administrations, irrespective of 
party colour, have worked to have them dismantled. 
European countries have pointed to the fact that the US 
armamentS market is in practice closed to the olltside, and this 
is not only due to lack of European competitiveness, but US 
4: Sce below, p. 13 for the problems [he snuB countries face within the EU 
on this point . 
.. ~ Those arguing against offset drew upon Kjell A. Eliasscl1 and ~-1arkus 
Skriver's brief comparative study of \X'esr European approaches: EU1'ojJeml 
Defence Procurement mId Jlldflstr!.ll Polic)': A cOl11lJaratiuc 6 cOllntries 
analysis, NorweglJI1 School of Managemem, 2002. 
4\ See "Gjenkjop mu brukcs srraregisk", Norsk Milita!rt Tidsskri/t, no. 10, 
2002, pp. 4-6. 
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import restrictions as well. As long as this is the case, offset 
will prevail. 
Although offset may be a disincentive, the attraction for 
larger countries to enter into an industrial cooperation with a 
smaller country may be the question of niche capacity, i.e. the 
smaller partner possesses highly specialised skills and 
production capacities the larger partner does not. Another 
issue at stake is procurement. The smaller country will make 
procurement commitments that will reduce the cost price of 
each item. This has a beneficial effect on all the participants. 
But it also means that the entire venture becomes very sensitve 
to each country living up to its comn1itment. If not, the costs 
will increase and the final bill will easily be quite a different 
one. This is another example of how multinational 
cooperation means reduced budgetary autonomy in that 
reductions in one country are immediately felt in others. 
A further factor influencing cooperation is ownership. 
Privately owned enterprises are in general more focused on 
adapting to meet market needs; they are also in general more 
innovative than state run firms. This means, that privately 
owned enterprises are more prone to enter into close 
cooperation with counterparts operating under similar 
conditions. Especially in Europe, privately owned armaments 
producers have been quite dexterous in their ability to join 
forces and promote their causes at the European level." The 
fact that they have chosen to do that at the European level 
should be taken as an indication of the need to distinguish 
between the political and the industrial level nationally. It 
would be misleading to assume that politicians automatically 
back cross-country cooperation. Industrial interests might 
favour a deeper, and perhaps different form of multinational 
cooperation than the politicians, but this might be a form that 
would sever the close linkage between state and industry, and 
4_" Sce below, p. "134. 
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therefore alter, diminish or remove political tutelage from 
industry. 
Ownership over European defence industry is being 
transformed with the state playing a less prominent role as 
direct owner. Different ownership modes are being explored, 
all aimed at making the enterprises less dependent on direct 
transfer from the public coffers. Whether state-owned or not, 
the state remains the largest customer with national defence at 
the receiving end. As will be pointed out later, this new-found 
freedom has been used to form larger units through mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Organisation modes 
As shown above, multinational cooperation confronts smaller 
countries with some uncomfortable choices, they will have to 
forfeit a wide range of products in favour of concentrating on 
key specialities that might be marketed with success. The 
alternative to this kind of niche production will often in the 
long run be no production at all. 
This is in fact no less different from the factors compelling 
countries to search for ways of joining their units together. 
Cost is important here as well, and so is rhe fact that the end 
of conscription means less manpower. For the smaller 
countries this has had drastic consequences in that their ability 
to set up sizeable national units, and train the officers in the 
skills needed to command them, is effectively removed. This 
means that these officers will be precluded from holding 
command posts over larger Allied units . .tYlultinationality 
solves this by letting smaller units from several countries be 
pooled together. But as in the case of industrial cooperation 
and specialisation, multinationality means less national 
autonomy. This is reflected in the way multinational units are 
organised. 
Yet, national concerns are just one factor with an impact on 
organisation, another is cohesion. Cohesion depends to a large 
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extent on <1 COI1l1110n interpretation of the situatiOll 
irrespective of national background. Cohesion is necessary if 
the unit is to respond flexibly to a crisis. This was very much 
at the forefront of the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept: 
to ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play 
an effective role both in managing crises Jnd in countering 
aggression against any AIlY1 they will require enhanced 
flexibility and l110bility and an assured capability for 
augmentation when necessary.·)1 
But in the Strategic Concept passed eight years later, the tone 
had changed away from the somewhat conjectural "can play" 
and "when necessary" towards more fo[ceful 1 conclusive 
formulations: 
Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational 
and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will 
include controlling, protecting and defending terrirnry; 
ensuring the unimpeded use of sea 1 air, and land lines of 
communication I ... ] and provide effective and flexible 
command and control facilities, including deployable 
combined and joint headquarters. 4s 
This was a reflection of the security changes, and the increased 
likelihood that these troops would be deployed to coumer the 
new threats militarily. 
To do that, the new concept underlined the need for 
"flexible command" :., This was not coincidental. A fregllemiy 
;- The Alliancc 's Ncw Slrategic COllecl}t, Press Communique S-1 (91 )85, 
Brussels, NATO Press Service, 7 November 1991, point 47. Emphasis 
added. 
4" The Allimw.!'s Slfdtegic C()llcept, Press Communique, NAC-$(99)65, 
Brussels, NATO Press Service, 24 April 1999, point 59. 
I" Definition of NATO command authorities: Opemticmc1/ C011l111<11UI: The 
authority grcHlted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to 
subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to rct,lin 
or delegate operational ,md/or mctiC:ll control as mar be deemed necessary. 
It does nor of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. 
invoked point serving either as criticism or explanation for 
shortcomings in NATO efforts to create nudtinntionnl forces, 
is the lack of flexible command structures. The security 
scholar Thomas-Duffell Young refers to this problem as 
perennially "vexatious" in his analysis of why NATO's 
attempts to create multinational land forces were so half-
hearted during the Cold War.'" 
Young's point has been supported elsewhere. Indeed, in the 
course of this study, how to marry multinationality with 
effective command was repeatedly pointed Out as a difficult 
topic, and one where the practical solutions often had to be 
devised in the field." There are notable exceptions, especially 
on the naval side. But when looking at multinational army 
units established during the Cold War ,1J1d even well into the 
1990s, factors other than preparing the men for combat under 
a multinational leadership were at the forefront. Often the 
!vby also be llsed to denote the forces assigned to a commander. 
OpcratiOJh1! control: The authority delegated to a comm;1nder to direct 
forces assigned so chat the commander may accomplish specific missions or 
casks which arc usually limited by function) time, or locationj to deploy 
units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control EO those units. Tt 
does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of 
the units concerned. Neither does it, of Itself, include administrative or 
logiSTic control. 1~1ctical COI1111Ii:lJld: The authority delegated to a 
commander ro assign tasks to forces under his command for rhe 
accomplishmenr of the mission assigned by a higher authority (this concept 
is nOt been given a separate heading in the 2001 Glossary, despite rhe fact 
char "tactic11 command" is used repeatedly when command and control 
terms are defined. The definition here is taken from NATO Glossary of 
Terms and Dclil1itioHs, Brussels: NATO, 1995). 7:u:liml cOlltrol: The 
detJiled and, usually, local direction and conrrol of movements or 
manoeuvres necessary (() accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (Source: 
NA TO"Russi,l Glossary of CO}}tclIl/Jormy Politic(r/ and Anlitar)' T ('rillS, 
Bru"el" NATO. 2001.) 
;" Thomas-DUfrel Young, "Post-Cold \\?ar NATO Force Structure Planning 
and the Vexatious IS~LJes uf !v1l1ltinarional Land Forces", in Gusta\, Schmidt 
(ed.), A History of NATO: tile First Fifty Ymr..;, Houndmills: P,llgrav(', 
2001. pp. 197-217. 
\j Interview with Oberstleutnanr c.P. I-linz, Bundcsll1inistcriull1 fijr 
Verreidigung, Berlin, November 2002. 
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prime reason was to demonstrate good neighbourliness, e.g. 
Franco-German Corps, the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion; or to 
diffuse western methods, e.g. the l'vlultinational Corps North-
East. Based on a set of European examples, three of the most 
representative multinationality forms are identified as based 
on lead-nation, integration or framework principles. Under 
each heading, key characteristics are presented." 
Lead-nation principle 
One country, the lead nation, makes the largest contribution 
of manpower, i.e. the largest combat units. The other 
countries will draw upon the lead-nation's auxiliary functions, 
and they will be responsible for supplying services like 
engineers, military police, medical support etc. They can also 
be vested with operational command over units. Officers from 
the other countries may be attached to the staff, either 
permanently or on an exchange basis, virtually all positions of 
importance are held by the lead nation. However, in case of 
crisis the number of non lead-nation officers attached to the 
staff will be increased. 
Equipment will be subject to national priorities. In none of 
the examples usually classified as belonging to the lead-nation 
category do all the participants have identical equipment. In 
peacetime, the units will exercise together with rotation 
schemes for officers implemented. But the units remain under 
national command. Only when a crisis emerges will 
contingents from the participants be subjected to the 
operational control of the lead nation. But the delegation of 
command authority will be closely linked to the character of 
the mission. National authorities will, as a rule, attach a 
i~ This division corresponds w the one ourlined in Multi11atio11alitat, Das 
Eurokorps, Bonn: Bundesminisrcriurn clef Vertcidigung, 1996; and the one 
adhered to by i\1artin F;1Usr in Betriebswirtscha(tliche ProblclIlc 
1JlultiJlathmdler TrupPcllteilu, pp. 46-47. For another, albeit not too 
dissimilar categorization, sec Ellehuus, Multinational Solutions ucrSllS JlltrLl-
Alliallce Specialisatiol1, pp. 18-20. 
stricter set of rules to their soldiers' participation in combat 
operations than to peacekeeping. 
Multinationality remains therefore rather limited. This is 
also why some experts either refrain from mentioning this 
type, or at best only cursorily. During interviews, some were 
surprised that this was classified as multinationality.1l 
Nevertheless, ti,is waS for a long time the most common form 
of multinationalit), within NATO, and one may therefore 
claim that it has served as the starting point for more 
profound forms of multinational integration. However, it 
would be wrong to give the impression that this mode of 
organisation is a thing of the past. There arc several ex~unples 
of multinational units organised along the lead-nation 
principle. Among them are the II German/US Corps, and the 
5th US/German Corps. The intentions behind the 
establishment of these corps were above aU political, to tie the 
US Army to Germany. 
Lead nation 
Co;:{)s 11 Germall'US (Corps 1I CElUS) 
Established April 1993. 
Headquarters Uim, Germany. 
PnrriciD<1nt o:1tions GermanY, USA. 
Ministerial The leadership of the Corps is German. Agreements 
moniroring: are revised jointlv every second year. 
Org-anis<1rion Senior command positions almost exclusively Ger-
man. In peacecime, .5 US officers and :J junior officer 
are members of the staff. In caSt' of crisis, the US COfl-
tim!encr is increased. \Xlorking larwual'e is English. 
Command Structure In peacetime, all units arc subject to national 
command. If deployed, Germany assumes operational 
control over the US division. Logistics and medical 
assistance are divided alon)! l1ationallines. 
Standardisation of Uneven, but strong efforts to increase the level of 
cauioment inccroDerabiiity undertaken. 
H One said in surprise "But this is the way we have always done it, it's 
nothing special". If nothing else, this attitude is an indication that 
multinationatiry has become deeply ingrained. 
Integratio11 principle 
Here, multinationality permeates both staff and the troops. 
Command positions will usually be divided according to the 
size of the countries' contribution of soldiers in order to 
approach a proportional balance, exchanges of officers are 
well organised to familiarise them with the national 
procedures of the other participants. The general in charge 
assumes operational command in peacetime. Operational 
command means that the commander has the power to 
formulate the mission statement. He also has the authority to 
reallocate and reorganise the contingents under his command 
as well as to decide on which measures should be taken to 
achieve a defined target. 
But multinationality stops short of issues pertaining to pay, 
social security, leave, and the legal basis for troop 
deployment. These issues remain subject to national politics. 
This mal' seem like minor details, hur when questioning 
officers, as well as going through the material available, rhese 
issues are readily seized upon as irritating sources of friction. 
The lack of progress in these rather petty areas may also 
reflect a degree of reluctance within the armed forces against 
having been forced to engage in multinationality by what they 
perceive as zealous politicians. This seems ro have been the 
case with some of Great Britain's multinational commitments 
where the military leadership has criticised multinational units 
for their failure to perform as cohesively and efficiently as 
I . 1 q pure y natlona ones. 
Examples of multinationalllnits organised according to the 
integration principle are the Eurocorps, the 1st German-Dutch 
Corps, and the Multination Corps North-East. 
q Sce Palin, All1ltillatiOlw! Military Forces; Fausr, RctriebsU'il'tsch .. 7(tliche 
ProblcJ1Ic lIllfltil1<.ltiol1l1!er TntfJfJl!lllcilc, pp. 70-71; for an earlier, bur 
poignant criticism sce Colin !vlclnncs! The British Arm)' and NA TO's Ra/)id 
Rmctioll Corps, London Defence Studies, no. 15, 1993, p. 28. 
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The 1st German-Netherlands Corps is an example of 
multinational integration that has proceeded quite 
successfully. National differences are manageable, the style of 
command broadly similar. The Corps contains virtually what 
is left of the Dutch army and due to the organisation of 
command presented in the figure below, this means that the 
German Heeresinspekteur (army inspector) has close to full 
command over the Dutch army. But political perceptions 
differ on what the role of the corps should be. Before the 
corps assumed command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul in early 2003, the German 
side waS particularly apprehensive about any efforts to extend 
the mandate of the mission outside Kabul or pressure from the 
US side to prolong the deployment. In the end, Germany 
agreed to let its contingent assume responsibility for the city of 
Kundus area outside the Afghan capital. s; 
{i The mOSt norc\Vorrhr point in this decision \VJS perhaps the German 
Minister of Defence Peeer Struck's Jrgul11cllt thJt Germany's security was 
defended at the foor of rhe liindukush. 
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Integration principle 
1st German-Netherlands Corps (DfNL Corps) 
Established August 1995. 
Headquarters Ivlunster, Germany. 
Participant Germany, the Netherlands. 
nations 
Ivlinisterial Permanenr bi-national committee. 
monitoring 
Organisation Headquarters have 300 positions, not all arc permanently 
filled. Senior positions rotate every second year with one 
nation contributing commanding general, head of press 
and information, and some of the staff officers; the other 
country will fill the deputy commander's position, chief of 
staff, and the officers in charge of the command suppOrt 
I )!fOUp. \X'orking language is Endish. 
Command In peacetime, the German Army Inspector and the Dutch 
Structure general in charge of the army have joint command over the 
corps, bur the commanding general has considerable 
autonomy in the fields of training, exercises and logistics, 
medical assistance. In case of \\'ar, ench country can 
withdr.1\v its contingent for national defence. 
Standardisation Uneven. 5,· 
of equipment 
Framework principle 
Here, one country is responsible for command 1 administration and 
logistical support, making up the cadre for the 111111tinationalllnit. 
For this reason, it will also fill mOst of the staff positions. Procedures 
within the sraff will be conducted according to guidelines decided by 
NATO Or along the SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) 
compiled by the framework nation. The other contributing countries 
will fill a defined number of staff positions according to an agreed 
key. In contrast to the integration principle, there is no fixed 
relationship between the size of national contributions and the 
number of staff positions or who fills which positions. 
<" Nevertheless, this was never referred to as posing much of problem by any 
of my German interviewees. \Vhen asked about compatibility problems, 
they would as a rule point to the Franco-German Brigade. 
ONE SIZE FITS ALL? 45 
F k . I ramcwor i: pnnClp c 
ACE Rapid Reaction Cor s (ARRC) 
Est;tblished October J 992. 
Ready for deploymenr April 1995. 
Headquarters Rheindalen, Germany. 
Participant nations Belgium, Canada, Denmark, German}', Greece, Iraly, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Britain, 
United States. 
.Ministerial monitoring Annual conferences with senior MoD officials, Senior 
Resources Conunittee. 
Organisation The commanding general is British. Of the approx. 400 
positions in the headquarters, the British contingent 
makes up approx. 6"0 per cent, US and Germany 8 per 
cent each, Italy and the Netherlands 5 per cent each, 
\','irh the remaining 14 per cent divided among the 
remaining 8 nations. The headquarters form a permanent 
core element; the different units assigned to ARRC can 
be called upon ad hoc to face ,1 crisis. 
Command structure In peacetime SACEUR has operational command over 
ARRC Headquarters. If deployed, operational command 
is transferred to the divisions. 
Srnndardisatioll of Uneven 
equipment 
The divisions above should not be exaggerated. Research 
indicate that even in multinational staffs organised along 
other lines than the lead-nation principle, the country 
contributing the most advanced equipment, the largest 
contingent of men, will often be in charge at alllevels.s7 This is 
especially the case with a large US contribution, and notably 
even when the US officers in charge explicitly want to avoid 
an '~americanisation" of the comn1and structure.5S The factors 
contributing to this development are not difficult to find: the 
US will often be the most experienced, and this is a highly 
prized asset. Moreover, if the technology gap is forbiddingly 
,,- Sce \\;ralter E. Kretchik, "lvlultinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace 
Operations: The Case of the US Army and UNi\:lIH, 1994-1995", Armed 
Forces .md Society, Spring 2003, pp. 393-413. 
fA Ibid. 
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high, this will mean that US soldiers will be in charge of 
handling inforn13tion. Unless this commodity is shared 
equally, one counrry's monopoly will rapidly become a grave 
source of friction. 
The units' ability to react quickly to an emerging crisis 
depends on the participant nations commitments. The 
problems raised by a country's access to opting out from a 
multinational unit will be touched upon in greater detail 
later." Suffice it to state that this problem is the least in the 
case of the lead nation because multinational integtation is 
rather limited, and the lead nation retains most, if not all the 
key functions. A political blockade will have a much greater 
impact on the ability of units to react quickly if they are 
organised in accordance with the framework or integration 
principles. 
Such a political blockade may be the result of legal 
differences. This is a topic that has been discussed relatively 
little in writing, although it will often be mentioned as a 
potential obstacle when units are to be deployed:'" Countries 
differ as to how fast their troops can be deployed, Particularly 
cumbersome is the German parliamentary procedure requiring 
a recommendation from the defence commission followed by 
a plenary debate, This proved to be a serious impediment 
during the wars in Yugoslavia, barring a quick response from 
any contingents involving German soldiers." 
The ability to react quickly may also be impeded by the 
carefully-wrought command arrangements. The 1st. German-
Netherlands Corps is a good example (table 2), The equal 
position enjoyed by the German army inspector and the Dutch 
\., See below, p. 117. 
,~\ Faust touches upon it in Betriebsll'irtscha/tliche Prob/eme 1Jlllftinaticmaier 
TntfJpeJlt£~ile, pp. 77-79. 
d Jcffrey S. Lanris has appropriately entitled his chapter on the German 
response to the developing crisis in Yugoslavia" Diplomacy and Delay", See 
Llmis, Strategic Dilemmas mId the Euo/uthm ol GermaJl Foreign Policy 
since Unificaticm, \Vestport: Pracger, 2002, pp. 79-106. 
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general means that in the case of any disagreement between 
the two, a harmonisation meeting ITIUst be called by the t\vo 
countries' defence lninistries, this is a tin1e-consuming 
procedure. The Eurocorps has even greater potential for 
complete stalemate due to the high number of participant 
nations.'" Here, the commanding general gets his orders from 
a committee consisting of not only delegates from the foreign 
and defence ministries from the participant nations, bur also 
members of parliament. 
A more serious problem for multinational units is the legal 
differences separating the countries. There are clear differences 
as to what soldiers from one COllntry can do compared to 
others. This has to be solved prior to deployment. Within 
NATO, it has been customary to work out a common 
Ivlemorandum of Understanding the participatory countries 
have to agree to before troop contributions are made. That 
does nor mean that the memorandum will level all national 
differences. For instance, the NATO-led Implementation Force 
(IFOR) deployed in Bosnia in 1995 consisted of units with 
very different rules of engagement depending on their 
nationality. This waS solved practically by issuing each and 
everyone with a "Soldier's card" specifying what he was 
permitted to do. 
National differences also apply to standing multinational 
units training together in peacetime.'" \Xlhen questioned about 
what problems multinationality brought with it, German 
officers would mention seemingly insignificant differences like 
how damages and casualties are to be financially covered and 
by whom; labour protection; environmental damage; 
disciplinary procedures ete. Petty as they may seem, they all 
require time and considerable paperwork to overcome. In a 
"~ Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain all participate in the 
Eurocorps. 
", For a survey of these problems, see Torsren Stein, "Rechrsformen 
l11ultinationaler Verbande", in NClle Zeitschri(t fitr \'(!ehrrccht, \'01. 40 
(1998). no. 4, pp. 143-51. 
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recent analysis of the lvlultinational Corps North-East, these 
differences are referred to repeatedly as hampering efficiency 
and detracting attention from more important tasks.'" The 
countries have tried to regulate these problems through 
bilateral agreements, but for a country engaged on many 
quarters like Germany, this has resulted in a legal patchwork 
requiring time and manpower to monitor and respond to 
quenes. 
The organisational affiliation may also be a complicating 
factor. Attention in this study is given to multinational units 
created under the auspices of NATO or the EU. These are the 
same men, but answerable to either of the two organisations 
depending on the circumstances. It does not end with just two 
since many of the units can also he deployed at the request of 
the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, The 
United Nations, and until recently the West European Union 
(henceforth WEU). Who has the right of priority?'" Only in a 
few cases has this been agreed on beforehand, one concerned 
Eurocorps where the WEU had priority over NATO. Another 
case, even more entangled involved Poland and the WEU. If 
the Multinational Corps North-East had been deployed on 
behalf of the WEU, Poland would have participated militarily, 
but since it is not a member of the WEU, how the countrv 
would have been granted political control remained unclear. 
The country could at any time have withdrawn its contingent 
H Sven Bernhard Gareis and Ulrich vom Hagen, 1\'Iilitiirkuiturell lIUJ 
MlIitil1atiol1olitiit. Das A1ultil1ationale Korps Nordost ill Stettin, 
Schriftenreihe des Sozialwisscnschaftlichen Instiruts der Bundeswchr, 
Oplnden: Lcske & Budrich, 2004. 
,·1 This question has been at the centre of NATO~EU relation since EU tlrst 
started to contemplate a military force of its o\vn. For a survey of the 
differcm proposals made to chart out a division of labour between the two 
scc rhe collections of core documents published br the EU Insritute for 
Security 5rudics: l'vlaartjc Rurren, From St. Malo to Nice, Chaillot P<lpcr 47, 
2001; From Nice to Lwkcl1, ChaiJlot Paper 51,l002;]ean-Yvcs Hainc, 
From Laekcll to Copenhagen, Chaillot Paper 57, 2003; and Kori Schake, 
C(mstmctil'e Duplication: Reducing EU reliallce 011 US military assets, 
London: Centre for European Reform, 2002. 
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from participation if it was perceived to be incompatible with 
national interests. \1(!ith the demise of the WEU, this 
controversy belongs to history. Nevertheless, the emergence of 
similar problems in the relationship between the EU and non-
members cannot be precluded.';" 
The three different modes of organising multi nationality 
presented here all try to resolve the problem of how command 
and control can be organised to satisfy the concerns of those 
involved without endangering efficiency. The different results 
depend on a number of factors. Among these the most 
important are size of the national contributions, and the 
causes leading to the establishment of the units. For example if 
the intention is to familiarise all the participants with western 
forms of command as in the case of the Multinational Corps 
North-East, rotation of command is implemented. This will 
also be the case if national contributions are of equal size. 
There are some drawbacks to rotation that should not be 
overlooked. First of all, this is a costiy procedure, 
economically as well as in terms of efficiency. New staff 
members require time before they are able to function 
effectively.;" Especially in Germany criticism has been voiced 
against the time it takes before an appointment is made and 
the commander assumes his new position. Key posts have 
been left vacant for a long time, key decisions are postponed 
and operational planning is effectively stopped before tile 
vacancy is ended. This problem, although disturbing in 
peacetime, only becomes pressing when operations have either 
·,b An attempt to draw up a line between the EU and non-mcmbers is done in 
the St.mcld. no. 12 (lOOO-200l), Om Norge og Euro/m lied ilmgal1gel1 til et 
l1ytt Jrhlmdre, esp. 9.4.1. "Forholdet til trcdjeland". Here it is asserted that 
only countries milking a significant militarr contribution will be given the 
same rights as full members. But even then, strategic command will bc 
vested ,virh EU's Council ur rhe Security Policy Committec. Non-mcmbers 
are barred from participating in those organs, a limitation admitted in the 
Srortingsmel dingo 
.,- See Fausr, Betriebsluil'tscha(tliche Probleme mllltiJl<7tiolwlcr Trll/Jpentei/c, 
pp. 145-47. 
reached an important stage in the planning process, or are 
being implemented. This was the case when the ACE Rapid 
Reaction Corps was deployed to Bosnia." 
This discussion omits one very important aspect of 
multinationality, namely the ability to come up with practical 
solutions minimising the impact of national differences on 
efficiency. During interviews, officers repeatedly referred to 
unforeseen problems that had required flexibility from all the 
participants. National rules of engagement differed, and if one 
country was restricted froIn perfornling certain tasks, or 
patrolling a designated area, a way out was found." The 
ca pacity to come up with compromises depends to a 
significant extent on leadership, on the commander's ability to 
instil confidence.'" Sharing information and close 
consultations are necessary to arrive at a C0111111011 perception 
of problems and how they can best be solved. Bur this rests on 
a more fundamental premise that has not been addressed so 
far: a clearly defined mandate for what should be achieved 
with the application of military means. Joint Endeavour and 
Operation Allied Force may serve as illustrations. Joint 
Endeavour (1995-97) was a multinational operation 
mandated by the UN to assist the implementation of the 
Day ton Agreement. This was a peace-support operation. Once 
the agreement had been implemented, the engagement would 
end. Operation Allied Force was different. Although phrased 
in other terms, this was war. Although the aim was to stop the 
'-'" Sec 1viicharl \Xlalker, "Mulrinarionalitat auf dem Priifstand. Das ACE 
Rapid Reaction Corps im Bosnieneinsatz", in Bundesministeriu111 fur 
Verteidigung: Jv1ulti/wtioJlaJit:it. W'chrtcc/misclJcr Report, Frankfurt al11 
Main: Repon Verlag, ] 996~ pp. 11-17. 
,,<' Inrcrvicw with Oberst Karl~Henning Kri)ger, Einsatzfi.ihrungskommando 
der Bundeswehr, Porsdam, 13 November 2002. 
~.J This has been poimcd our as onc reason for General Gcorgc Joulwan's 
successful leadership of Operation .Joint Endc;:l\'our in B05I1ia 1995-97. For 
an analysis of his leadership compared with that of General Wesley Clark, 
see ]acob Borresen, .. Feltherren i var tid", Norsk lvlilif(ert Tidsskrilt, no. -I, 
2002, pp. 22-28. 
ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population, the members 
disagreed over the choice of strategy. Moreover, the final 
status for Kosovo remained uncertain. 
When all the participant countries perceive their vital 
interests as being under threat and necessitating a military 
answer, reaching consensus is possible. As Joint Endeavour 
indicates, UN-mandates will also weigh heavily in favour of 
participating. On the other hand, consensus is far mOre 
difficult once the threat is perceived differently by Alliance 
members. The disagreement over Iraq is a case in point. 
RMA and command 
The introductory quote from Wesley Clark's recollections 
point to the fact that politicians and military leaders will often 
view problems differently." The gap in perceptions is of 
course nothing new. Clausewitz wrote about this at length, 
and warned against juxtaposing them: "there can be nO 
question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic 
issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it."" Clausewitz 
underlined the supremacy of politics. But whereas the political 
leadership retained ultimate control over the leadership and 
conduct of welr, they should not and could not replace officers 
in the planning and conduct of operations. How to maintain 
this division of tasks has received renewed attention since the 
end of the Cold War.-; Part of the explanation is the increase 
in multin,nional operations, maintaining political and military 
cohesion is more problematic within a coalition than if the 
"I Sec foomote 3. 
-2 "Zwei Briefe des Generals "on Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr", 
special issue of Milit:irrl'issellschaftliche Rtfl1dschall, ~ilarch 1937, pp. 5-9, 
quoted in Perer Parer, Understandi11g War. Essays cm Cialls(!witz (.wd the 
His/o})! of Milili.1r)' Power, Princeton: Princetoll Univer!-iiry Press, 1992, p. 
129. 
-3 Prominenr among these are Palin, Nfu/tinationai Military Forces; Thomas, 
The Military Challenges o(Trl.1l1sdtiantic Coalitions; Zanini and tvlorrison, 
The Arm)' and lvlultil1.1fional Pon'e ComtJatibility. 
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military operations were undertaken by a single country.'~ But 
the impact of RMA also accounts for the growing attention. 
In the ongoing debate on how command should be adapted 
to take advantage of the possibilities inherent in network 
centric warfare, two schools of thought can be identified. One 
emphasises that the chief benefit in NeW lies in the extensive 
information now made available to the soldier at the tactical 
level. He remains in a superior position to choose how to 
respond to the challenges facing him compared with the 
decision-makers sitting in front of a Screen somewhere far 
away. This speaks in favour of decentralised command, of 
more specifically what is known as Auftragstaktik. This is a 
German command concept, sometimes translated as mission 
tactics, where emphasis is given to innovation and flexibility 
in the implementation of a particular mission.'5 
But not all countries apply Auftragstaktik. Whereas this is 
common in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Germany, this is 
not the case in France or in the new NATO members.'" French 
and for example Polish officers expect orders to be detailed 
leaving less scope for initiative than would their German or 
Norwegian colleagues. This difference sets clear limits as to 
how far down multinational solutions can be applied. If 
modelled on the lead-nation or the framework principles, 
integration is prevalent at the top level, with national units 
being commanded by their own officers. The Franco-German 
~4 However, as General Clark vividly describes in his book, mainraining 
consenSllS among the participanr coumries was nor the only problem on his 
agenda; differences within the polirical leadership in Washington added to 
his burden as well. 
-, For a brief definition of Aufrragstakrik and how it may be affected by 
Rlv1A, see Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. 1v1ey, The Revolution in Military 
AfTairs, l\.1cNair Paper 60, April 1999, esp. ch. 6 "Germany and the R1v1A". 
~" For a comparison between Germany and France, see Faust, 
BetriehslVirtschaftliche Probleme 11111itil1aticnwier TrufJpellteile, 6.1.3.3.1.1 
(sic), "Operative und taktische Einsatzgrundsatze"; on the problems of 
implementing Auftragstaktik in the rVlultinarional Corps North-East, see 
Gareis and vom Hagen, Militdrkulturen lmd Jvluitil1c7tioJldlitdt, 
4.4. "Fiihrungsverhalren". 
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Brigade may serve as a contrast. It was established as a 
standing component of the Eurocorps in 1988. Since then it 
has been hailed as an example of European defence 
integration. Nevertheless, national differences in command 
mode have hampered integration since the beginning. A 
complete adaptation of either side's view and understanding 
of command is ruled out. Instead, a series of compromises 
have been implemented, e.g. French officers are less specific 
than they would be if they were commanding a purely French 
unit and their German colleagues adjust their orders as well. 
Although adjustments are made in other multinational units as 
well, this process is less demanding when national command 
traditions resemble each other, e.g. the German-Dutch Corps. 
Here, Auftragsraktik facilitates decentralised command. 
Opposing the preference for decentralisation, is the view 
that real time transmission of information opens up for more 
centralised command and control: "The likelihood that 
greater experience and knowledge will reside at higher 
command echelons would seem to argue for centralising 
decision making and control to the fullest extent allowed by 
.. . ,,77 
C01l1111Ul1lcatlOl1s capacity. 
Whether this will be rhe case probably depends less on the 
technological possibilities that RMA open up, than the 
character of the operation in question. In a fully-fledged war-
like operation, commanders may be assumed to have wider 
command authority than in a low-intensity peace operation. 
This can be achieved in two ways: The commander may have 
operational command. If so, he has the power to decide how 
the units should be assembled, divided, and which tasks they 
should be assigned. He may also delegate command to the 
units below. Alternatively, the commander may only be given 
operational control. If so, he cannot dispose of the troops 
7- .lames R. Firzsimonds, "The Cui rural Challenge of Information 
Technology", Ni7lltl! \\701r College RCl'ic1l.', Summer 1998, p. 16. 
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assigned to him or delegate command unless specified by his 
supenors. 
It should be noted that in some cases, NATO multinational 
force commanders often have only coordinating allthority in 
peacetime. The 2001 NATO Glossary defines this as: 
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned 
responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities 
involving forces of twO or more nations, commands, services, 
or twO or more forces of the same service. He has the 
authority to require consultation between the agencies 
involved or their representatives, but does nOt have the 
authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement 
between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain 
essential agreement by discllssion. In the event he is unable to 
obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the 
appropriate authority. 
This has been the case with the 1st United Kingdom 
Armoured DivisionlDanish International Mechanized Brigade; 
3rd United Kingdom Division/Italian Ariete Mechanized 
Brigade; and 3rd Italian Division/Portuguese Independent 
Airborne Brigade. 
Natiollal scope of actioll 
Alll11ultinational participation means that some degree of 
national sovereignty is surrendered nOt least in economic 
matters. Participation in multinational units ties up parts of 
the budget and therefore reduces the scope for national 
decision-making. If a country suddenly reneges on its 
comminnents, this wilI easily 111ean Cl greater share having to 
be covered by the other members of the Alliance. In the long 
term, others may be deterred from entering into an alliance 
with any country perceived to be an unreliable partner. 
Multinationality has thus turned defence planning and 
budgeting of one country into issues of utmost interest to its 
partners. For instance, the lack of progress in German military 
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reforms and the series of cutbacks in spending seen during the 
government of Gerhard Schroder cannot but have 
repercussions both on the different multinational units where 
Germany is a key member, bur also on EU's ESDP plans.'" 
On the other hand, participation ill mulrinationalullits or 
projects may be regarded as a shield against cutbacks for the 
units concerned. Reductions in defence spending, ad hoc or 
not, are more likely to affect units that are not tied up in 
cross-country agreements. Bur if the multinational units are 
protected from reductions, the rest of national defence may be 
hit all the harder if defence budgets are reduced. Especially in 
those countries that maintain conscription, the resources 
invested in multinational units have created a division of the 
armed forces into an A team usually made up of professional 
soldiers with all the newest equipment, and the conscripts 
who will have to "make do and mend".l\1ore and more 
countries find that this gap is increasingly impossible to 
bridge, and have either done away with conscription all 
together (e.g. France), or have chosen a path where conscripts 
serve for a shorter time and are mainly used as a recruitment 
pool. Germany and Norway both belong in this category." 
However, although multinationality may offer a degree of 
protection from cutbacks, it would be misleading to presume 
that units will be guaranteed sufficient funding in the future. 
-Y, "Bundeswehr wird efIleut verkleinert", Die \,\lelt, 2 October 2003. For ;J 
critic11 analysis of German defence reforms. sec !'vlartin Agliera, "Reform of 
the Bundeswehr: Dcfcnse Policy Choices for the Next German 
Administration", COl11paratil'c Strategy, vol. 21, no. 3, 2002, pp. 179-202. 
Agiiera points our that one of the major deficiencies is in the field of 
command and comrol. This hampers inreroperability both within the 
German armed forces but also wirh the country's allies. 
-., This is the main idea behind the German Defence !vlinister Peter Struck's 
reform proposals presented in January 2004. Sec Karl Feldmeycr, 
"Veftcidigungsben:itschaft fdllt", Fnmhjifrter AIIgel1leillc Zeitlfllg, 30 
December 2003. Conscription as a basis for recruiun(:m is explidrly 
mentioned in Sr.prp. no. 45 (2000-2001), Oml/!gghlgen .u' Forsl'11ret i 
periode1l2002-20{)5, section 5.6.1 "Prinsipper for praktisering ClV 
l·k ,. vernep I 'ten . 
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With the introduction of the EU monetary union national 
budgeting became subject to llluch stricter guidelines, it lost its 
flexibility. This puts defence budgets in a vulnerable position 
since this is virtually the only area where cuts can be made 
without alienating a large section of the electorate. Not 
surprisingly, in the run-up to the implementation of the EU 
currency union this expenditute on the armed forces waS 
reduced. 
The danger of alienating the electorate may also compel the 
politicians to abstain from participating in a multinational 
operation. If the risk of casualties is high, governments will be 
unwilling to deploy soldiers unless the mission is regarded as 
having a direct impact on national security:" It should be 
added that aversion on the political level will often be 
supported by the military top echelons; in a US survey on 
attitudes towards military intervention the military elite was 
more casualty-averse than the political leadership. The 
greatest level of acceptance waS found in the electorate.HI But 
casualties may not be the only factor weighing against 
participation; a government may also interpret military llction 
as contradicting international law and for these reasons opt 
Ollt. 
There may also be strong political reasons speaking against 
letting a specific country participate. This was most recently 
illustrated when the US refused to let Turkey send troops into 
northern Iraq following the defeat of the Iraqi Army. The 
Kurdish population would have interpreted their presence as a 
provocation. 
The European split over Iraq highlighted how differing 
political perceptions of threats and the way to counter them 
will make countries inclined to abstain from participating. The 
,11 Scc Pascal Girardin, "Casualty Aversion in Tepid \Var", C01l1lectiolls, no. 
2,2003, pp. 99-124. 
~I .Jdfrey Record, "Force Protection Fetishism", Acms/hlce Power Journal, 
Summer 2000, pp. 4-1 '1. In this article, Record claims that rhe US political 
and military elite suffers from a "Vietnam syndrome" not found in Europe. 
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problem that emerges is that actions that are in the coJJective 
interest may fail to be undertaken due to disincentives at the 
national level. The problem emerges under conditions of non-
excludable public goods. This means that the benefits 
resulting from one action wiJJ apply to aJJ the members even 
though only a few have contributed to the final positive 
outcome. Thus participants have a strong incentive to free 
ride, i.e. to keep the national input at a minimal level 
assuming that the others will bear the brunt of the coJJective 
costs. How to avoid this quandary has been addressed in 
much of the literature on multinationality. The conclusions 
have tended to he rather vague, usuaJJy underlining the need 
for flexibility, so that a mission is not rendered impossible if 
one country should choose not to participate. But on the other 
hand, this flexibility should not be so large as to provide so 
generous an exit strategy that aH but the most committed 
leave the stage since the political costs of opting out are 
negligible. It should he added that the desired flexibility is 
only possible if specialisation is not carried too far, i.e. that 
other countries can offer the necessary skiJJs and capacities. 
But what if a country defaults not on participation in an 
operation, but on its commitments to develop an agreed 
capacity? This is an issue rarely addressed in the political 
statements, articles or books on muJrinationality. 
OccasionaJJy, the need for flexibility is underlined, usuaJJy 
taken to mean that if one country backs our for political 
reasons, another country should be able to cover the gap. 
Although this recipe raises some difficult questions concerning 
how far specialisation should be .Howed to proceed and 
whether some sort of duplication should be encouraged, 
failure to deliver the agreed capacity is not necessarily due to 
political reservations. Economic problems may bar a country 
from engaging in lengthy missions." 
~~ This quesrion has already been raised, see Re/JOrt 011 Allied COl1tributions 
to tbe C011lmon Dc(el1se 2002. A RejJort to the United Stdtcs C01lgress by 
)'0 F($.'')V/-!RH.:;'1'f.WJER 3/2004 , ,) 
Privatising the fringe benefits is one strategy to reduce free-
riding." This means that access to these benefits should be 
restricted only to those that have contributed to the operation. 
This is the policy applied by the current US administration to 
the rebuilding of Iraq. Only the countries that supported the 
war are permitted to participate in the tender for the 
reconstruction contracts. This move has resulted in sharp 
protests from Germany and France, the two NATO countries 
d f
•• 
that were the most a amant opponents 0 the war.' The 
political price was an increase in transatlantic tensions. 
Nurwegian participation ill O/Jeratioll Enduring 
Freedom 
In the discussion above the importance of national rules of 
engagement defining what a national contingent can do, was 
underlined. This is not the only way national control is 
exerted. Frequent contact, transmission of information, all 
play an important role. Before ending this chapter, some 
comments on the Norwegian experience as participant in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (henceforth OEF) may throw 
some light on how this has been done." 
The US was the lead nation with 1110st of NATO's 19 allies 
being directly involved in the operations. Although the US 
outsized their contributions, the allies could offers skills and 
the Seaetary o(De/ensc, Chart 1-1, "Defense Spending as Percentage of 
GDP". 
n See Thomas S. Szayna et al., 111I{J/'Ol'illg Arm)' Planning lor Future 
fduitilwfiol1ai Operatio11s, Sant;] '\'ionica: RAND, 2001, p. 39. 
eA SCC Roldck Sikorski, "Losing the New Europe", Washi1lgton Post, 7 
November 2003; and ~lichael Sriirmcr, "Die europiiische Illusion", Die 
\I/dt, 24 September 1002. 
id For a recent analysis on a recenr case of multinational operations, sec 
.Major Erik Guldhav, "Politisk komroll over norske styrkcbidrag i 
inrernasjonale koalisjoner. Erfaringer fra operasjon Enduring Freedom", in 
Torunn Laugen Haaland and Erik Guldhav, B1'lIk at' l10rske styrker i 
h1111//{!II mOl illtenwsjol1al terrorisme, IFS In fo, no. 3, 20(H, pp. 6-16. 
ONE SIZE FITS ALL? 59 
capacities that were in high demand."" This also applied to the 
Norwegian contribution." A further difference was the rules 
of engagement with the Norwegian ROE being stricter than 
those valid for the US troops. This concerned in particular the 
F-16 planes. Their role waS subjected to considerable 
attention and debate in the Norwegian parliament and media. 
Reports had been published on US bombs hitting civilians 
instead of Taleban positions. If Norwegian pilots were 
discovered to have committed similar mistakes, political 
support would be undermined and pressure to withdraw from 
OEF would have grown. Norway was not alone on this point. 
The Norwegian planes were deployed together with units 
from Denmark and the Netherlands with broadly similar 
ROEs applied to all. Norwegian, Durch and Danish 
authorities cooperated closely during this phase to ensure that 
the national limitations were respected."S Periods occurred 
when the planes were used less than expected and the US side 
relied exclusively On their own resources. The reason for this 
seems to have been American dissatisfaction with the stricter 
European ROE, although this dissatisfaction was never openly 
• h'L/ 
vOIced. 
The ability to do sO depended on information and access to 
decision-making. This was ensured through the deployment of 
Norwegian officers at the US Central Command 
~" Balances changed with the inrroduction of rhe UNMl11anclared Intemational 
Security Assist:Jl1ce Force was deployed in January 2002, here the European 
contribution is significantly larger. 
,,- This included special forces, minc clearance units, F~16 and tramport 
pbnes, and Norwegian crews manning A \'(' ACS aircrafts monitoring US 
airspace. Sce "Sratus florske bidrag til "Enduring Freedom" og ISAF", 
Forsvarsdepanemenret, hltp://odin.cit:p.nnlfd/nnrskfakrueir/ndll;ttrlO] 00 'j '1-
210 -r 20/indl'\:-dok()()O-h-f-~1.html 
\." "Avrale(rJ mdlom Norgc og USA i fnrhindelse mcd norskc kmnptlys 
deltakelse i krigen i Afghanistan", Forsvarsdep,1rremcmcr, 
http://odin.dcp.no/fJfnorsk/akruelr/nd1CtcrIOI0011-1 J OOS5lindex-dokOOO M 
h-f<l.hrml 
"" See Guldhav, "Politisk kontroll over norske styrkebidrag i inrernasjonale 
koalisjoner" . 
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(CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. Familiarity with US 
command proved a significant facilitator for the officer in 
question. His duty was to serve as a liaison between 
CENTCOM and the Norwegian political and military 
leadership. In Afghanistan, Norwegian officers were 
represented at different levels in the command chain. This 
meant that missions could be planned within the limits 
imposed by the Norwegian ROE. Much of the planning work 
as well as the actual action was greatly facilitated by the 
traditions for close cooperation between US and Norwegian 
special forces.'" A potential challenge to the routines for 
consultation between Oslo and the local officers was the need 
for speedy decision-making. This led to a series of 
adjustments, and nothing indicates that communication 
caused delays. 
Based on the conclusions available, the arrangements 
worked satisfactorily. Much of this was due to the US respect 
for national ROEs, and a command arrangement that 
provided the participant countries with information and 
access to decision-making. If not, a political backlash might 
result with countries opting out. The Norwegian Minister of 
Defence, Kristin Krohn Devoid underlined this linkage in a 
speech on the reform of NATO's command system: "If there 
is insufficient inclusiveness and transparency, then our ability 
to contribute - to reach agreement among ourselves, to 
convince our parliaments and publics - will inevitably 
suffer. ,,'1l 
'I,) Ibid. 
~I Kristin Krohn DevoId, "Transformation: Implications for the Alliance", 
speech given at Open Road, Norfolk, 20-22 Janlliuy 2003, 
http://ociin.dep.noiidinorskioiqudr/taierip100013'fiiC)! 00 11-0900ROiindex-
dokOOO-b-n-a.html 
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Conclusion 
Multinational force formations easily run the risk of 
disintegrating along national lines. In this chapter, how this 
danger can be reduced has been addressed. This has been done 
by looking at different aspects of multinationality ranging 
from equipment to the very organisation of the units. In the 
latter case, three contrasting kinds have been presented. It 
should be added though, that a given multinational mission 
wiJlnot be a carbon copy of any of them but rather display an 
array of ad hoc solutions arrived at because a particular 
problem suddenly had to be solved. Officers interviewed for 
this study would often refer to how a way out was found also 
in cases where a national contingency was subjected to tighter 
restrictions than the others and thns prevented from 
undertaking certain tasks or patrol certain areas. I had 
expected that this wonld cause friction, and perhaps tensions 
in the field, bur none of my informants could confirm that. 
Joint commitment to a task counted more, and in some cases 
the fact that the officers knew each other from joint training, 
seminars or previous missions proved to be a great facilitator. 
That is not to say that tensions did not exist, but they seem to 
have been more restricted to the political level. 
The influence of politicians on decision-making was 
addressed in connection with RMA. Political interference is 
nothing new. Nnmerous articles as well as a significant 
number of books have been written to elucidate these 
problems long before RMA was conceptualised. None 
contains any recipe for how these problems can be solved 
once and for all. The reason is most likely that both the degree 
of interference, and the remedies required to limit it, depend 
on the character of the mission and the number of countries 
involved. As will be pointed out repeatedly in later chapters, 
much will depend on perceptions. If the countries agree on 
what the problem is and the most effective way of solving it, 
interference will be less than if some of the countries involved 
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feel they are being dragged along into something that basically 
does not serve their interests. 
Even in countries where RMA has made an impact, in 
particular the USA which is far ahead of other countries, 
results are mixed. The ability to digest the information made 
available by the computers and act upon it differs across the 
US armed forces. The European countries are lagging behind 
the US in the adaptation of RMA, although progress has been 
made especially in the wake of the 2002 Prague NATO 
Summit. Progress in this field will prevent the transatlantic 
gap in technology from becoming wider. 
In the application of RMA, smaller countries will be faced 
with stronger constraints than the larger. Smaller countries 
have more restricted budgetary resources and they will be 
forced to choose, not only which sectors that should receive 
priority, but also with which countries they should align. 
These questions will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 
5, but as will be pointed out in the following chapter, 
alignment and priority have been perennial issues in the 
Norwegian security policy debate. 
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Chapter 3 
The Role of the Small: Norway 
Smaller countries' limited ability to exert influence over 
planning and command is a perpetual problem in 
multinational force formation. Douglas L. Bland, a Canadian 
scholar who has worked closely with Canada's national 
military representatives to NATO's Military Committee, has 
summed up the problem thus: "Countries with small armed 
forces, and whose chiefs of defence have limited experience, 
have difficulty in winning support. This works against 
Canada, Denmark, Norway and Portugal. ,,'" \Vith the recent 
expansion of the Alliance, an updated version of the list 
would contain more names. Yet all of them will try to gain 
influence on decision-making that affects their security. The 
question is how? The most straightforward answer is by being 
present in the decision-making organs. The challenge for the 
small countries is to have their nationals in the right slots. To 
get there they will have to offer the Alliance a relevant asset. 
Norway's chief asset has been its location. In return, the 
Norwegian authorities wanted credible Allied reinforcement 
plans for Norway in case of war. At rhe same time, they 
strived to maintain the largest scope possible for autonomous 
decision-making. This posed a dilemma, and how to pursue a 
strategy that balanced between what has apdy been called 
"~ Douglas L. Bland! The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
A Stlldy o(Stmctllre and Strategy, New York: Praeger, 1991, p. 180. 
64 FO.>\SVkRSSTUDIER 312004 
"integration and screening", remained a perennial headache 
for Norwegian decision-makers and will be accounted for in 
the brief historical overview provided." But the chapter has a 
more contemporary focus as well; the efforts undertaken 
during the 1990s to explore the possibilities for multinational 
efforts between the Nordic countries will be accounted for. 
Relevant assets 
Norway's location, especially its proximity to Soviet military 
installations on the Kola Peninsula, was a major asset for 
NATO dnring the Cold War. The German occupation of 
Norway during the Second World War had served to 
underline the strategic importance of controlling the 
Norwegian coastline. Its value to NATO was further 
enhanced with the Soviet build-up of bases on the Kola 
Peninsula serving the increasingly strong Northern Fleet. From 
these bases, vessels had open access to the Atlantic, not having 
to pass through bottlenecks like the easily controllable Danish 
Straits, Bosporus or the Straits of Gibraltar. In a report 
approved by the US President from September 1948, less than 
a year before Norway signed the Atlantic Treaty, the 
importance of Norway to Western security was underlined: 
The Scandinavian nations are strategically important both to 
the United States and the USSR, they lie astride the great 
arctic circle air route between North America and the 
strategic heart of Western Russia, arc midway on the air route 
between London and l\1oscow, and are in a position to 
control [he exists from the Bahic and Barents seas. 
Domination of Scandinavia would provide the sovie[s with 
advanced air, guided missile and submarine bases, thus 
enabling them to advance their bomb line to the West, [Q 
threaten allied operations in the North Atlantic, and to form a 
".1 See Tamnes, I11tegration and screening. 
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protective shield against allied sea or air attack from the 
" Northwest I ... J. 
Norway was an observation post; monitoring and collecting 
infonnation On Soviet activities was done frOIn Norwegian 
territory. Norwegian policy was to strike a balance between 
deterrence based on Allied guarantees and at the same time 
provide reassurance to Moscow that Norway would not be 
used as a launching pad for an attack on the Soviet Union. 
Based on these concerns, the Norwegian government decided 
to impose a set of constraints on Norwegian participation in 
NATO, one at the time of entering, others being added in the 
course of the years. Central among these was the refusal to 
allow stationing foreign troops in peacetime, the exceptions 
being short-term training and Allied participation in exercises 
and the establisbment of installations for command, control, 
navigation, warning etc. for Allied forces. Likewise, the 
stockpiling of Allied equipment to be used in case of an attack 
was permitted. As a further measure of reassurance towards 
the Soviet Union, it was decided that Allied exercises in 
Finnmark, the province bordering the Soviet Union, was not 
allowed. Likewise, Allied aircraft were not permitted to enter 
the airspace east of the 24 longitude. This limitation was also 
applied to Allied naval vessels." During the 1950s, especially, 
NATO wanted to gain Norwegian approval for the stationing 
of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. This was 
refused.'" 
-l National Archives, NSC 2811, "The Position of the Unites States with 
Respect to Scandinavia", 3 September 1948, quoted in Ola\' Riste, "\Vas 
1949 a Turning Point? Norway and the \'V'estern Powers 1947-1950", in O. 
Riste (ed.), W'estcrn SeclIrit)'. The Formatiuc Ycars, Oslo: 
Universitetsfodagcl) 1985, pp. 128-49, p. 144. 
"i St.meld. no. 94 (1978-79L FOTslh1rskommisjol1cl1s lftredllil1g og 
hOllcJretllingslin/cr lor Porsuarets uirksomhet i tidel1 1978-83, p. 72. 
"" For ail analysis of Norwegian nuclear policies, see Tamnes and Skogrand, 
FI)lktells likcuekt. 
Reinforcement 
Due to the small size of the population and inadequate 
military means, Norway was heavily dependent upon Allied 
reinforcement in case of attack. How this was to be 
guaranteed and organised remained a prime concern during 
the Cold War. In the first post-war plan for the reconstrnction 
of Norwegian defence, it was stated that "Norwegian forces 
must be able to resist on their own until we receive effective 
assistance from whoever will be our allies"." When Norway 
signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the conditional 
mood could be dispensed with; yet the basic issue of Allied 
assistance remained on the agenda. 
Only gradually was this answered through increasingly 
explicit arrangements for Allied assistance." Although 
Norway woulc! resist a Soviet attack, the question was for 
how long? Any long-term resistance would depend on it being 
"properly organised and strengthened by outside aid"." But 
this tenet raised two problems, both dominating Norwegian 
security policy and therefore Norwegian-NATO relations ever 
since: What forms would this assistance assume; and how 
credible would the promise of assistance in case of attack be? 
Expectations had been running high at the time of signing the 
pact in April 1949. But disappointments soon set in, there 
seemed to be very little actual work being done despite the 
heightening of international tensions. Judging from British 
chiefs of staff papers compiled at the time: "The Norwegians 
should be told that they cannot plan on any direct air or land 
,'- St.rneld. no. 31 CI945-46), p. 3, quoted in Olav Riste, "Eit 
'minimumsforsvar' for Norge, FK90 og sporsm51et om alliert ;1ssisranse", 
IFS 111(0, no. 5, 1992, p. 6. 
"'; For an analysis of this process, see Ola\' Riste, "\V'as 1949 a Turning 
Point?", pp. 128-49, p. 144; and Rolf Tamnes, "Norway's Struggle for the 
Northern Flank, 1950-1952", in ibid., pp. 215--43. 
'N Ibid. 
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assistance from the Allies, at any rate in the early stages of 
[ l " 11)1) war .... 
This perception was not limited to American or British 
military experts. In a lecture given by a Norwegian Major-
General as late as 1955, the following conclusion waS drawn: 
"Our starting point today should be the notion that we 
cannot expect the arrival of Allied ground forces to participate 
. I d f fN . . "Hll In t le e ence 0 orweglaI1 terrItory. ' 
Gradually, measures were implemented making 
reinforcement far more credible. In 1960, the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, (henceforth SACEUR) set up Allied 
Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF). It was made up of 
five air transportable battalions with command elements, 
communications, engineer, reconnaissance, logistical support 
units and four combat aircraft squadrons. In the beginning, 
AMF Land waS composed of units from Italy, USA, Canada, 
Great Britain, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany, only to be 
enlargened with contributions from other Alliance members in 
the course of the years. The AMF was to be used primarily as 
a deterrent to be deployed rapidly to any location in NATO. It 
was meant to show unity of purpose and Alliance solidarity in 
any area under threat. The multinational AMI' forces served a 
multitude of functions. Politically, they demonstrated 
cohesion. They would be deployed in crisis areas as a 
deterrent."" Even small-scale Soviet aggression would be met 
with a strong force presence. The AMF would here function 
1,)<) NA, RG 319, P and 0 091 Norw.1Y TS, end.: Reporr by the Jnine 
Strategic Plans Committee on a British JPS report "Norway - Advice on 
Defence", quored by Riste, "\Vas 1949 a T uming Poim?", p. "I..J.j. 
1!J1 "Det vi idag gjor retrest i :l ga ut fra er, at vi ikke bn gjore regning !TIed 
allierte sryrker rillands for delragclse i [orsvarer;]\, norsk terrirorium." 
l'vIajorMGeneral A.D. Dahl, "Noen synspunkter om den viderc utbygging av 
Norges forsvar", a lecture given in Oslo .Mjlitrerc Samfund, 8 November 
1954, and printed in Norsk Milita.m Tidsskrift, 1955, vol. 125, pp. 1-'19, p. 
, 
-, . 
)1): Rear Admiral R.P. Breivik, "Sjoforsvaret og forsterkninger tH ~orge", 
NOl'sk tidsskrift (01' sjouesell, no. 6, 1982, pp. 1-7. 
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as '''tripwires'' relninding the \X'arsa\v Pact to take into 
consideration possible retaliatory measures from NATO. 
Northern Norway was one area where a crisis might emerge 
that would require NATO presence. Nevertheless, the 
Norwegian government refused to grant the AMF permission 
to train in the region bordering the Soviet Union despite 
pressure both from both NATO and the Norwegian defence 
leadership. The government wanted to avoid any measures 
that conld be regarded as escalatory by the Soviet side. 
In 1968, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
(STANAVFORLANT) was established. Its roots go back to an 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Task Group, soon to become known 
as the MATCHlvlAKER squadron. "n But 
STANAVFORLANT was the first standing peacetime 
multinational naval force, periodically including Norwegian 
vessels. It was subject to SACLANT command. It participated 
in exercises and made several visits showing the NATO flag 
throughout the NATO area. As in the case of AMF, the basic 
idea was to convey a strong impression of Alliance cohesion 
and solidarity. 
A major step to make reinforcement more credible was 
taken in 1967 when the new strategic defence concept known 
as Flexible Response was adopted by NATO. The aim was to 
develop the ability for the Alliance to react flexibly to 
aggression irrespective of level. This also meant that NATO 
reserved the right to initiate a nuclear attack if conventional 
options had failed. Until the early 1980s, a number of 
measures were implemented in accordance with the new 
concept. In sum, the members increased their conventional 
forces, and improved reinforcements to areas deemed 
particularly vulnerable. 
The Norwegian efforts to have Allied forces earmarked for 
deployment in Norway in caSe of crisis and war were 
I,n .tvlATCHNlAKER was the name given to three consecutive exercises held 
in 1965, 1966 and 1967. 
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depended on airfields that could be used by US air 
reinforcements. In 1974, the US Air Force initiated the 50-
called Co-located Operating Bases (COB) programme to solve 
this quandary. Ammunition, drop tanks and equipment 
needed for maintenance were stored on airfields designated to 
receive the US troops. 
All through the Cold War, the authorities in Oslo worked 
hard to have allies commit forces to Norway. A mere political 
promise did not suffice; troops would have to participate in 
exercises regularly to lend the promise credibility. 
Participation would also enable the Norwegian party to 
monitor to what extent Allied troops would be up to the task, 
i.e. the state of their equipmenrs and the skills of their 
soldiers. 
Holding time and deployment time were perennial concerns 
of both Norwegian authorities and NATO. There was little 
use in having an impressive list of units earmarked for 
reinforcement if the time elapsed before their arrival would be 
too long for Norwegian forces to resist an invading Soviet 
enemy. The issue was discussed repeatedly. In the course of 
the 1970s, detailed reinforcement plans were made specifying 
which troops should arrive when after an attack had been 
launched against Norway.I<).I In this way, deterrence would be 
rendered more credible than had been the case so far. At the 
Washington Summit Meeting in 1978, the members agreed on 
the NATO Long Term Defence Programme. Of particular 
relevance to Norway was the decision that SACEUR should 
come up with a comprehensive plan for reinforcements to 
Europe. This was to be done in order to establish the 
designated deployment areas for the different units. 
A final version was approved by the members in 1982. The 
plan broke with the principle of maximum flexible 
deployment of reinforcements. This had been central to all 
Wl Sce RolE Tamncs, O/iea/del', vol. 6 in NOl'sk utc1lrikspolitikks historic, 
Oslo: Universitersforlagct, 1997, pp. 74-76. 
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plans in force until then. For Norway and the rest of the 
Northern Flank, the 1982 plan did not mean any change in 
the list of units earmarked for assistance, but it opened the 
way for a far more direct linkage between the deployment 
area and the units themselves. The plan sub-divided the 
reinforcements into three: Forces allocated to the Principal 
Subordinate Commands (Baltap, South Norway, North 
Norway), forces allocated to the entire Northern region as a 
whole, and the strategic reserves that SACEUR could deploy 
in the Northern, Central or Southern region at his own 
discretion. Moreover, the plan contained procedures detailing 
how reinforcements could be requested. [n case of war or 
crisis a demand could be made by the relevant national 
government. But for deployment to be executed, a unanimous 
decision would have to be reached by the NATO Council. 
A survey of all the units that could be used by SACEUR for 
reinforcements could not but seem impressive. Nevertheless, a 
closer look revealed strong limitations. First of all, there was 
no automatic guarantee that all the units would be made 
available for reinforcements. A decision to deploy would 
depend on needs in other areas. J'vloreover, the reinforcement 
units were general-purpose forces and not all were trained to 
meet the specific needs in a designated area. The question of 
how to protect the forces if they were deployed after hostilities 
had commenced was another issue. Deployment time would 
depend on the transportation mode chosen, bringing a Marine 
Amphibious Brigade (henceforth MAB) by ship from the US 
east coast would require 14 days, with a military aircraft the 
duration would be shortened to four. 
To secure rapid deployment while keeping airlift 
requirements at a minimum, the only option was to store 
heavy equipment, ammunition and supplies for reinforcements 
in the deployment area. But since this meant that an extra set 
of equipment had to be available for every reinforcement unit, 
costs were high. The extra equipment needed by one marine 
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amphibious brigade and stored in Norway was estimated to 
COSt approx. $300 million in 1979, at the time a prohibitivelv 
high sum. This Sllm would not be covered by NATO; ha ving a 
unit listed on SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan list did 
not guarantee any economic support from Brussels. The bill 
had to be divided between the sender and the receiver. 
Usually, the member sending units would pay for procurement 
and maintenance of the equipment. The receiver would cover 
support functions, transportation and additional equipment 
required. 
Allied exercises 
For reinforcement to be credible, the soldiers earmarked for 
deployment in Norway would have to know the setting. They 
also had to be aware of the Norwegian side's level of 
competence. Both sides had to know what to expect from the 
other. This could only be achieved though regular exercises. 
Exercises were also regarded as a strong expression of Alliance 
cohesion and as visible signals of Alliance commitment to the 
defence of Norway. Thus, the number and duration of 
exercises held in Norway have always been interpreted 
politically, as a sign of Norway's significance to the Alliance. 
Combined Norwegian-Allied exercises may be divided into 
two types, one covering staff exercises giving the military 
leadership the possibility of testing our decision-making 
procedures under different scenarios. Here, no real military 
forces were involved, but they gave the Norwegian officers the 
necessary training in commanding Allied forces if war or a 
war-like situation should emerge.''l' These exercises would 
often involve the same people and as an extra bonus close 
professional contacts were established. 
1", These exercises were known 3$ Keel' J\.ecl1 in rhe ] 9605, during the Finn1 
years of that decade Jlld dllflng rhe next, they were called E7lIex, Three 
Sword, and Wfjlltcr-Cil11£'x. 
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The other category included Express and Teamwork, both 
starting in the 19605. In the Express exercises units from AMF 
cooperated with the Norwegian brigade stationed in Northern 
Norway. The aim was to lay the ground for smooth 
cooperation in case of Allied reinforcements to Norway. 
During the 1970s, this was expanded to include Allied 
reinforcements with heavily equipped units. Teamwork 
denoted maritime exercises under the auspices of SACLANT, 
NATO's Atlantic command. The area affected by the exercise 
was huge with command decentralised to operational 
headquarters located among the littoral states. Some of these 
exercises, like Teamwork 76, included large-scale amphibious 
landing operations in Mid-Norway. Teamwork were large-
scale naval exercises with vessels from Britain, USA, Norway, 
the Netherlands, Canada and Germany. At times, French, 
Belgian and Danish vessels would participate. The purpose 
was to train for the deployment and reception of Allied 
reinforcements in Norway and Denmark. The number of ships 
increased considerably until 1976 only to drop sharply 
thereafter, reflecting the cutbacks in the US and British navies. 
In addition to Teamwork, exercise Northern Wedding was 
started in 1970. The main purpose was to train Allied forces 
in the reinforcement of the Northern European Command. 
Like Teamwork, Northern Wedding followed a four year 
cycle. 
In 1975, the Ocean Safari series was established with bi-
annual exercises. Focus was given to the readiness of forces 
and headquarters in naval operations, with particular 
emphasis on the control over vital sea lanes. 
The exercises indicated a strong Alliance commitment to 
Norway. The growth in the number of troops participating in 
the Express exercises may be taken as proof of this, going 
from 3800 Allied troops in 1964 to 17,000 twenty years 
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later. 100 But during the 1970s, US and British participation was 
reduced. This caused concern in Norway. US aircraft carriers 
spent a diminishing number of days in Norwegian waters. 
This did not change until the early 1980s when President 
Ronald Reagan increased the defence budgets. An additional 
factor was NATO's new naval concept, CONMAROPS 
passed in 1982; here the strategic importance of the 
Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic was underlined. 
Growing Soviet naval capabilities had further aggravated 
Norwegian concerns. Particularly the Soviet naval exercise in 
the summer of 1985 led to renewed Norwegian pressure for 
increased and longer US participation during exercises. IO' 
In addition to the large-scale exercises, bilateral agreements 
opened for Allied countries to send troops for winter 
exercises. A prominent case was the agreement with Britain, 
whereby military units were sent annually to Norway to train 
in the very setting where they were likely to be deployed in 
case of war. 
The exercises meant that troops from other countries could 
familiarise themselves with local conditions, especially sub-
arctic winter conditions. The exercises received in-depth 
coverage in the military journals. Analyses were published to 
assess \vhere improvements were needed. The views of 
prominent Allied officers were quoted; inadequate equipment, 
imbalances in the strength of land, navy and air units were 
pointed out. u)< A constant theme was the lack of mobility; 
European units did not have the necessary equipment to 
guarantee the transpOrt of units over longer distances. 
I,!', Tonne HuirfeJdr, NATO and the Northern Fh1l1k, Forsvarets hogskole, 
FHFS Ilotat, no. 6, 1986, p. 26. 
Ul7 This was clearly expressed in Defence 1\'iinister Anders C. Sjaastad's 
lecture entitled "l\1aririme Strategy and the Defence of Norway", given in 
Oslo l\1i1irxrc Samfund, and printed in Norsk Milita.~rt Tidsskrift, no. 2, 
1986. 
](J~ I1 "d )1 . 
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Command 
Exercises and reinforcement plans underlined Norway's 
exposed position as NATO's northern flank. The geographic 
location was an asset that endowed Norway with a degree of 
importance above its size as a small NATO member. Although 
not always taken into account, Nonvegian concerns were 
listened to. lO·' This was greatly facilitated by NATO's 
command structure, and the gradual build-up of institutional 
structures that facilitated the exchange of iuformation and 
viewpoints. 
During the early years, only the larger allies with sufficient 
bureaucratic resources were capable of exerting direct 
influence over the decision-making process. Norway differed 
little from other comparably sized members. This changed in 
the coutse of the 1950s when the institutional build-up of the 
Alliance made considerable progress. It became easier for 
smaller members with correspondingly limited resources to 
make their presence felt. Procedures were formulated in Paris, 
at the time the location of NATO's headquarters. 
On lower levels in the command structure, Norwegian 
officers held positions enabling them to convey Norwegian 
viewpoints and transfer inforn1ation to Oslo about 
contemporary and upcoming issues. Not surprisingly, having 
Norwegians inside the command structure was regarded as an 
important means of securing influence over the decision-
making process, and as a channel of information back home. 
Apparently, aspirations were frequently disappointed, with 
Norwegian applicants often loosing out in the competition 
with representatives from other member states. One 
explanation given was that Norwegians had too little 
lM This parr draws upon the research done by Karoliina Honkanen, The 
Il1fluellce of Sl1wll Stdil'S OH NA TO Dccisioll-Jvlakillg, tl)e Mcm!JL>fship 
Expericl1ces of DellJ1wrk, NOfl{lay, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 1001; and Bjerga and 
Skogrand, "Nato Planning and Decisi()n-~bking: A Small-State 
Perspective", forthcoming. 
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international experience. tlO Serving abroad was regarded as a 
bonus, only to be enjoyed once in your career. In other 
countries, especially the larger members states, this was less 
the case and their officers therefore had a considerable 
advantage. 
Allied Forces, Northern Europe (AFNORTH) was set up in 
1951 in London. In 1954 It was moved to Kolsas, just Outside 
Oslo. AFNORTH developed into a joint tri-service command 
with officers from six NATO-members serving. Since 1954, 
the commander-in-chief was always Cl British four-star-
general. The post of deputy commander-in-chief was rotated 
between a Danish and Norwegian general. Rotation between 
the two countries also applied to the post of deputy chief-of-
staff for joint operations. Thus, when a Norwegian officer 
served as deputy commander-in-chief, the deputy chief-of-sraff 
for joint operations would be Danish. 
In 1971, Allied Forces North Norway (NON) was 
established as a NATO command and located at Reitan, near 
Bodo in Northern Norway, where it remained until 2002. The 
cOlnmander was alWtlYs a Norwegian. In peacetin1e it was a 
national command. In crisis or war, the Norwegian 
government could transfer command authority to NATO. The 
same year NON was set up, Allied Forces Somh Norway 
(SONOR) was established as a NATO command located in 
Oslo, and from 1987 in Stavanger. 
Parallel ro the build-up of a Norwegian presence within 
NATO was the continued emphasis given to the bilateral ties 
with Britain and the United States. This was a legacy from the 
war years when leading politicians had underlined the 
necessity for Norway ro develop links with these two Atlantic 
states. One might argue that NATO was perceived as a 
"formalised framework for developing realistic plans for 
IF( Sce Rol" Eios, "Refleksjoncr fra min tjencste vcd NATO IvlILITARY 
CO!vlivIITTEE", lecture given at Oslo Milit,{?re Samfund, 28 November 
1988, primed in Norsk Mihhl!rt Tidsskrift, 1989 no. 1, pp. 1-9. 
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American and British military assistance to Norway."'" 
Norwegian security concerns were often raised bilaterally with 
London or Washington instead of using NATO, where not 
only bureaucracy might prove an obstacle bur Norwegian 
concerns would have to compete for attention with other 
issues. One outcome waS the bilateral Norwegian-American 
Study Group set up in 1976 to draw up plans for the defence 
of Northern Norway compatible with the doctrine of Flexible 
Response. 
Division 0/ responsibilities 
During the early years of NATO, the division of responsibility 
between the Allied command system and national authorities 
caused concern in Norway. The question was at what point 
Norwegian troops would be transferred to an Allied 
command, and if so, would Norwegian troops be deployed 
outside the country?'" Norwegian authorities were opposed to 
an all-out surrender of national command in wartime. The 
government worked hard to secure strong institutional 
safeguards permitting Norwegian influence over 
CINCNORTH and SACEUR decision-making. But this 
strategy was not without its paradoxes since strong Allied 
influence in the command structure was regarded as the only 
way of securing a strong commitment to the defence of 
Norway and adjacent waters. 
In 1953 attempts were made to delineate national and 
Allied competences. It was decided that every intermediate 
Allied command leading NATO troops in Norway was to be 
held by a Norwegian national. This principle was further 
strengthened in 1958 when the highest ranking operational 
commands in Northern and Southern Norway were placed 
III Bjerga and Skogmnd, "NatO Planning and Decision-Making". 
l!:: Sr.prp. no. 20 (1951), Om Stortillgcts sml1tykke lil at Norge deltar i 
opprettelsel1 at! et (elles k01Jlmalldos),stem og (elles (orslll1rsst),rker for 
Atlal1terh,wspaktens land, section "Forholdet mellom 
overstkommanderende og de nasjonale regjeringer". 
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within the national command chain in peacetime. The 
principle was confirmed in 1971 when the new principal 
subordinate commanders, COMNON and COMSONOR, 
were placed within the national command chain. In war or a 
crisis situation, the Norwegian government could decide to 
place the forces in the Allied command chain. 
In 1961, an agreement was signed dividing the areas of 
responsibility between SACLANT, SACEUR and the signatory 
countries, Norway among them. The agreement opened for 
CINCNORTH operating maritime patrol aircraft over 
SACLANT waters. Nine years later, in 1970, Norwegian 
submarines were assigned to SACLANT. Operational control 
waS to be exercised by the appropriate Principal Subordinate 
Commander, in Northern or Southern Norway. 
In 1984, HQ AFNORTH was reorganised. Command was 
simplified. This was done in order to create a headquarters 
structure that could be adapted from peacetime work to a 
wartime role as smoothly as possible. German and Canadian 
representation in the headquarters was made commensurate 
with their contribution to the Northern European Command. 
The nationalities balance within the headquarters was thus 
redrawn and the Anglo-American dominance reduced. 
AFNORTH was not the only headquarters affected. All major 
European subordinate commands went through a similar 
reorganisation process. 
Within NATO, the division between national and 
international responsibilities were worked out in the course of 
the years. Readiness and deployability remained national 
tasks. Deployment as logistic support remained mainly 
national responsibilities as well, although a clearcut line 
cannot always be drawn. NATO decided what national efforts 
could draw upon NATO funding, and to what extent. III 
IL~ NATO operates two budgets: Infrastructure; and Operating and 
Iviaintenancc. Cost-sharing formulae and annual budgeting processes are 
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Command issues caused tension between Norway and the 
US. In the 1970s and 1980s, the focal point was the size of the 
amphibious objective area (AOA), the land, sea and air space 
in which the amphibious commander for purposes of force 
protection, needed complete control with all movements in the 
air, on the ground and at sea during the critical landing phase. 
According to the USMC doctrine, the size of the AOA was so 
large as such most of Northern Norway including the Swedish 
ports in the region. The US requirement would have meant 
that civilian air traffic should be subjected to their control. 
The Norwegian authorities refused this transfer of authority 
outright. For exercise purposes a c0111promise was struck in 
that the AOA was reduced in size and tailored to fit the 
terrain. The theatre of operations was split in two with 
SACLANT having the responsibility for the sea area whereas 
the Defence Command North Norway maintained command 
authorities over land and airspace. I" How command and 
control would have been delimited in case of war, was not 
clarified. 
Recent changes 
With the end of the Cold War, international tensions eased. 
Together with Russias rapprochement with both NATO and 
the EU, the importance of the Northern flank declined with a 
corresponding increase in threats stemming from terrorism 
and instability in the Balkans, the Middle East and Northern 
Africa. 
Few disagreed that the redrawing of the command structure 
was necessary to meet the challenges posed by new threats. 
This meant a stronger emphasis on flexibility and mobility. 
The number of sub-commands would have to be diminished 
established separarely for each. Since NATO does nor have an operational 
budget, the members pay for their troop contributions individually. 
lH Kjell Inge Bjerga and Kietil Skogrand, "NatO Planning and Decision~ 
Making". 
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both in number and size. Whereas the larger members would 
face fewer problems in making their presence fdr. even in a 
leaner command structure, the smaller countries could soon 
find themselves left with little more than a nominal presence 
and thus on the receiving end of the decisions made. Norway's 
geostrategic location had been a valuable asset during the 
Cold War and had ensured a degree of influence which was 
not commensurate with the countris size and anlled forces; 
this asset was now less relevant. 
The first change occurred in 1994 when AFNORTH at 
Kolsas was dissolved and the command over NATO's 
northern area was placed with newly established 
AFNORTHWEST in Great Britain. Although this meant less 
prominence for Norway, the already close relationship with 
Britain was further consolidated and this might have 
sweetened the pill somewhat. In 1997 it was decided that the 
command structure should be redrawn again, as a result, 
AFNORTHWEST was dissolved and a new AFNORTH, this 
time located in Brunnsum in the Netherlands, was established 
in 2000. Its area of responsibility would cover the whole of 
Northern Europe, including Poland and the Baltic states once 
membership was finalised. 
The enlarged area as well as attention paid to the needs of 
the countries in line for membership meant that Norway faced 
an uphill battle in the fight for attention.'" But mOre 
important was the fact that the 1997 reform implied the 
closure for Joint Command North located at ]atta outside 
Stavanger in Western Norway. Loosing this meant less ability 
to make Norwegian viewpoints felt. An alternative strategy 
was devised to change the remit of the headquarters into a 
joint warfare centre that would play a central role in the 
transformation of the Alliance's armed forces. The Norwegian 
trump card was the considerable efforts that had been invested 
11;: See Sdle Ulriksen, Dell110rske (orsuarstradisjol1ClI: milittvmwkt rlfer 
folkefo,.,va,.?, Oslo: Pax, 2002, p. 239. 
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in the transformation of the Norwegian armed forces and the 
efforts to merge political and military leadership into a unified 
structure. Few other countries had a matching record in this 
field. In addition, Norway could offer excellent training 
facilities. 
In 2003 it was decided that NATO would establish a Joint 
Warfare Center at J'ltt,L The name fits the future areas of 
responsibility of the centre: Doctrinal development, 
operational planning, training and exercises . ./WC will be 
subordinate to the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) 
co-located with the United States Joint Forces Command 
(US]FCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia. ACT's prime task is to 
monitor and evaluate the transformation of the armed forces 
in the member countries to ensure that NATO is able to 
undertake missions jointly. The Center's work will be based 
on standards set by operational commanders. I", This will 
ensure that the most important sources of friction 
undermining cohesion and combat efficiency can be identified 
rapidly and minimised. The Center will be instrumental in 
collecting the lessons learned from multinational operations, 
and diffusing them to prevent past mistakes from being 
repeated. The Center will therefore have a key function in the 
transformation of NATO decided at the Prague Summit in 
2002. 
Multinationality by degrees 
In this section, the ways in which multinationality affected the 
Norwegian navy, air force and army will be sketched before a 
closer look will be taken at the role played by joint education 
in fostering cohesion across national differences. 
11" Remarks by Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani on the Joint \'Y/arfare 
Centcr Activation Ceremony, Stav,mger 23 October 2003, 
http://www.Gcr.NATO.lot 
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Naval cooperation 
Norway has long seafaring traditions and the navy has 
traditionally been strongly influenced by its British 
counterpart. The navy was to play a prominent role in 
averting Soviet attempts to seize control over the sea lines of 
communication (SLOC). The Norwegian Sea waS of utmost 
importance to NATO in case of war. More than 90 per cent 
of total NATO reinforcements would be seaborne:11' 
The initial stages of a NATO naval war, therefore, are 111(Jst 
likely to be a contest for rhe neutralization or disruption of 
the NATO receiving postS and a contest for the destruction of 
NATO carrier task forces. If the West could surmount these 
initial attacks, then the character of rhe war could change and 
a more protracted engagement might result, with surviving 
NATO naval units on the offensive and Soviet submarines 
Il~ focosing 011 the open ocean SLOe. 
This assumption was by no means confined to the American 
side of the Atlantic, but was widely shared in Norway and 
Britain as well." 9 This may explain why the navy became 
deeply integrated into Alliance cooperation. l20 
Naval cooperation had an important impact on the 
standardisation of equipment. National differences in this 
field impeded cooperation. Through a series of 
Standardisation Agreements, known as STANAGS, national 
differences have been reduced and as a result a comprehensive 
W Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies, p. 53. 
IIH Paul H. Nirzc et al., Securing the Seas: The Soufet Noll/a/ Challenge c111d 
W'estem Alliance 01)(ioI15, Boulder. Co!., 1979, p. 190. 
If" Nonetheless, Jordan gives the impression that this was an American 
concern, see Jordan, Alliance Strategy ami NaL!ies, p. 35. 
110 This is also clearly reflected in the navy journal, NOfSk tidsskrift for 
sjoucsell. The number of articles, analysis, commentaries, devoted to 
multinational cooperation b)' far surpasses (hose found in Norsk Milihvrt 
Tidsskrift, rhis being mainly an army journal. The sense of continuity was 
strongly emphasised in Arne Gronningsxter, "Norge ng NATO-
silmarbeidet", in Nors/.:. tidss/ai!! for sjoul!seJl, no. 8, October 1953, pp. 
306-11. 
codification system covering most items needed down to the 
smallest nuts and bolts is in force. This means that the vessels 
do not have to rely on national lines of supply should an 
emergency arise. Furthen11orc, there is extensive comI11onality 
in amnlunition. Fuel is, needless to say, universal. National 
differences do exist, especially in the systems procurement 
stage, but as far as can be ascertained, differences lessened in 
the course of the years. Technical solutions overcoming 
national differences have usually been developed, but not 
always applied. For instance the US and UJ( navies' satellite 
communication uses different frequency bands despite decades 
of close cooperation between the two. 
Often referred to as the prime example of multinationality 
is the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), 
which was set up in 1967 as a permanent multinational naval 
squadron consisting of vessels from the navies of various 
NATO members. If a crisis should arise, other vessels could be 
added together with air and amphibious groups, transforming 
it into a larger task force. Constant training and exchange of 
officers assured a high degree of operational efficiency. 
Air force 
Multinationality, understood as the levelling of national 
differences, has been greatly facilitated in the air force by the 
reliance on the US for equipment and training common to 
most Alliance members. Some West European countries, i.e. 
France and Britain, developed their own production lines, but 
for smaller countries this would have been immensely costly. 
Even in the case of countries that have opted for a greater 
degree of national production, US technology has often played 
a key role. 
As in the case of the navy, English was the undisputed 
language of communication. Pilots, whether military or 
commercial, had to be able to communicate in English. This 
was the language used by the internationally linked air-traffic 
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control systems. Like in the case of the navy, an Air 
Standardisation Committee has promoted cooperation. 
Air defence systems have been fnlly integrated under the 
command of SACEUR, although the constituent elements are 
largely national. NATO has played an important role in the 
funding. NATO sponsored a tactical leadership programme to 
enable air forces from the entire Alliance to train and work 
together. Specifically, the focus was on the planning, and 
conduct of multinational operations at the tactical level. 
Despite the progress made, technical differences persisted to 
hamper cooperation. This concerned particularly air-to-air 
refuelling. Similarly, air-to-air weapons were not universally 
compatible either. Nevertheless, this was mitigated through 
the NATO cross-servicing system regularly practiced by all the 
air forces and intended to solve precisely such problems by 
familiarising the different crews with each others' equipment. 
Likewise, it was used to pinpoint the areas where 
standardisation is required. Among these was identification-
friend-m-foe (IFF) in both air-to-air and air-to-ground and at 
sea. A common system capable of resolving all the problems 
associated with security, anti-jam and spoofing, i,e. the spread 
of disinforrnation via electronic means, and which can be 
fitted to the different weapons systems at a reasonable price 
has not been found, 
The army 
Glancing though the volumes of Norsk Militl1!rt Tidsskrift, 
which despite its name caters mainly to the army's needs, 
cooperation withiu NATO, developments in the armies of 
allies etc. were Ilot a priority.121 Especially during the first two 
post-war decades, close to the only reminder in this respect 
12\ This conclusion is further enforced by the faCt that the few anicles on 
llHllriniHioI1ilIity, often ;;lfe written by officers from either the navy or rhe air 
forcc l e.g. Comm;ll1dcr Birgcr Dalcn, "Norsk forsvar i NATO", Norsk 
Milihert Tidsskrift, no. 5, 1971, pp. 209-28. 
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was the annual address given by the lVlinister of Defence 
which mentioned NATO cooperation, but then often in rather 
general terms. Articles from this period dealing more 
specifically with defence planning, acquisition etc. pay scant, 
if any attention to multinational cooperation. Of all the three 
services, the army has been the least marked by 
multinationality. The main reason is the close link between the 
army and territorial defence. 
This was not an isolated Norwegian phenomenon. 
Compared with NATO's navies and air forces, the armies 
remained less affected by standardisation efforts. For instance, 
during the Cold War, the Allied army units deployed along 
the inner-German border had clearly delineated operational 
responsibilities and were supported by national lines of 
communication. Writing as late as 1995, Sir Roger Palin, 
research associate at IISS, took a rather sombre look at what 
had actually been achieved: 
Commercial and industrial considerations, the fear of total 
reliance on another nation for a vital supply item, and of the 
desire to retain the ability to act unilaterally outside the 
confines of the alliance have resulted in a system run almost 
entirely on nationallines. 1z2 
\X7ithin NATO, cooperation has more assumed the form of co-
ordination of plans. Below the level of controlling 
headquarters, no attempts were made to integrate or adopt 
multinational structures. In fact, before 1989 the examples of 
multinational integration were only the Allied Command 
Europe (ACE) Mobile Force Land and the LANDJUT HQ.") 
Il2 Pat in, Multilwtionai Military Forces, p. 46. His views arc supported by 
those of \'(!im van Eekelen, Secretary General of the \VEU, "International 
.Maritime Cooperation: the \VEU Perspective", paper prepared for rhe Sea 
Power Conference, London 5-6 1(13)" 1994. 
12.1- LANDJUT is a German-Danish corps established as early as 1962, for the 
defence of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. This is the oldest multinational 
corps in NATO. 
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The two army groups in the Central Region were made up of 
national corps with their own lines of comn1unication but 
working under an international headquarters. But in 
peacetime, these headquarters had no authority over the 
corps, and its role was limited to planning functions and 
participation in NATO exercises. NATO exercises attempted 
to train the national contingencies in their General Defence 
Plan role. Staffs would be coached in those aspects of their 
role that required multinational experience. During exercises, 
interoperability skills involving different units were trained 
with special emphasis given to communications. Plans also 
tried to take into account the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different units. Nevertheless, commonality in communications, 
munitions and equipment remained limited.'" After 1989, the 
establishment of new multinational army units had little to 
build on; this situation was very different from the traditions 
found in navies and air forces. 
Although the Norwegian army's lack of participation in any 
permanent multinational units differs little from other Allied 
annies, the extensive joint training and exercises conducted in 
Norway had a considerable impact on the arm)'. It was 
usually the same nnits that were sent to hone their skills in 
Norway, and in the course of the years a close cooperative 
relationship waS formed. This is clearly not multinationality 
on a level with the permanent force units established between 
Germany and France, the Netherlands and Germany. 
Nonetheless, dnring interviews, this regular form of joint 
training has been pointed out repeatedly as an efficient tool to 
reduce problems and make multinationality work. 
Poolillg ill practice: NAEW! 
Norwegian participation in NATO's airborne early warning 
system is a prime example of the beneficial effects of 
multinationality. During the 1970s, the build-up of the Soviet 
1"-1 Palin, Multinatiol1ai Alilitary Forces 1 p. 56. 
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Northern Fleet with home ports on the Kola Peninsula, and 
the strengthening of \·Warsaw Pact capacities to launch air 
attacks, forced NATO to built up a surveillance capacity as a 
response. In 1975, the NATO Military Committee 
recommended the introduction of an airborne warning and 
control system, known as NAEW (NATO Airborne Early 
\Varning force). Three years later, a memorandum of 
understanding was signed between 13 participating countries, 
i.e. NATO less France and Iceland, for joint procurement of 
NAEW aircraft.'" This turned out to be the most expensive 
commonly owned acquisition programme in NATO's 
history. ",. 17 aircraft were jointly owned and operated by 13 
member countries. '" The crews were fully integrated both in 
peacetime training and during operations. In addition, the 
tactical evaluation team was internationally staffed. 
NAE\V represented a breakthrough because it opened up 
for joint funding, acquisition, operation and maintenance 
costs. But it was not a deal swiftly or easily made. Arriving at 
an acceptable division of costs and benefits for the countries 
involved was a lengthy process. The most cost-efficient, i.e. 
cheapest way would have been to purchase all the planes and 
the radars needed from the United States, since the equipment 
was already in production there and units costs would have 
been lower if the production run had been extended to meet 
European needs. But if the equipment had been bought ofi-
the-shelf, it would have affected the balance of payments in an 
unacceptable way especially for the smaller countries. 
Furthermore, the European partners were eager to extract as 
much spin-off as possible in the form of employment and 
access to US R&D. Thus, European involvement had to be 
included in some way to offset these factOrs. The offset 
L'.; In addirion, Great Britain purchased 11 Nimrod planes. 
1':" "The NATO Airborne Early Warning Force", 
htrp:llww\\'.c3a.nato.intiinfo/ddilult.htm accessed 12 December 2003. 
1!~ In addition, Britain has a fleet of six aircrafts. 
problem was solved through co-production agreements that 
certainly benefited European industry but had a detrimental 
effect on costs.'" Nevertheless, NAEW is reckoned as a major 
breakthrough because it constituted a collective response to a 
collective need all agreed had to be covered, and it was done 
through pooling the resources. 
The northern flank was designated a priority area for 
NAEW. Norway joined in 1978, with mixed feelings. The 
planes would require a base in Norway for maintenance and 
refuelling. The Norwegian authorities were concerned that 
this would have detrimental effects on the relationship with 
the Soviet Union. Norwegian participation therefore came 
with strings attached, among them clear limitations on the 
number of flights operating from Norway."" Norwegian 
concerns over aCcess to decision-making was met in the 
NAEW charter where it was stated that Norway was to have 
decisive influence over the operational concept for 
employment in Norwegian areas of interest. Furthermore, 
operations here were to be controlled by the Norwegian 
military authorities. The Norwegian side insisted that 
operations plans should nOt undermine Norwegian efforts to 
111aintain a low level of tension. I \(l 
Olltside money 
Funding either by NATO or by the United States has played a 
key role in promoting multinational solutions. In recent years, 
the upgrading of the defence sectors in the new Central 
European members has received a significant boost through 
donations of equipment, favourable loans or direct grants. 
I'::, James R. Golden, NA TO Burde1l-Sharil1!!" Risks dlul OIJ/JOrtltllitics, New 
York: Pracger Publishers, 1983, p. 47. 
Il" St:t: TUIllne:., "Flankeproblcmcr", pp. 112-13; and Arnold Lee Tessmcf, 
Politics of Compromise, NA TO m1Li A \\lA CS, \,\lashington D.e.: National 
Defence University, 1988, pp. 138-39. 
]lii Sr.meld. no. 39 (1978-79), Norsk dcltakclsc j NATO's llf/I/J.lr11c kOl1lroll 
og l'Llrslillgsstyrkc, pp. J-2. 
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This is not very different from what Norway and other 
European NATO-melllbers received in the 1950s and 1960s. 
During the early years of NATO, large amounts of US arms 
were donated to the new members under the auspices of what 
became known as the \'q ea pons Assistance programme. In 
addition, NATO's members were entitled to draw upon the 
Alliance's infrastructure programme for the financing of 
projects of common importance. The funds came from the 
membership fees paid by each country, and with the US share 
reaching on average between 25 and 30 per cent, it dwarfed 
all others. J1I NATO would cover a share of total project costs, 
the recipient country the rest. The division of costs would be 
decided on the basis of the recipient country's economic 
strength. 
The investments in Norway conducted under the auspices 
of the infrastructure programme reached impressive 
proportions. By the mid 1990s, it had reached an accumulated 
total of 33 billion Norwegian crowns. Funding reached top 
levels in the 1950s and the 1980s, both times reflecting 
heightened international tensions. LlZ 
The infrastructure programme proved doubly beneficial to 
Norway in that it had considerable civilian spin-offs. The 
construction of new airports, and the upgrading of existing 
ones, was partly financed by NATO. Likewise, telephone and 
radio communication throughout the country waS vastly 
improved, and new cables tying Norway to Britain and 
Denmark were co-financed with NATO. During the first 15 
years, equipment estimated to be worth NOK 6 billion was 
d d . I' III (mate ,a staggerIng sum at t le nme ... 
NATO investments in Norwegian military infrastructure 
played an instrumental role in the work for standardised 
III Tamnes, "Flankeproblcl11cr", p. 64. 
Ll..' Ibid" p. 64; cf. table "'Infrastruktur i Norge finansierr over NATOs 
blldsjctr" (Infrastructure in Norway financed through NATO), p. 77. 
lHT. Torsvik, "15 ar i NATO" (15 years in NATO), Norsk tidsskrift (or 
sjouescl1, no. 10, 1964, pp. 517-36, p. 524. 
ONE SIZE FITS ALL? 89 
solutions assuring inter-member compatibility. The 
Norwegian officer Tonne Huitfeldr concludes in his analysis 
of the investments that they had two functions. IH One was 
their practical value, i.e. they were needed to facilitate 
practical cooperation, but since they were also an expression 
of Alliance solidarity, they carried a strong poliricalmessage . 
.T oint educatiol1 
Joint education is another mechanism for instilling a sense of 
cohesion on men from different countries. National 
peculiarities are evened. From an early point in the history of 
the Alliance, officers from all sections of the armed forces 
were sent abroad for training. The basic idea was that by 
letting officers from different member countries follow the 
same curriculuiJI, a common understanding of how a crisis 
should be met would be achieved. In addition, by getting to 
know each other, a better understanding of the cultural 
differences and therefore how a colleague from another 
country would perceive a problem, would ensue. lE 
Some of this was done through bilateral exchange 
programmes whereby officers enrol in an educational 
establishment in another country for a short-term course or to 
receive a full education. In the latter case, the country sending 
the students may be unable to offer the necessary training. 
Nevertheless, despite the higher costs national education for 
officers was often maintained. The main reason was very often 
that without the national training, technical and tactical 
expertise would be dissolved and lost. These clusters could be 
drawn upon when procurement WaS planned and contracts 
negotiated. They provided small countries with a protective 
114 Huitfeldt, NATO ond the Northern F1allk, p.ll. 
11,\ For <l presentation of Norwegian experiences, see Group Captain Annar 
Thinn, "NATO Defence College, tredvc ad", Norsk Militccrt Tidsskrift, no. 
11,1981, pp. 547-50, 647. 
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buffer against being unduly pressed by the larger partners, be 
they allies or industrial contractors. 
Joint education also covers joint educational establishments 
led and funded by the Alliance. The oldest, NATO Defence 
College was established in 1951, only two years after North 
Atlantic Treaty was signed. It was initially located in Paris, 
and then moved to Rome in 1966. The College is directly 
subordinated to the NATO Military Committee. Student were 
selected with a view to their future positions, or to quote the 
founding paragraph: " [ ... ] selected personnel who may be 
required to perform important duties in or associated with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to promote ll1utual 
understanding within the Alliance" .Il" Three vacancies were 
allocated annually to Norway, one usually given to a civilian, 
the other to a senior army officer. The navy and the air force 
alternated in filling the third position. L17 
In addition to the obvious benefits of joint schooling listed 
here, yet another aspect applies strongly in the case of 
Norway, and one may assume in the case of other small 
countries as well. Participation was a way of demonstrating 
that even a small member brought skills and experience that 
were an asset for the Alliance. Earning the respect of other 
schoolmates was an effect that should uot be overlooked, 
however difficult it may be to pinpoint. This seems especially 
to have been the case with Norwegian navy officers who often 
had longer sailing experience than their colleagues from the 
larger countries. Earning the respect of the other gave them a 
feeling that Norway was worthy of reinforcements, and that 
the recipients would be able to meet with the requirements 
this imposed. 
u" Founding paragraph quoted in Thinn, p. 647. 
p- COI11I11.mdcr E. Eibnger, "NATO Defence College", Norsk tidsskrift lor 
" ""19"1 '1" S]OU('S(!I1, no. ), 0, pp .. 1 -.")J. 
ONE: SIZE Fn':;; ALL? 91 
Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping is often overlooked when multinationality is 
discussed. This is understandable insofar as larger nations are 
concerned. For their smaller counterparts, peacekeeping has 
been significant as a foreign policy tool, bur also because it 
has involved a sizeable share of manpower.'lS Since 1945, 
Norwegian units have participated in around 40 missions 
abroad, close to 30 of them under a UN flag. 1.\" 
The largest of these did not take place under a UN flag, but 
was a part of the Allied occupation of Germany. From 1947 
to 1953, a total of 50,000 uniformed men participated in 
what became known as the German brigade. The plans for a 
Norwegian contingent had been drawn up during the war. 
British authorities had originally asked Norway to come up 
with "a small division of 12,000 men".'·'<I This was well 
beyond what Norway could contribute. In the end, Norway 
sent off a small brigade of 4000 men. The brigade was placed 
under British command. Sending off the soldiers to participate 
in the occupation was not a decision made without 
reservations. If the Cold \Xlar were to turn hot, Norwegian 
soldiers would be withdrawn to cover national defence needs. 
Throughout the Cold \Xl3r, Norwegian involvement in 
peacekeeping grew at a steady pace. The longest, and largest 
was the UN Interim Force in Lebanon set up in 1978. Over 
the course of the next twenty years, more than 21,000 
Norwegians served there. 
Peacekeeping was multinational in a broad sense in that 
missions were undertaken by units from more than One 
country, and these units had to cooperate to succeed. The 
degree of multinational coordination differed from mission to 
1\:" Scc Hirofimu Shimizll Jnd Todd )andler, "Peacekeeping and Burden-
Sharing, 1994-2000", ]oumal ol Peace Research, vol. 39, no. 6,2002, pp. 
651-68. 
"'}' F l' J '00' 1-orsuarefs OTf/m, no. _, une _ , ), p. .'>. 
I-Ill Ibid. 
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mission. But peacekeeping exposed the men to an environment 
that in every way was remote from what they knew, and they 
were forced to adapt. 
Peacekeeping provided international standing and was 
therefore politically useful. It also provided small states with a 
niche that larger conntries were reluctant to fill. Small states 
are less likely to be accused of acting out of imperialist 
motives. Moreover, peacekeeping did not require heavy, 
advanced or expensive equipment. And above all, it was 
relatively low-risk. 
These distinctive features are no longer as evident today. 
Peace enforcement operations have contributed to this 
blurring. The kind of peacekeeping operations known from 
the Cold War period whereby the UN requested troops to 
monitor a truce or peace agreement, has been supplemented 
by operations that presuppose more military muscle. For 
smaller countries, this is not necessarily a welcome 
development. It is politically more difficult to commit soldiers 
to what are clearly more risky operations. This, together with 
increased costs, has triggered cooperative efforts between the 
Nordic countries to come up with a joint peacekeeping 
element that can be deployed when called upon. This will be 
discussed next. 
SHIRBRIG 
A Danish initiative taken in 1994 led to the establishment of 
the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (henceforth SHIRBRIG). 
The then Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hrekkerup and 
Koffi Annan, at the time head of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, had discussed the need for fast and 
adequate reactions to limit and quell emerging crises. Both 
agreed that this required multinational forces that were not 
composed on an ad hoc basis, but units that were well 
integrated as a result of joint training and manoeuvres.141 
'" !:!tm:llwww.$HJRBRIG.dk 
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Denmark pursued the idea contacting other countries with a 
long peacekeeping record. Response was positive. Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Rumania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Austria 
voiced their interest. In January 2000, all the countries with 
the exception of Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, had earmarked 
all-in-all 4500 men, sufficient to constitute a brigade. 
The brigade is part of the UN Stand by System whereby 
countries report units the United Nations can call upon for 
UN-mandated missions. But the ultimate decision on whether 
to send soldiers or not rests with each contributing country. 
Within the brigade, there are two units trained to fulfil the 
same role. In this way, the brigade has an in-built flexibility 
rarely seen in other multinational units. The possibility that 
one of them might choose to refrain from participation is 
therefore unlikely to hinder deployment. 
The units are stationed in their respective countries but are 
trained according to jointly agreed standards. They also meet 
for exercises. Running expenses are covered by each country, 
but once deployed on a UN peacekeeping mission, expenses 
are refunded by the UN. If a crisis situation arises, an advance 
command unit should be deployable within two weeks once 
the national parliaments have given their acceptance. For the 
main force, the time limit is 30 days. The brigade will not be 
deployed for more than six months. Once that period is 
completed, other peacekeeping forces must take over. 
The leadership of SHIRBRIG is divided in two, the Steering 
Committee and the Planning Element. Representatives from 
all the participating countries meet in the Steering Committee. 
This is where political and economic decisions are made. 
SHIRBRIG's permanent military staff makes up the Planning 
Element. It is located in Hovelte in Denmark. Operational and 
logistical training for the staff itself and the heads of the 
SHIRBRIG units is undertaken here. In addition, the Planning 
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Element bears the responsibility for the development of 
common procedures and standards for Sl--lIRBRIG. 
The UN has called upon Sl--lIRBRIG three times, although it 
has so far only been deployed once. The first time was in April 
2000 when plans where made to send units to southern 
Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal. But the 
withdrawal was completed sooner than the outside observers, 
including the UN, had expected, and an interim solution to 
enhance the capacities of the peacekeeping units already there 
had to be found at short notice. This urgency precluded the 
deployment of Sl--lIRBRIG units. 
The second and third time coincided. In late June 2000, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea eutered on a cease-fire agreement. The 
UN was asked to send peacekeeping units to police the 
agreement. The UN turned to Sl--lIRBRIG. The Sl--lIRBRIG 
countries agreed, but no decision was made on what elements 
to send before another UN request was transmitted. This time 
the UN urgently needed forces to assist the faltering United 
Nations operation in Sierra Leone. The Sl--lIRBRIG countries 
rejected this request unanimously stating that this would 
overstretch the resources available. Instead it was decided that 
Sl--lIRBRIG should support the UN mission in Eritrea. 
Norwegian support for Sl--lIRBRIG was reluctant. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was all in favour of Norwegian 
participation, with the Ministry of Defence supported by the 
Supreme Command expressing reservations. The Ministry 
feared that SHIRBRIG would be used for peacekeeping in 
regions and conflicts of little if any relevance to Norwegian 
security. Contributions to Sl--lIRBRIG could potentially make 
it difficult for Norway to provide men for NATO missions. If 
so, SHIRBRIG could undermine Norway's credibility as an 
Alliance partner. 
NORDCAPS 
Norwegian hesitancy towards SHIRBRIG did not mean that 
the Norwegian government scorned the idea of joint Nordic 
efforts. Consultations between the Danish and Norwegian 
lVIinisters of Defence in the summer of 1996 led NORDCAPS, 
(Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace 
Support). The idea was to provide a framework for Nordic 
participation in peace support operations mandated by the 
United Nations. Whereas SHIRBRIG was to be used for 
peacekeeping, NORDCAPS would be deployed to control 
armed conflicts. 
Under the auspices of NORDCAPS, each country may 
report units available for peace-enforcement to a cOl11mon 
force pool, but the decision to send them rests with the 
government of each country. Thus, there is no binding 
commitment enforcing a member state to join the others if 
they should choose to deploy theirs. But the aim was to come 
up with forces amounting to a brigade, a size that would be 
commensurate with the requirement of visibility and influence. 
Joint exercises have been held annually since 1997. The idea 
is that only those units likely to be deployed in the field on a 
mission will train together. The exercises are instrumental in 
the development of common procedures as well as common 
c0l11mand, control and C0l11111unications systenls. It remains 
the responsibility of each country to make sure that its men 
meet the necessary requirements to undertake the missions. 
NORDCAPS is supervised by two organs: The Steering 
Group and the Military Coordination Group. The Steering 
Group consists of director generals or deputy permanent 
secretaries of state for defence from the contributing countries. 
The group meets every six months; the chairman rotates 
between the participants on an annlIal basis. 
The Military Coordination Group meets every second 
month. Its members are senior officers. Pending on the issues 
on the agenda, they may bring with them national experts and 
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advisors. The Group is responsible for issuing military advice 
to the Steering Group. The chairmanship rotates on a bi-
annual basis. 
The only permanently staffed body within the NORDCAPS 
framework is the Planning Element. It fulfils a military staff 
function for the Military Coordination Group which also 
decides its size and function. The member countries assign 
personnel to the Planning Element, the norm is two officers 
from each nation. Experts may be temporarily assigned to the 
Planning Element if needed in the preparation for a specific 
task. The Planning Element is responsible for keeping the 
force pool up-to-date. Within NORDCAPS, NATO 
procedures and definitions will be used to the widest extent 
possible. This has certainly been facilitated by Swedish and 
Finnish membership in NATO's Partnership-far-Peace 
programme. 
NORDCAPS represents a net gain for all the Nordic 
members. It helps overcome the dividing lines created during 
the Cold War. For Sweden and Finland, NORDCAPS is a step 
towards stronger westward links. On the practical level, 
NORDCAPS enables the countries to train their officers to 
take command over a multinational brigade. This makes them 
relevant in a wider context. This is one of the concrete positive 
results that can be attributed to NORDCAPS. 
It is still too early to arrive at any lessons learned. But 
national restrictions make it questionable to what extent 
NORDCAPS will be able to react as swiftly as planned. This 
concerns in particular Denmark which has reservations about 
participating in any EU-Ied military mission, even if the EU 
were to request assistance from NORDCAPS. '" Likewise, 
Finnish participation is subject to constraints. Although 
Finnish soldiers may participate in peacekeeping, peace 
H~ "Dmmmrk lIil ikke kWlIle del/age 111c.1 milittl!re styrker i EU-ledede 
militcere krisest),ril1gsoperatiol1er", bilag ril Forsvarsministerens skrivelse af 
24 November, 2000. Kobenl13vn: Forsvarsministeriet, 2000. 
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enforcement is a closed option. Furthermore, Sweden 
harbours reservations against letting NORDCAPS be used in a 
NATO context. This makes a strange contrast to Norway 
. , 
which despite not being an EU-member, has declared its 
will ingness to contribute militarily to an EU-led force 
provided that Norway has access to the command structures. 
From a Norwegian perspective, Britain's decision to enter a 
cooperation agreement with NORDCAPS in April 2002 was a 
significant step forward. It would boost the credibility of the 
NORDCAPS arrangements, and it would do the same for the 
bilateral relations between Norway and Britain. 
The scope for Nordic muitinationality 
If the Nordic countries are able to modernise their armed 
forces and develop niche capacities, they will make the move 
from nice-to-have to need-to-have when a coalition is 
assembled.'" But whether this will mean that they pool their 
resources to form a Nordic segment within a coalition, is not 
yet clear. For all the countries, the attractions of cooperating 
with countries that play a leading role in a specific field 
supersede the wish to engage in binding and comprehensive 
cooperation with their neighbours.'" l\{oreover, the 
complications ensuing from different Alliance memberships 
and individual reservations complicate the ability to act in 
unison. It should be added that this may not always be an 
impeding factor. Although it would have been far easier to 
push a particular Nordic viewpoint in the EU or NATO had 
all been members, the countries' memberships complement 
each other. To Sweden, Norway is a source of information on 
HJ This phrase is borrowed from Major Jens .Jorgen Hansen, 
Forsvarsspecia/isering i de llordiske Imide, Research~brief no. 8, Kobenhavn: 
Dupi,2001. 
144 This was rhe conclusion drawn by students at the Norwegian staff college 
who had been working on the porentials for Nordic cooperarion, Oslo 
2003. This view has also been expressed during tln interview wirh .lames 
Hursch, Inrernarional section, Danish Minisrry of Defence, January 2000. 
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proceedings within NATO, and Sweden and Denmark may 
serve in the saI11C capacity with regard to processes within the 
EU. In some cases, Sweden has consulted Norway on changes 
to the PIP programme which Sweden has joined. Norway has 
subsequently supported the proposals in NATO. "5 
Joining the pfp programme was a major part of Swedish 
and Finnish efforts to expand contacts with NATO. ",. 
Neutrality is no longer a guiding principle. Both countries 
have underlined the fact that national security is best 
maintained through extensive cooperation with other 
countries. Swedish official documents have underlined the 
need for a continued US engagement in European security.'" 
Denmark has so far been similar to Norway in that both 
countries are outside the EU's common security and defence 
policy. The present Danish government has voiced its interest 
in scrapping the exemption in an upcoming referendum. On 
this, they enjoy the tacit support of the largest opposition 
party, the Social Democrats. But Danish defence debate and 
reforms already seem to be geared towards developing the 
capacities the EU will need.'" 
Plans that have been discussed for possible joint Nordic 
efforts have involved strategic airlift, a capacity in short 
supply in NATO and in the EU."" On their own, the Nordic 
countries would not be able cover this gap. Instead, the 
\4\ For a survey of Norwegian-Swedish defence and security cooperation, sec 
Rolf Tarnncs, "Norge og S\'erige: frcnmridigc stratcgiskc parrnere?", in Erik 
Rossander (cd.), P6rel1i11gcl1 FHS 1953-2003, Stockholm 2003. 
14" See Njord \'\1eggc, Med B1'llssei S()111 t)'Hgdepullkt? Svel1sk og fillsk 
sikkerhets/Jo/itikk i det l1)'e Etlro/hl, Forsvursstudier, no. 5, Oslo: Institutt 
for forsvarssrudier, 2003. 
H'e "Utrikesdeklarationen: Regeringens deklaration yid 2002 utrikespolitiska 
deb~ltt i riksdagen onsdagen den 13 februari 2002". 
l4\<, Ibid.; and Nlichael H. Clcmmescn, "NATO lite", W'eekcndl.llliscll, 25 
April 2003. 
141 Norbert Eitelhuber, "Europaische Streitkriiftc unter dem Zwang cler 
Bcscheidung Partner der USA nur bei friedenssichernden Einsiitzen" 1 SW? 
Stlldiel1, no. 8, March 2003; Hansen, FOl'sl'arsspecid/isering i de l10rdiske 
[d11de; ElIehulls, AIIlIltinatio11al Solutions l'e1'SIlS IHtra~Aflii.111Ce Specialisation. 
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Nordic countries currently using C 139 Hercules planes could 
form a pool with other European countries ho!<.ling these 
planes in their inventories for their transport needs. If pooled, 
maintenance costs could be reduced. Here pooling makes 
economic sense. \Xlhen Germany and the BeNeLux countries 
decided to purchase Airbus A400M planes in 2001, it was 
decided that maintenance would be undertaken jointly with 
costs split depending On the number of planes each COuntry 
has purchased. The ability of the Nordic countries to cop)' this 
may have been precluded by the Danish decision made in late 
2003 to purchase three Hercules transport planes. 
The way armaments production is structured and supported 
in the Nordic countries may also impede integration. 
Differences here reflect size. Sweden dwarfs the other 
countries with the sheer size of its sector. The production of 
fighter planes plays a key role, and is one product where 
Sweden is competing with US F-16 and Eurofighter planes for 
orders in a glob,'l market. Spending on research and 
development has remained consistently high with funds both 
coming from public sources and the firms involved. Sweden 
and Finland's non-alignment policy was reflected in a heavy 
reliance on domestic products.'iI) The two countries 
cooperated industrially in some fields. In comparison, the 
Norwegian industrial base is much smaller, concentrating on a 
few niche products. In both Norway and Sweden, research 
establishments conduct a wide variety of work on the 
development of technology for the defence sector. In Norway, 
much research also concentrateS on how imports must be 
modified to meet the requirements posed by the climatic and 
topographic conditions. In Denmark and Finland, research 
has operated much more on a "technology watch" basis, and 
thus had more or less the role as a channel of information on 
developments abroad to the national defence sector. These 
I_'u Domestically produced Of not, Swedish aero5pace iI1du~tr}' remains 
strongly dependcnt on US technology. 
differences cannot fail but have an impact on industrial 
cooperation. 
Nordic industrial coolJeratioll 
Developments in the European armaments sector throughout 
the 1990s influenced the Nordic defence industries. These 
developments can be summed up in three words: Downsizing, 
integration, monopolisation. Important milestones have been 
the consolidation of British Aerospace, which after a series of 
acquisitions of smaller European firms, is now on Iy surpassed 
by the US firm Lockheed Martin in turnover; and the merger 
of the German DASA with the French Aerospatiale Matm and 
the Spanish CASA into EADS (European Aeronautics, Defence 
and Space). EADS is now among the ten largest international 
armaments producer. The possibility that British Aerospace 
and EADS might choose to pool their resources with one 
gigantic European firm as a result, should not be ruled out. 
EU efforts to create a military pillar will influence European 
armaments production positively in the years ahead, although 
the final shape and size of the sector remains uncertain. 
These developments triggered Nordic defence enterprises to 
explore the potential for cooperation. The limited size of the 
enterprises when compared with the larger European ones left 
them in a more vulnerable position to market changes. The 
drop in demand at the beginning of the 1990s hit all badly, 
but the Nordic countries had few protective buffers and found 
it hard to find new markets outside their own countries. If 
politicians and industry could work together, drastic cutbacks 
and closures could be prevented and the industry might 
emerge both "leaner and meaner". The political interest in 
furthering this process was also motivated by the desire to 
promote Nordic cooperation in a field that had so long been 
out of bounds, namely security. 
In November 1992 the Nordic defence ministers decided to 
establish a working committee with the mandate to look at 
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the potential for closer cooperation in the production and 
procurenlent of armaments. TVlO years later, in December 
1994, the four countries signed an agreement on this issue; the 
agreement was renewed in late 2000. In May 1995, the 
defence commands from the four countries jointly signed an 
agreement concerning armaments cooperation. This has been 
replaced by a more recent version in 2001. 
The intentions behind the agreements were to provide a 
framework for mutual exchange of information on planning 
and procurement. The agreements can facilitate closer 
coordination and possible joint efforts in research and 
development, and procurement. This would in turn pave the 
way for increased interoperability, necessary not least for 
Nordic peace operations in the years to come. As the dates for 
the agreements indicate, they have not been in force long, and 
it is still too early to draw any definite lessons from what their 
effects have been.'" Indeed, in some of the most recently 
published evaluations of Nordic industrial cooperation in 
armament, they get little more than a polite mention."2 
Nonetheless, the joint Nordic projects that have been 
launched have depended on political backing. One such 
example is NAMMO. 
NAMMO is the acronym for the Nordic Ammunition 
Company. The company specialises in the manufacturing of 
ammunition, propulsion and demilitarisation technologies. It 
has approx. 1500 employees in Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Germany. In many European countries the production of 
L<I There is a question of method at stake here. There is nO register of firms 
that have entered cooperation agreements under the auspices of this 
agreement. Nevertheless, the importance of the agreement was repeatedly 
underlined by Norwegian and Swedish armaments producers at a Nordic-
Central European rOllnd table nn armaments cooperation arranged by the 
Norwegian Tr;1de Council, Prague, January 2000. 
I\~ E.g. Preben Bonnen and Tccmu Palosaari, "On rhe Road to., Nordic 
Defence Co-Operation? Bringing .Milit:1ry Issues Back to Politics", paper 
presented at the conference NO/'den at the Crossl'Oads, Helsinki. October 
2002; Hanscr1, FOfsL',Jl'ss/Jecialiserillg i de }1o/'diske ImIde. 
ammunition has continued to enjoy a degree of state 
protection even more con1prchcnsivc than other defence 
producers. This could have spelt doom for a relatively small 
Nordic company like NAMMO, but the enterprise has 
managed to survive not least because it has carved out a niche 
for itself within propulsion technology. 
But Nordic industrial cooperation has some less celebrated 
cases that should be included. Another venture where the final 
outcome deviated from the original, multi-Nordic plan was 
the Nordic Standard Helicopter Programme (NSHP). The 
firms behind spanned Swedish Aerotech Telub, the Danish 
Aerotech, and the Norwegian Astec Helicopter Services. The 
armed forces of all the four Nordic countries agreed to 
purchase 70 helicopters. LIl The project would have given the 
Nordic enterprises a competitive edge in the international 
market. Nonetheless, experts in all the countries involved had 
reservations about the wisdom of the project. In Finland, the 
need for a battlefield utility helicopter was doubted, and 
whether there was any common ground between Denmark's 
need for a search-and-rescue aircraft and the Norwegian 
emphasis on a multipurpose helicopter capable of undertaking 
both missions and logistics support was questioned.'H Thus, in 
September 200], Denmark announced that it backed out and 
would instead buy Westland/Agusta helicopters. 
The Nordic Viking submarine project represents another 
project that faltered. Plans were presented in ] 994 for the 
development and production of a submarine that could serve 
the needs of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Originally, ten 
boats were to be produced for delivery between 2009 and 
2016, with Denmark and Norway having ordered four each 
with the remainder destined for the Swedish navy. Yet, in 
1"\ CHe Helicopter Corporation, '·Scandinavian Helicopter Logistics 
AlIia nee", Media rciease, h up:/ /w\\'\\' oc;hc.ca/pfc-ss/;l pr! [ 1 0 () 1 astec.b rm 
)\·1 Giovanni de Briganti, "Nordic Procurement must proceed", Rotor illld 
YFillg, August 100:1. 
2002, Norway withdrew. The government claimed lack of 
funds. Another cause, although never openly admitted, had 
been the wish to break the production monopoly of the 
German Howaldtswerke Delltsche \Verft AG, (henceforth 
HDW). This monopoly covered the production of submarines 
suited for littoral warfare used by the Nordic countries. When 
HDW purchased Kockums, the Swedish industrial participant 
in 1999, continued dominance was secured. As a result, 
Nonvegian interest \\faned. 
The few cases mentioned here share the characteristic that 
they all deal with defence industry in the traditional sense. 
The distinction between the defence sector and the civilian 
market is being blurred, and some comments should be made 
on how this affects small countries. 
I-Iigh-tech firms, especially within biotechnology or 
information technology, supply virtually the same goods and 
services to clients inside or outside the defence segment. These 
enterprises share a set of characteristics that set them apart 
from those that make up the defence industry sector. Their 
products are based on long-term research and development. 
Defence is only one of many customers, most of whom are 
found abroad. Operating in a highly competitive international 
market environment, these firms are quick to spot promising 
trends. Bavarian Nordic, a Danish firm, is a recent example of 
an enterprise that has managed to land a significant contract 
with the US government a vaccine against smallpox.'" Other 
niche producers in the same sector suddenly discovered that 
their services are in high demand as a result of the increased 
apprehension over attacks with biological weapons. 
The small size of these firms means that they lack the 
resources, financially as well as in terms of manpower, 
required for lengthy negotiations with large-scale clients such 
as those found in the us defence sector. The acknowledgment 
15\ Ivlorten Crone, "Ny daI1sk forsvarsindustri", Berlillgskc TidClldc, 9 
November 2003. 
104 FOR3VARSSTUDIER 3/2004 
of this potential bottleneck has resulted in efforts on the part 
of some of the enterprise to exchange experiences and possibly 
cooperate not only with each other but with enterprises in 
other countries. Finally, being so thoroughly internationalised 
means that the choice of partner will not be influenced by 
nationality, but by what the firm in question has to offer. 
\'Vhether the development sketched out here will lead to more 
Nordic multinationality is therefore uncertain. From the point 
of view of the firms the question appears irrelevant. 
Conclusion 
This chapter started out by asserting that the prime asset 
Norway brought into the Alliance was its geostrategic 
location. From Norway, Russian naval movements in 
northern waters and the military developments on the Kola 
Peninsula could be monitored. But this location was also a 
source of concerns over the viability of Allied reinforcement in 
case of an attack. Plans drawn up by NATO specifying what 
units would be deployed to Norway if the need should arise, 
were a direct response to these worries. To get accustomed to 
the topography and the arctic climate, large-scale exercises 
were conducted in Norway with participation of these units 
and Norwegian troops. The exercises were a concrete 
expression of Allied interest in the Northern flank. As shown 
above, neither the exercises nor this relationship was 
unproblematic. This concerned in particular command issues 
where national interests and US principles clashed. Norway 
wanted to use the command structure within NATO to 
promote national interests and to ensure integration. These 
tWO objectives are not easily compatible. The challenge of 
achieving the one without compromising the other remains 
equally valid today. 
Another field that was lIsed to enhance integration within 
the Alliance was education. Schooling abroad, the long- and 
short-term exchange of officers became the norm in both the 
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na vy and the air force, to a lesser extent in the army. This 
gave the students an ~l\vareness of each other's national 
peculiarities that would be difficult to attain in any other way. 
This awareness is of considerable value since it will help 
reduce the adverse effects national differences have on 
multinational ventures. From a less altruistic perspective, 
training Norwegian officers abroad as well as enrolling 
students from Allied countries at Norwegian defence 
establishments was an important way of promoting Norway's 
credibility as an ally. And the need to demonstrare credibility 
is felt more keenly by a smaller partner than a large country.U" 
But costs also played a role here, joint schooling meant access 
to know-how that would have been too costly to provide 
nationally. 
With the end of the Cold War, the value of Norway's 
location to the Alliance declined. The improved relationship 
between Russia and the West meant that the likelihood of an 
attack on Norway had diminished drastically. Although there 
were some clear signs of tardiness in the Norwegian response 
to this change, NATO's transformation away from an 
exclusive focus on territorial defence to out-of-area operations 
was supported by the Norwegian political leadership 
irrespective of party colours. Nevertheless, the Norwegian 
perspective differed somewhat from that of the other 
European allies. Russia maintained strong military forces in 
the north, and it also questioned Norway's interpretation of 
the Svalbard Treaty and of the legal status of the zone and the 
shelf around the islands, something which constituted sources 
for concern to Norwegian politicians. From their perspective 
NATO remained a necessary safeguard for Norway, and 
without EU membership, one of the few forums where 
,-,n That is probably the reason why this is rarely, if ever mentioned in 
German or English literature on multinationality, whereas the outline for a 
comprehensive reform of Norwegian defence pubJished in 2000 underlines 
this pOInt. See Et lI)'tt forsvar, Oslo: NOU, 2000, p. 38. 
Norway had a say. Yet at the same time, it was clear that 
unless NATO was regarded as relevant by Washington, US 
interest would evaporate and the Alliance would be little mOre 
than an obsolete armed variety of the OSCE. Consequently, 
Norway supported the changes implemented within NATO 
towards more flexible, high-readiness forces capable of 
operating outside the membership area. This triggered a 
radical overhaul of Norwegian defence aimed at producing 
forces that could participate alongside Allied units. 
Participation was one way of ensuring relevance within the 
Alliance. The change in headquarters that had been 
implemented to reflect new threats affected Norway 
negatively. The loss of headquarters and the influence that 
comes along with it was balanced by the decision to establish 
a Joint Warfare Center at Jattii which will play a key role in 
defence transformation in the Alliance. 
One part of the Norwegian defence transformation was to 
explore the possibilities for multinational cooperation with 
the country's Nordic neighbours. The most notable results 
have been SHIRBRIG and NORDCAPS. Although national 
restrictions and different Alliance memberships limit the scope 
of what is possible, these differences have dwindled. This 
paves the way for new projects and forms of cooperations in 
training, education, logistics, research and development, 
procurement ete. The driving forces are easily discernible. By 
pooling their resources, smaller countries can expect to gain 
greater influence. This may be the case in peace operations, or 
in the negotiation for armament contracts. In the latter case, 
pooling means reduced costs. But pooling also implies that not 
only the benefits but also the burden is divided among the 
participants. That is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Dividing the Burden 
Burden-sharing is the term used to describe the different 
schemes lor how defence costs are divided among the member 
countries in NATO. This refers less to the costs for NA TO-
funded projects, the lions share of these has traditionally been 
covered by the US, but to the size of national defence budgets. 
Burden-sharing has a profound impact upon the transatlantic 
relationship within NATO. Burden-sharing has been an 
intrinsic part of the transatlantic dialogue. More often than 
nor, it has boiled down to the US side urging the Europeans to 
spend 1110re to assure a greater degree of parity, and thus to 
reduce what US politicians have occasionally labelled as 
"burden shedding". 
This chapter provides a survey of some of the problems in 
defining an equitable scheme for dividing the burdens of 
common defence. As will be shown, during the Cold War 
much depended on how each country's input was defined, and 
here differences abounded. With the end of the Cold War, the 
parameters for the debate on burden-sharing changed 
radically. The decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in 
.June 1992 to let NATO undertake operations out of area was 
welcomed by the European members, above all since it seemed 
to imbue the Alliance with new life. This sentiment must ha ve 
been dampened once it was realised that 1110st European 
countries lacked the training and equipment needed fot Ollt-
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of-area operations. This meant that the burden-sharing debate 
resumed, after a brief lull at the beginning of the 19905 when 
the viability of the Alliance was questioned. At this point, 
defence spending had slumped dramatically as most countries 
were eager to cash in on what was called the "peace 
dividend". As shown in the table below, spending remained 
low throughout the 1990s when compared with the 1985 
figures. 
European and US defence expenditure 1985-2001 (figures in 
constant 2000 US dollars) 
1985 2000 2001 
'X,GDP USSm 'YrJGDP US$m (X,GDP 
US$m 
Belgium 6,223 3,0 3,212 1,4 3,017 1,3 
Czech Republic nla 11/:1 1,148 J ' _,0 1,167 ? ) ,-
Denmark 3,161 1 1 2,395 1,5 2,409 1,5 -,-
France 49,378 4,0 34,053 2,6 32,909 ',6 
Germany 53,303 ' 1 0,_ 27,924 1,5 26,91J2 1,5 
Greece 3,521 7,0 5,528 4,9 5,517 4,8 
Hungary 3,588 7,2 805 1,7 909 1,8 
Italy 25,974 , ' -,,) 22,488 2,1 10,966 7,0 
Luxembour~~ 96 0,9 1'9 0,7 145 0,8 
Netherlands 8,991 3,1 6,027 "1,6 6,257 1,7 
Norway 3,12~ 3,1 2,~23 1,8 ',967 1,8 
Poland 8,706 8,1 3,092 2,0 3,408 2,0 
Portugal ],853 3,1 2,221 2,1 2,226 2,0 
Spain 11,398 2,4 7,063 1,2 6,938 1,2 
Turkey 3,470 4,5 9,994 5,0 7,219 5,0 
United Kingdom 48,196 5,2 35,655 1 --,) 34,714 2,5 
United States 390,290 6,5 304,136 3, "1 322365 ' ) _"1,-
. . Source: MdIlm:v Ba/oJ1ce 1002-2003, London: IISS. 2003 . 
Transatlantic tensions 
The debate over burden-sharing has gone in waves. The 
causes triggering it had often less to do with concerns over 
NATO capabilities than domestic economic problems. 
Whenever spending was cut to cover a fall in state income, 
defence budgets were affected. For several US administrations, 
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and in particular Congresses, this meant questioning whether 
US commitments to NATO represented too large a burden, a 
burden that would only be reduced by withdrawing troops 
from Europe. 
This was the case at the beginning of the 1960s when the 
US side pressed for the \'Vest-German government ro cover 
part of the costs of US troOps stationed there. At the same 
time, the US engagement in Vietnam turned costlier by the 
week. The German government had at the beginning of the 
decade entered into an agreement over German purchases of 
US weapons. This was intended as an indirect offset payment 
for the US deployment costs. But by the mid-hOs, budget 
problems made the German government ask to be relieved 
from the agreement. The US Secretary of Defence Robert 
McNamara threatened to cut US commitments to Germany 
and insisted that the payments should be made as agreed. 
McNamara's attitude had significant support in the US 
Senate. The majority leader Mike Mansfield introduced the 
first of what became known as the "Mansfield resolutions" 
calling for substantial troop withdrawals from Europe on the 
grounds that the Europeans were economically capable of 
paying more than they did. 
Yet, US efforts, especially congressional efforts to increase 
European spending by threatening to withdraw troops in 
response to insufficient European input, have hardly been an 
unmitigated success. For instance, German offset 
commitments were in fact reduced when a new government 
took office in 1966. 
In 1969, discontent waS voiced on Capitol Hill over alleged 
insufficient European spending with the possible withdrawal 
of US troops being discussed as a retaliatory measure. This 
caused alarm. In response, the so-called European Defence 
Improvement Program was set up in 1970, embracing all the 
European allies with the exception of Iceland, France and 
Portugal. The countries were referred to as the Eurogroup. L)7 
Firstly, as a result of the work in the Eurogroup, funding 
was provided for the implementation of an integrated 
communication system for NATO, as well as for improved 
protection of aircraft. Total costs were estimated at $420 
million; secondly, a five-year investment programme aimed at 
strengthening those national units assigned to NATO 
command was implemented. Total coSts were estimated to lie 
between $450 and 500 million. The third project embraced 
short-term measures to strengthen joint defence over the next 
twO years amounting to $79 million. 
Progress was swift. Already in 1972, the financial derails 
had been worked [Jut and detailed planning completed. 
Norway contributed $14 million, at the time equivalent to 
NOKI00 million. ", In return, the programme allotted $105 
million to investments in Norwegian military projects.';' 
Norway chaired the group in 1974. 
However, the Euro programme did not quell American 
dissatisfaction over insufficient European defence spending. In 
1973, the US Congress decided that unless the Europeans 
covered the US deficit on the military balance of payments, 
American soldiers would have to be withdrawn to cover the 
gap. The disagreement over burden-sharing at this time was 
fuelled by the generally problematic economic climate. 
Inflation was high. This affected defence spending. Several 
countries were being forced to scale down already agreed 
plans. 
The pressure from \Vashington notwithstanding, the US 
position on European payments and US troops withdrawals 
remained somewhat ambiguous. Congressional posturing was 
W Scc Se.meld no. 60 (1970-71), "Om samarbcidcr i Atlanterhavspakrens 
organisasjon i 1971", p. 9, and St.mcld. no. 65 (1971-72), p. 12. 
1;-» St.meld. no. 60, p. 12. 
n"' The main projects were rhe construction of protective hangars at military 
airports and upgrading of [he garrison in Porsanger in Northern Norway. 
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balanced by successive US administrations emphasising that 
troop withdrawals would only be aimed at as a part of a 
wider framework agreement with the Warsaw Pact on mutual 
reductions. 
Burden-sharing took a rather surprising turn in the 1980s 
with president Ronald Reagan's plans for a Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI). At this time, a missile attack was regarded as 
the most probable form of Soviet-led attack against the West. 
Provided the shield covered both North AmeriGl and Western 
Europe, SDI would have conferred public benefits to the 
European allies. 
Defining the share 
The debate on burden-sharing continued with increased force 
during the 1980s. The main positions did not change. Much 
of the attention was focused on how the member countries' 
share in the common defence should be defined. This proved 
to be a quagmire since there is no commonly agreed key as to 
how national contributions are measured. 
An ally that supports NATO infrastructure more than 
others will focus on this despite the fact that defence spending 
is well below the average for the other members. Any 
evaluation will be confounded by alternative ways of 
measuring, the problems of comparing spending, and the 
multiple missions of the Alliance. Different analysts arrive at 
different results. Counting tanks is easily done, but numbers 
alone reveal nothing about their state and capability. 
Moreover, unless the tanks can rely on adequate air support, 
they run a realistic danger of being obliterated in case of war. 
Thus, spending money on ranks may look good on the budget 
and endow a country with a relatively greater weight than 
other Alliance Jllembers, but it says little abour combat 
efficiency. 
Furthermore, a comparison based on annual contributions, 
either selecting a given year or a brief period, Jllay lead to the 
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wrong conclusions. Large procurement orders may boost the 
budget only to disappear the next year. Likewise, personnel 
costs may swing as a result of changes in peacekeeping 
missions, or foreign engagements. For instance, during the 
1960s, the US war in Vietnam meant that the American 
defence budget alone accounted for approximately 70 per cent 
of total NATO defence expenditures. Thus, no automatic 
linkage between numbers and efficiency should be assumed. 
To even out transatlantic differences in burden-sharing, 
NATO has usually resorted to urging the members to spend a 
fixed share of GDP on defence. A case in point was the three 
percent rule-of-thumb recommended at the 1977 London 
Summit. 
Three percent was an arbitrary number arrived at after 
lengthy negotiations and represented the politically possible. 
Thus, the number was neither tied to a specific quantity or 
quality. It carried no promise that the money would be spent 
on what NATO needed to maintain its military credibility. 
Very soon, it was clear that the recommendation caused 
confusion. What could be included under the heading defence 
spending had not been specified. Disagreements also covered 
what indices to use as yardsticks (purchasing-power-parity, 
exchange rates etc.). The transatlantic gap, not as acutely felt 
at the time as now, was not reduced. In the end, far from all 
the European members reached, let alone maintained spending 
at or above three-per cent for the following years. 
This example illustrates how the burden-sharing debate 
within NATO often failed to pass the first obstacle, namely 
that of determining the contributions forthcoming from each 
member."() There is another, far more pertinent problem 
!>,(] For a derailed survey of the different accounting methods, sce Golden, 
NATO Burden-sharing. A more updated version, taking into account the 
cOSts of enlargement, can be found in Todd Sandler and Keirh Hartler, The 
Po/ific.l/ Economy of NA TO, Past, Present and into tbe 21'1 Century, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, especially ch. 2, "Burden-
sharing and related issues", pp. 22-57. 
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though, and that is agreeing on what the relevant targets are, 
and how spending can be directed to fulfilling them. This is a 
relevant goal not least with the competing security agendas of 
NATO and the EU in mind. If there is no agreement on the 
targets, the debate will often tend to be focused on 
generalisations like "Europe must spend more, spend more 
effectively, cooperate more". This contrasts with the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment agreed in 2002 where a detailed list 
of tasks that had to be solved to ensure continued military 
viability was agreed. ',d This should make it possible to avoid 
some of the pitfalls and problems described here. 
Post-Cold War burden-sharing 
During the Cold War, NATO's security was a public good. US 
engagement and the possibility of resorting to nuclear 
weapons in case of an attack, provided security for all the 
members irrespective of wbether they increased their defence 
budgets or not. Adding new members had little impact on 
costs. The practical problems emerged once the bill was 
divided. Members valuing deterrence more than others would 
be inclined to spend above average on defence, whereas 
Alliance members attributing less importance to deterrence, 
would, as discussed previously, try to get a free ride.'" 
The debate on burden-sharing after the end of the Cold 
War is intertwined with the decision taken by the North 
Atlantic Council in June 1992 to "support, on a case by case 
basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping 
activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including 
making available Alliance resources and expertise.""" From 
this rather timid beginning, ollt-of-area operations have 
increased in importance, in the new millennium due to the 
I,,) Sce Golden, NATO Burden-sharing, p. 17. 
h'S 57 - ee p. . 
Id .. Ministerial meeting of the NAC in Oslo, 4 June 1992, Final 
Communique, § 11. 
identification of international terrorism as a major threat to 
the \Xicst. This development could hardly have been foreseen 
in 1992. 
Although few dispute the dangers posed by terrorism, 
perceptions differ on how the new terrorist threat should be 
fought. ,," It follows from this that differences also include 
what capabilities are needed and who can provide them. 
Running the danger of oversimplifying transatlantic 
differences, one may claim that the Bush administration tends 
to perceive security as a zero-sum game, either you have it or 
you don't. Europeans find this difficult to allow, not least 
because they have become used to living with a much higher 
degree of vulnerability both during the Cold War, but also 
due to repeated terrorist attacks. This translates intO different 
views on how the threat can best be countered. Whereas the 
European side emphasises what is sometimes summed up as 
preventative diplomacy covering economic assistance, trade, 
political contactS and dialogue, the US side will attribute more 
weight to military means."'; In 1999, i.e. two years before the 
terrorist attacks on the United States, the impact of this 
disparity in perceptions was described thus: 
The transatlantic schism could turn fatal to the alliance in the 
event of a violEnt conflict with a \XiMD Iweapons of mass 
dl'struction]~armed rogue over shared interests, in which 
European forces fail significantly to respond alongside US 
H For 3n imerpretaticl1l of how the fight 3g3inst terrorism influcnces the 
Alliance, scc Tom Lansford, All (or One: Terrorism, NATO and the United 
St.ltes, Aldershow: Ashgate, 2002. 
I", The seminal paper ollrlining the transatbnric differences post-91l"1 is 
Roberr Kagan, O{ Pdf(ufisc alld Power: America and EUI'O{JC ill the Nt!1£! 
World Order, New York: Alfred A. Koopf, 2003. Kagan cl3ims th3t the 
European predilections 3re due, among other things, to their lack of milimr)' 
capabiliries. 
forces [ ... J European militaries art' not challenged by the same 
mission as their American cousins. 1(0(. 
In the United States, this split has refuelled a long-standing 
debate on the benefits of alliances. Although The National 
Sewrity Strategy of the U11ited States of America ftom 
September 2002 reaffirms the Alliance commitments, Other 
voices recommending a "grand exit strategy" can be heard as 
well.'''' But the war against terror has also fuelled a sense of 
vulnerability; needless to say this has shaped the debate in the 
US more acutely than in Europe as to how this threat can be 
met with effective military means. One reply has been the need 
to speed up the establishment of military forces that afe 
deployable "within days rather than weeks" according to one 
report written for the US administration."" The report was 
published in 2000, i.e. before the terror attacks in New York 
and Washington, and was primarily intended for a US 
audience. 
The complaint voiced in the report should be borne in mind 
when attention is shifted to this side of the Atlantic. According 
to EU estimates, the military expenditure of the Union is 
roughly half that of the United States, yet they possess little 
more than ten percent of the US capacity to deploy and 
IO!" David e. Gomperr, Richard Kuglcr and !vlartin C. Libicki, Mil1d the Gap 
- Prol1lotillg a Trmlsat!.1l1tic Rellolutio}1 in Military Af/~lirs, \'X1ashingron: 
National Defense Universiry, 1999, p. 7. 
1',- The Natiolwl Strategy of the United Stdtes, \'V'ashingron D.e.: The \X1hire 
House, September 2002. The need for a concerted acrion wirh US allies is 
asserted in Chapter HI "Strengrhen Alliances ro Defeat Glob,ll terrorism and 
\'<fork to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends." A recommendarion 
for leaving NATO, and orher "entangling" alliances can be found in 
Ed\vard A. Olsen, US National Dc(ense for the Twellty-First Ce1lflt1'Y, 
London: Frank Cass, 2002. Olsen is professor of national security affairs at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, C<1!ifornia. For the opposite view 
professing that [he Alliance can still function as a transarlantic bridge see 
Lansford, All (or One. 
Ir,; Eugene Grinon et ai, Grouud Forces (or d Rapidly Employable Joint 
Task Force, First- \'(! eek Capabilities (or Short- \"V/,mzin£( C011flicts, National 
Defence Research Institute, Santa ,Monica: RAND, 2000, p. xiii. 
sllstain troops outside NATO's area.'"'' And this tenth is 
poorly equipped to handle the new threats made visible on 
September 11. This necessitates a rethink and increased 
budgets. Dr. Julian Lindley-French, a DJ( defence specialist, 
has remarked that: "for the past ten years Europe has acted as 
though it only seemed prepared to recognise as much threat as 
it could afford." ,7(, The same was emphasised by lord 
Robertson in a speech given in January 2002: 
Orders of battle and headquarters wiring diagrams read 
impressively. Overall numbers of soldiers, tank and aircraft 
give a similar impression of military power. But the reality is 
that we are hard pressed to maintain about 50,000 European 
troops in the Balkans. And that a new operation would oblige 
most European countries to slash their contingents in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and FYROM to produce usable forces in any 
!71 
number. 
The change advocated by Lord Roberrson seems to be in the 
offing, at least on the rhetorical level. In the summer of 2003, 
ED foreign ministers agreed to a draft outline of a security 
doctrine for the ED. The threat perception presented there, 
displays a number of similarities with the one the Bush 
administration published in 2002. Most importantly, in the 
ED draft, it is acknowledged that the soft instruments the ED 
has resorted to in its attempts to provide stability for 
neighbouring regions like trade, political contacts and 
10" Charles Gram, European defellce fJost·Kosol!o?, Centre for European 
Reform, \XJorking Paper, June 1999, p. 1, identical figures were presented by 
Oana Lungescu, "Partial progress on 'EU' Army", BBC News, 19 .May 
2003. 
1~',1 Julian Lindley-French, Terms of engageme1lt. The paradox of American 
power and the trallsathllltic dilemma post-11 September, Chaillot Paper no. 
52, Paris: Institute for Security Srudies, May 2002, p. 63. 
I~l Lord Robertson, "The T ransatlanric Link", S5ien, Sweden, 21 JanuJry 
2002, NATO OnJine Library 
http://www.naro.inrldocu/specch/20()2/s0201') In.hrm, accessed 27 
November 2003. 
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economic support, are insufficient when faced with an 
aggressive opponents. In that case, an armed response will be 
among the answers considered. 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
The problematic relationship between burden-sharing and 
transatlantic relations was fully illustrated both in the US 
attack on Afghanistan named Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and in the more recent war in Iraq. 
After the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of 
the Atlantic Treaty interpreting the attack on the US as an 
attack on all. The political support offered by the allies in the 
operations against the Taleban, was welcomed by the Bush 
Administration, and maximised in the public statements made. 
But the Allied contributions remained small especially during 
the initial phase when the Taleban regime was driven out of 
Kabul. One reason may have been the fact that none of the 
European allies disposed of precision-guided bombs, drones 
and electronic warfare equipment in sufficient numbers.172 
Another may have been that limiting Allied participation 
ensured a smoother decision-making process. The defence 
expert Philip Gordon's conclusion goes beyond the issue of 
technical deficiencies and the widening gap in capabilities, 
when he sums up the US view of Allied participation as: 
l ... ] politically useful but not particularly significant 
militarily. In this case it was reinforced by what many 
Americans saw as a key "lesson' of Kosovo. Whereas many in 
Europe saw the Kosovo air campaign as excessively 
dominated by the United States and American generals~ most 
Americans - particularly within the military - saw just the 
opposite: excessive European meddling, with French 
politicians and European lawyers interfering with efficient 
targeting and bombing runs, and compromising operational 
l'~ See Perers er al., European Contributio11s to Ot}eratioJl Allied Porce. 
security. This time, the Bush tcarn decided, would be 
different.I'J 
Gradually, European contributions to the war on the Taleban 
increased. With US attention turning increasingly towards 
Iraq, a larger European input could release US forces for 
deployment in the Gulf region. "., The European contributions 
to Operation Enduring Freedom included both air power and 
ground combat troops in addition to the policing units sent in 
once hostilities had ended. PS 
Yet the overall pattern that did emerge suggests one of 
division of labour and burdens. The principal Allied 
contribution was in stabilisation operations and in the 
humanitarian field. The US had requested that the European 
allies developed contingency strategies for possible operations 
in Afghanistan. In November 2001, NAC requested the 
civilian as well as the military organs of the Alliance to start 
drawing up plans for a wide range of missions should the US 
be successful in removing the Taleban from Afghanistan. This 
underscored NATO's relevance, no other organisation 
disposed of military forces that could be deployed in 
Afghanistan. Although the stabilisation operations - the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - was not 
formally a NATO operation, until August 2003 close to all 
the countries involved were either members of the Alliance or 
Partner states. 
Although the US attack received the approval of the United 
Nations as a legitimate use of self-defence, European 
participation fell short of what the US and the Afghan 
authorities hoped for. This concerns in particular the forces 
1-' Philip J-I. Gordon, "NATO After 11 Septemher", SlIrl'iIml, \'01. 43, no. 4, 
p. 4, pp. H9-J06_ 
1'4 Sce Chrisropher Bennct, "Aiding America", NATO Rel'ft!w, col. 49, no. 
4, \'V'inter 2001, pp. 6-7 for a brief survey of allied contributions. 
I~\ For the No[wcgi;]!1 contribution, see Norwegian porticipathm ill 
Opt!n7tiOl1 El1dlfril1g Freedom, p. SS. 
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on the ground. So far, the number of men has been too few 
and insufficiently equipped to extend stability beyond the 
capital itself."" So-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
ha ve been deployed to centres in the countryside. The US has 
tried to extract stronger commitments especially from the 1st. 
German-Netherlands Corps, which has been deployed in 
Kabul. Only after lengthy negotiations did the German 
authorities accept to extend their presence beyond the agreed 
deadline. 
The German decision was taken not only to suppOrt Afghan 
peace, but also as a step towards improved relations with the 
United States. '" The German government had excluded all 
German participation in the occupation of Iraq, a position 
that brought the bilateral relationship with Washington to a 
low point. A continued and enlargened engagement in 
Afghanistan is intended as the remedy to repair the 
relationship. 
Germany was not the only country to signal its opposition 
to the US policy towards Iraq. The war against Saddam 
I-Iussein's regime soon ran into the very problems the Bush 
team had wanted to avoid in Afghanistan. The Franco-
German refusal to back any UN resolution legitimising the use 
of force, was quickly translated into open disarray within 
NATO over the support to Turkey in case of war. On this, the 
two countries were joined by Belgium whose defence and 
foreign ministers declared that the port of Antwerp as well as 
Belgian airspace would be closed to the Americans."" The 
Belgian Prime Minister quickly retracted this amidst 
considerable embarrassment. Nonetheless, the point that the 
cohesion characterising the Alliance during the Cold War 
:~" Karja Ridderbllsch, "Auch die NATO driingr ;;1l1f ein Engagement liber 
die Grcllzcn K~buls hi1l3US", Die \\feft, 7 August 2003, 
1-- Ansgar Graw and f\.'lartin Lurz, "Kanzler l;leibr bel dem Ivfono 'Kabul 
start Bagdad"', Die \Velt, 11 August 2003. 
I~~ Luke Hill, "Belgium throws NATO into disarray",Ji1l1C'S De(ence 
\Veckiy, 1 April 2003, p. 4-5, 
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clearly was a thing of the past, had been made abundantly 
dear. 
In Norway, resistance to the Anglo-American attack on Iraq 
was widespread in the population. This challenged the 
traditional pro-American security policy. The government 
came up with a compromise. It refrained from expressing 
support for the war, but nevertheless agreed to send soldiers 
to participate in the post-war humanitarian efforts. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the difficult relationship between 
Il1ultinationality and burden-sharing has been explored. 
Burden-sharing has been understood rather narrowly in terms 
of economic and political costs. During the Cold War, the 
efforts by the American side to get its European allies to boost 
their spending resulted in arithmetical exercises often 
deserving the epigran1 "curiouser and curiouser." 
The main reason was the fact that national sovereignty 
remained relatively untouched throughout the period. 
National governments could decide for themselves how the 
defence budget was to be spent. It almost goes without saying 
that the final outcome often corresponded with the political 
agenda of the incumbent government and less with what 
military experts within NATO would have preferred. Once 
the Alliance was put to the test, in the Balkans in the 1990s, 
the results were rather mixed. US military supremacy led to 
some painful questioning both within NATO and within the 
European countries on how spending could be coordinated 
more efficiently in order to get a "bigger bang for the buck". 
This debate triggered EU efforts to set up an independent 
armaments agency and military capacities under the auspices 
of tlle EU, efforts that will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter. 
What has been emphasised here though, is that the US 
debate was rather different from the European, a difference 
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reinforced after September 11. The developments within the 
EU were regarded with suspicion by both the Clinron 
Administration 11I1d the present one and interpreted as moves 
that would undermine the transatlantic relationship. But even 
more fundamental questions are posed. Why get entangled in 
alliances with countries that are not militarily up to the task? 
And why have to depend on politicians likely to interfere in 
decision-making in ways impairing military efficiency? There 
are two that raise doubts about the relevance of the Alliance. 
The questions overlook the fact that the European allies 
have shown their relevance in the 1990s in two important 
ways. One is by providing political support and thus 
legitim'lcy to US actions. This was important in the case of 
Afghanistan, but became crucial in the run-up to the attack on 
Iraq. The other claim to relevance lies in the sphere of peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping, this is also why the lessons 
from the 1990s were mixed and not so dismal that some 
observers have tended to conclude. Here, NATO proved itself 
an efficient organ, far surpassing the UN in American eyes. In 
an essay written for NATO Review, the editor Christopher 
Bennet suggested five different areas where NATO could 
contribute to the US anti-terrorist strategy. I'" They included 
humanitarian and peace efforts in the aftermath of the 
campaign; non-proliferation efforts to prevent states or actors 
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; upgrading civil 
emergency capabilities; coordinating efforts and activities with 
other regional and international organisations; improving 
relations with Russia. A further two factors should be 
included: legitimacy and burden-sharing. By getting more 
countries to participate, it would be more difficult to accuse 
the campaign of being just an expression of US imperialist 
motives. By getting more countries to participate, the 
economic burden as well as the human toll will be spread 
I~~ Bennet, "Aiding America". 
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more widely. This will make a campaign politically more 
palatable. 
Let us pause toconsider the topic of humanitarian and peace 
operations. They have become an increasingly important part 
of military engagement in the post-cold war period, and this is 
an area where the European allies have accrued considerable 
experience."" NATO's operations in the Balkans, in particular 
peacekeeping in Macedonia underlined the importance of 
these aspects as well as NATO's ability to incorporate them. 
NATO functioned as the coordinator bringing together 
military units, IGOs as well as NGOs. NATO provided the 
security necessary for these organisations to be able to provide 
assistance to the civilian population. The efforts to increase 
capabilities for peace operations have been welcomed by the 
European members. This has also been linked to the doctrinal 
shift towards out-of-area operations. 
Tom Lansford, in his analysis of the Allied response to the 
terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, concludes that 
the division of labour, whereby the European contributions 
were on the humanitarian side of the operations, was a 
sensible solution not only because it maximised what the 
Europeans were best at, but also because: "In this manner, the 
Administration restored one of the Cold War functions of the 
Alliance - that of a bridge between the United States and the 
West European Allies". "I Lansford's conclusion is very 
upbeat, and can be dissected quite easily. The war against Iraq 
shows clearly how fragile the bridge can be when a political 
consensus among key allies has not been reached before 
operations start. 
There are other reasons why Lansford's conclusion should 
not be taken at face value. If a division of labour whereby the 
1_11 In 1992, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Bourros 
Bourros-Ghaii, decided that preventive diplomacy should be included in UN 
peacekeeping operations. 
"'I- -t' d AII/- .() > 1"1 ,"ailS or , 0/, lIt, p. ,1-,-, 
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US, either alone or in coalition with one or two more 
couIltries, is responsible for" kicking in the door" with lTIOst 
Europeans relegated to the role of "shovel hrigade", the 
corrosive effects on the Alliance should nOt be 
underestimated.'" Such a division means that those Europeans 
that lack the capacity and political will to engage in high-
intensity expeditionary warfare, will be deprived of actual 
influence over operations, but will easily find themselves 
saddled with lengthy and costly peacekeeping operations. 
Thus, both Lansford and Bennet recommend a continued 
division of labour, a division based on actual capabilities and 
comparative advantages, but nevertheless one that underlines 
US military dominance. This is hardly a recipe for improved 
transatlantic relations in the years ahead. If the security 
challenges affect both sides of the Atlantic, the military burden 
must also be shared more equally, and above all more 
effectively. How is the topic of the next chapter. 
])< 5rcphcn Larabcc and Fran~ois Heisbourg, "How global a role can and 
should NATO play?", NATO RCI'icll', Spring 2003, pp. 13-17, p. 16. 
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Chapter 5 
Dividing the Capabilities 
If NATO broadens the scope of its operations I ... ] and begins 
to think of security as a global rather than a European issue -
a redistribution of alliance roles will become increasingly 
Important. 
James R. Golden, 1983 
Size was not a prominent issue in the last chapter. In this 
chapter, it will be. This is not least due to the important role 
small countries can play in the planned NATO Response 
Force (NRF) agreed at the Prague Summit in 2002. Many of 
the capabilities and skills required to make this force 
operational constitute the very niche capacities sI11aIl countries 
can specialise in, Norway among them. 
This raises the questions of the pitfalls and advantages of 
specialising addressed in previous chapters.'" These points 
will not be restated here. But there is another quandary for the 
small countries that should not be passed over. The increasing 
vigour within the EU, especially among key EU countries like 
France and Germany, in the pursuit of independent military 
capacities answerable to the EU, must be included. For long 
the potential for conflict between the two projects was 
downplayed, not least by the supporters of EU's ambitions. 
Now, with both organisations pursuing separate projects, 
both the potential fot conflict as well as the impact this will 
),J Sec S1Jecialisatiol1, p. 27. 
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ha ve on NATO burden-sharing have become easier to 
identify. The small countries cannot have it both ways; they 
will have to choose between the EU and NATO. What these 
choices represent will be discussed below with particular 
attention given to procuren1ent. 
The focus on the EU's vigour is nothing new. European 
concerns over lacking autonomous capacities have been raised 
before. This was one of the reasons leading NATO's decision 
to establish a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994. 
This is where we will begin. 
Combined Joint Task Force 
As a consequence of the change in NATO's doctrine opening 
up for out-of-area operations, the US proposed in 1993 to 
establish combined joint task force (CJTF) headquarters. This 
was agreed hy NATO the following yeaL l " The CJTF concept 
involved the development of easily deployable multinational 
tri-service headquarters. It was open to elements from non-
member countries. CJTF could be called upon by other 
organisations than NATO, e.g. the UN or the Western 
European Union (henceforth WEU). CJTF would then be 
given access to NATO assets like command and control, 
transport and combat support functions for their own 
operations. This would insure that CJTF would be "separable 
but not separate". 
The CJTF was supposed to be able to conduct large-scale 
operations. Below the joint headquarters, component 
headquarters for sea, air and land forces were to be 
established, all along strictly multinational lines. With the 
Europeans lacking sufficient capabilities, the US would have 
played a leading part here. Military exercises have been held 
to test the CJTF concept in practice (e.g. Strong Resolve in 
1998). 
1~4 NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office for Information and Press, 
2001, p. 253. 
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The CJTF opened up for EU access to NATO resources in 
case of a crisis where US participation was not called ior. This 
would mean that the duplication of assets, the EU developing 
parallel structures and reSOurces, could be avoided. But it 
would also mean that NATO would be left with the final say 
as to whether access should be granted to the EU. France 
claimed that this amounted to granting the US the right to 
veto EU operations, and this was unacceptahle since it would 
reduce the EU to minion status on security issues. At the 
Prague 2002 Summit, the French President Jacques Chirac 
declared that no NATO plans should be allowed to infringe 
upon the obligations the EU members had already agreed to in 
accordance with the 1999 EU Summit in Helsinki.'" What this 
exactly meant was never explained. But it was just one of 
many, usually French statements attempting to carve out a 
separate space for a EU security role independent of NATO. 
The basic idea was that the CJTF should provide the 
Alliance with a testing ground for the development of 
deployable command structures. Yet, the results were 
unsatisfactory. An evaluation of the C./TF written by 
prominent US security experts points to the problems posed 
by including countries with conflicting interests, motives, and 
differing degrees of commitments to the task. "" There is 
nothing new in this, and it should be added that the 
evaluation is short on exactly what should be further 
elaborated to overcome "the uncertainties and idiosyncrasies 
likely to attend future operations. ,,1" They do not provide any 
guidelines on how "effective political control over CJTF 
h' Statement made by President Chirac 25 November 2002 in Prague, 
quoted in Michacl ~;leimcrh, "Oeutsche und franzr)sische Pcrspektiven ciner 
Gemeinsamen Europiiischen Sicherheits~ und Verteidigungspolitik", A.1fS 
Politik 1fl1d Zeitgeschichte, 20 January 2003, pp. 11-30, p. 25. 
1"" Peters et aI., Europea11 COlltril)J(tiOI1S to Oper,ltiol1 Allied P()n~e, p. 67. 
]>;.,. Ibid. 
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operations while simultaneously maintaining their flexibility" 
. . ISS 
can be maII1tamed. 
In the aftermath of the Iraq war, it seems doubtful that the 
CJTF will be pursued with any vigour. The US will be 
disinclined to let their ttoOpS be put under the command of a 
multinational headquarters simply because of their lower 
efficiency when compared with a purely national command. 
The Danish brigadier Michael H. Clemmesen has written that 
the CJTF headquarters will serve as little more than training 
ground for officers from smaller countries. "., It will provide 
them with the opportunity to learn how a large national 
command functions and little more than that. 
The emerging role of the EU 
The war against Iraq showed the profound differences in 
security political outlook among the European countries, and 
made it clear that the single European voice Henry Kissinger 
was once reported as searching for is still not a reality. Before 
Iraq, there were other, smaller and thus presumably more 
manageable conflicts that had left the EU utterly impotent. "" 
Yet, Iraq was altogether on a different scale because it 
highlighted how threat perceptions differed. The Bush 
administration's assertions that it would strive to maintain 
military hegemony, and if need be resort to pre-emptive 
military strikes to averr a threat, were regarded by many 
European intellectuals as being in direct conflict with the 
system of international law regarded as fundamental to 
European security. 
This debate is far from over. The relevance to our context, 
however, is the impact it has on the EU's endeavours to draw 
hi, Jbid. 
IF" See ~'lichael H. Clemrnesen, "NATO lite". 
I·") Most recemly the Spanish-!vloroccan crisis over a small island off the 
l\tlofoccan coast traditionally used for grazing sheep; and the recurring 
Greeo-Turkish quarrels over maritime fights in the Aegean Sea. 
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up a security policy that includes the use of military means. 
Although Iraq has definitely accelerated the process, these 
endeavours are not new. Early in the 1990s, the EU started to 
sketch the outlines for a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and a Common European Security and Defence Policy 
(CESDP). In 1992, it was decided to include humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping and the use of military forces in 
crisis management (the so-called Petersberg Tasks) into the 
Treaty on the European Union. This breathed new life into the 
Western European Union (WEU) and led to the appointment 
of a Secretary General and the establishment of a planning cell 
which would be responsible for assessing emerging crises and 
for the planning and handling of the WEU. The number of 
troops the WEU could draw upon was increased. The basic 
concept was that the WEU would act either independently or 
as part of a UN force in humanitarian operations where the 
US had chosen not to participate. Western European 
governments as well as the US expected that the WEU could 
serve as the coordinating body to resolve the problems 
common to multinational operations. Norway was satisfied 
with the WEU's new role. Although not having the right to 
vote on WEU decisions, Norway was granted an associate 
status that gave it access to internal processes, information 
and meetings. 
But this turned out to be a brief interlude. The WEU's role 
changed in 1999 when the EU decided to build up its own 
crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities. A 
further step was taken at the Helsinki Summit in December 
1999 when the Union decided to build up the necessary 
institutions to undertake crisis management. The creation of a 
separate institutional structure was regarded with 
apprehension by the non-EU European NATO-members as a 
development that in the long run would undermine NATO. 
The US reacted with protests, a pattern later to be repeated 
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whenever the issue of creating parallel institutions accOuntable 
to the EU was on the agenda. 
At the Helsinki Summit, it was agreed to establish an EU 
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The Petersberg Tasks would 
form the core of the RRF mission. A detailed list of what the 
new force would require was agreed at a Military Capabilities 
Conference held in November 2000. The following month, 
during the European Council Summit in Nice, decisions 
concerning the military and political command structures were 
made, although in rather vague terms, the reason being that 
any moves in this direction would easily be interpreted as a 
direct challenge to NATO. For this reason, the British 
government assumed the role of bystander. Yet, without 
Britain the project was in danger of foundering. Compared 
with the other European countries, Britain was a military 
lead-nation. Moreover, British participation would be 
regarded as an assurance by the more Atlanticist EU member 
states that close relations with the US would not be weakened. 
Although somewhat shaky at times, the British position 
remained negative until the November 2003 Naples meeting. 
Here, Britain signalled that it would participate provided that 
military planning were undertaken by an EU cell set up within 
SHAPE. '" The EU already has a ISO-man strong military 
planning staff, but their mandate has been limited to 
"strategic planning". Once operational the EU cell will assume 
responsibility for field operations. 
Although the quantity targets set by the EU have not been 
met, the RRF has undertaken two missions. The first was in 
Macedonia lasting from March till December 2003, here the 
RRF took over peacekeeping from NATO. The second, which 
began just a few months later, was the so-called Operation 
1"1 All1brose Evans-Pritchard, "Britain in secret EU army deal", Daily 
Telegraph, 29 November 2003; "Durchbruch bei EU-Verteidigungspolitik in 
Sicht", Die Vlelt, 28 November 2003. 
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Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here, French-
led forces provided assistance to UN humanitarian workers. 
These operations have been test cases for the Union's ability 
to undertake military missions. As such they are important 
milestones in the development of an identifiable role for the 
EU in security matters, a role that will go beyond tbe 
traditional emphasis on preventative diplomacy. The next step 
is the development of a security doctrine. A draft was 
published by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana 
in the summer of 2003.'" Here, the need to be able to counter 
threats with military means, and if necessary pre-emptively 
was implied. In some members states, this assertion was not 
well received. In many European countries, the US 
administration's statement that it would strike pre-emptively 
before a threat had fully emerged, is subjected to especially 
harsh criticism. Consequently, it was difficult to accept that 
the EU should assume a similar policy. For others like Britain, 
EU pre-emption would mean that the Union gave itself this 
option but without having the necessary means to carry it out. 
The other difficult issues concern the idea of permitting 
some EU states to form a vanguard that can forge ahead with 
military cooperation under the auspices of the EU, yet without 
having to wait for others to catch up. This is not as innocent 
as it may seem. Lack of a clear division of labour with NATO 
has been one cause of delays. But now it is possible for 
countries that are less concerned with reactions within NATO 
to pursue their own agenda within the EU. This is what will 
be discussed next. Any final conclusion on the extent of 
compatibility between the EU force and US strategy depends 
on several factors. Since so little is clear at the time of writing, 
little more can be done than to sketch them out. Much will be 
settled once an EU strategic doctrine has been finalised. If the 
final version emphasises autonomy from NATO, and this 
1"" JJViCf Solana, A Sect/re Europe ill a BettCl' \"Forfd, European Council, 20 
June 2003. 
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emphasis has a bearing on procurement and training, the 
effect will he ro weaken NATO. If the opposite approach 
prevails emphasising linkages, and this is where the stress in 
the draft version is placed, interoperability and joint 
operations with the US NATO will be strengthened, but what 
is more important is that beneficial synergies will ensue. 
A new alliance within? 
The idea of a vanguard of states willing to pursue integration 
further than the majority can be found in several Franco-
German initiatives.'''] But it was not this conple that launched 
the most radical proposal. Instead, it was to be the Belgian 
government that published a proposal for European defence 
integration.'"' This proposal went fnrther than the measures 
already decided at various EU summits where the emphasis 
has been on cooperation and coordination. The Belgian plan 
included the establishment of a General Staff including the 
building of a suitable headquarters in Tervuren, i.e. not 
connected ro the NATO complex. If carried out, it would have 
expressed the separation of NATO and the EU in no uncertain 
terms. 
The Belgian initiative should not be read just as a response 
to transatlantic tensions, although Iraq certainly provided a 
golden opportunity to launch it, but was also a response to a 
report compiled on behalf of the European Parliament by 
Philippe Morillon, a retired French general. "5 As in previous 
documents, the linkage between foreign policy and the 
1"1 For the defence secror, this W,lS perhaps best expressed in the two 
countries' proposal nude in November 1002. Tt was entitled "Gemeinsame 
dt'utsch~franz()sische Vorschlagc fUr den Europiiischcn Konvcnt wm Bcrcich 
Europiiischc Sicherheirs und Verteidigungspolitik". The fu1l text was kindly 
made available by Dr. Eckhard Uibkemeier, German .Ministry of Defence, 
Berlin. 
I"~ Die Weft, '16 April 1003. 
IH Report 011 the new Elfro/Jeal1 security and defe11ce architecture - priorities 
and defIciencies. Rapporteur: Philippe Morillon, European Parliament, 27 
March 2003. 
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military capacities to support it is underlined. The 
technological gap between the US and its European allies is 
taken as an argument in favour of increased spending, 
Morillon concludes.lee. 
There is little difference between Morillon's conclusions and 
the admonitions expressed by Lord Robertson quoted earlier. 
Underlying them is the danger identified by Frant;ois 
Heisbourg, director of the French Fondation pour la 
Recherche Strategique: 
[ ... ] if the presenr rrends continue, there is a real danger that a 
three-tier Alliance may emerge; (1) the United States and a 
few selecr NATO members who can project power; (1) rhe 
bulk of the Alliance, which remains wedded essentially to a 
Cold War posture; and (3) the new members; whose forces 
l'l~ 
are less modern rhan those of rhe second group. " 
Morillon claimed that this development could be avoided by a 
stronger European military. A large majority in the European 
Parliament supported the conclusions drawn in the report. But 
whether this will translate into concrete measures depends on 
two different problems, both similar to the ones confronting 
NATO. One concerns funding, this will be addressed later. 
The other concerns perceptions of security. Unless the 
perceptions are widely shared by all the members in a 
coalition, countries may choose to abstain from participating 
in a multinational venture, be it under the leadership of the 
EU or NATO. This is most likely a main reason why France 
and Germany have been such eager promoters of the vanguard 
concept, with the rather unexpected support of the Belgians 
thrown in. This merits a few more comments, hypothetical as 
they may be, with much still undecided. 
"'II"d 1-, )1 " p. ) 
I'F Francois Heisbourg, "Introduction", EU's Rapid Reactiol1 Capability, 
Seminar at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 10 Seprember 
200], unpaginarcd. 
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EU efforts aim for troops tha t can be sent on peace 
enforcenlent and peacekeeping missions outside the 
membership area. These ambitions correspond closely to 
French desires to continue to play a leading role, especially in 
African politics. But, as one might infer, France would not be 
averse to having other countries share the costs and shonlder 
the burden. The old argument in favour of coalitions, namely 
that they lend a greater degree of legitimacy to the operations, 
should also be included among the French motives. A purely 
humanitarian operation in Northern Africa might entice other 
EU members, possibly the l\1editcrranean countries, to 
participate because they would be adversely affected by 
increased numbers of refugees if a crisis is not stabilised. But 
with the difficulties of drawing the line between this kind of 
operations, and warfare, participation will be hard-wrung. 
That is probably why the report underlines that the countries 
willing to participate must be able to forge ahead without 
waiting for the approval of the rest. The question then is 
whether or not the rem,lining states would be willing to share 
the burden of developing a military capacity that might be put 
at the disposal of just a few? 
The answer seems to be no. The response to the Franco-
German attempts to form a vangnard in the aftermath of Iraq, 
and even before that, have not been positive. Other countries 
have clearly signalled their desire to rein in this development if 
done in the name of the EU. The non-aligned members, 
Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria, have a priori difficulties 
in entering anything resembling a binding military alliance. 
But even to those EU countries that are members of NATO, 
the vanguard concept is not a popular one.'% Their 
!~;- See Eckhart Lohse, "Allzu grosse Nahe", Fnmklurter Allgemcille Zeittmg, 
12 April 2003; Anne-l\1arie Le Gloannec, "France and Germany must work 
for all EU members" 1 Financial Times, 19 November 2003; for an analysis 
of the position of the ne\\' members, see l(;1i-OIJf Lang, Trojal1isciJe Pferde 
del' USA oaer proearopiiisciJe Atftmtikcl'? Die J1eUel1 Mitglieder del' EU Imd 
ihr VerhattHis ZIf Amerika, S\\lP-Studic S 46, Dezember 2003. 
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reservations are based partly on apprehensions over what the 
effects will be for the transatlantic relationship, partly 011 huw 
the military pillar should be funded. 
EU capacities and fJrocurement 
The missions in Macedonia and Congo show that EU's 
capacities despite falling short of agreed targets, are not 
insignificant. Plans have been drawn up for upgrading and 
procurement that will further enhance EU abilities to project 
power and engage in high-intensity combat operations. New 
ranges of weaponty like Eurofighter Typhoon are being 
prepared for entry into service within the next few years. 
When the Airbus A400M Future large Aircraft (FLA) is 
available, strategic airlift will be less of the bottleneck it is 
today. The EU is also developing its Own intelligence satellites 
through the development of different systems like Helios II, 
SAR Lupe and Cosmos Skymed. Command and control 
functions are being upgraded through the application of more 
sophisticated computer technology. A lot of this work has 
been spurred on by the general drive for modernisation 
already agreed by NATO, but not all can be ascribed to the 
Alliance. The desire to have autonomous forces has been a 
significant factor. And the question whether this amounts to 
the duplication, so dreaded by many in NATO, will have to 
be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how the EU can expect to build up any degree of autonomy in 
crisis management without institutional capacities, in 
particular in intelligence satellites that do not duplicate NATO 
assets. A prominent German security expert, Hans-Christian 
I-Iagman has concluded that this development is not only 
unavoidable, but will lead to greater parity in the transatlantic 
relationship and may therefore strengthen it, indeed no 
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difference from what General Morillon had previously 
d l,;!Y expresse . 
But this is still rather far ahead. EU resources still fall short 
of what was planned at the Helsinki Summit and the 
following ca pabilities meeting. In the immediate future much 
will depend on the extent of EU coordination of the upgrading 
process. Plans have been announced for a new EU agency for 
armaments and military research. If so, it would mean that the 
EU finally does away with the article in the Treaty of Rome, 
reaffirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam, where national 
defence industries are expressly exempted from the Union's 
competencies and trade in armaments remains excluded from 
inner market regulation. Arguably, this exclusion has been 
severely undermined in the course of time, but it has still 
meant that any explicit EU policy in this field, let alone 
financial support targeted exclusively for the defence sector, 
has been impossible. That does not me,ln that the EU has been 
without tools to influence defence production, albeit so far 
only indirectly. This has been done in three different ways: 
First, the Commission administers EU support for research 
and development. Officially, defence research is a national 
area of responsibility. But the strict separation of defence and 
civilian industry had proved increasingly difficult to uphold. 
In the course of the 1990s, the number of research projects 
including enterprises in the defence sector increased."'" In 
1996, the Commission estimated that a third of all projects 
funded were dual-use, i.e. of relevance to the defence secror."" 
Secondly, in 1995, the Commission established procedures for 
license-free export of dual-use technology within the EU. And 
I"" Sec Hans-Christian Hagman, Ellropean Crisis Mal1ageme11l mu! Defence: 
The Search for Capabilities, Adelphi paper 353, London: IlSS, 2002, pp. 
58-59. 
~;)<) Burkard Schmidt, The Ef/ropean Uuioll and A1'11h1l11ents: Getting d bigger 
bang (or the E1Iro, Chaillot Papers no. 63, Paris: Institute for Security 
Studies, \X'csrern European Union, 2003. 
21;1 Ibid. 
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thirdly, the Commission has to grant its approval to all 
rnergers, including those between defence enterprises. 
The Commission's ventures into defence production have 
been spurred on by the development in the European defence 
industry in the early 1990s when demand dropped drastically. 
The politicians started to discuss possibilities for closer 
cooperation to salvage the sector. Yet talks at this level 
progressed slowly, at any rate with less progress than the 
contacts developing between the defence enterprises 
themselves. State subsidies would soon be a thing of the past. 
But the development of new weapons systems was certain to 
he a cost-intensive process, requiring funding the industry 
would find difficult to cover alone. One source of subsidies 
would then be the European Union.'" 
The need to expand cross-country cooperation had long 
been recognised. The question was therefore how the EU 
could further integrationist factors to promote this 
development. One measure, fairly easily done, was to loosen 
the criteria for getting EU financial support for research and 
development projects. In May 2003, this development took an 
important step forward with the need for an EU armaments 
agency being recognised in writing for the first time.'" At the 
same time, it was declared that the EU would release an initial 
€25 million for defence-related research, pitifully small when 
compared with the national budgets of some of the members 
countries, let alone the US. 
For the armaments producers this was nevertheless an 
important signal that the Commission would look upon the 
l',l, For a survey of the different weStern attempts to create a joint European 
armaments sector, see Pierre de Vestel, Defence Markets and Industries ill 
Europe: Time (or Political Decisions?, Chaillot Papers no. 21, Paris: 
Institute for Security Studies, \X'estern European Union, 1995; and Keith 
Hayward, Towards a Europeal1 W'ea/Jolls Procurement Process, Chaillot 
Papers no. 27, 1997. 
lOJ Luke Hill, "EU force declared operational but capability shortfalls 
remain",Jc111c'S Defence Weekly, 28 tvlay 2003, p. 3. 
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sector favourably, a change largely initiated by the armaments 
lobbies themselves. Their policies affect the position of the 
smaller countries within the EU. Two major organisations had 
been formed to represent European producers: EDIG 
(European Defence Industries Group) and AECMA (European 
Association of Aerospace Companies). In addition, a third but 
significantly smaller body representing the interest of 
shipbuilders was the European Marine Equipment Council.'" 
EDIG was established in 1976. The members are the national 
defence industry associations of the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG), but it has been expanded to 
include Sweden and Hungary as well. AECMA differs in that 
here not only the associations but large firms are also 
members. The firms have met with few obstacles in their 
efforts to influence EU decision-making. They have managed 
to establish "an important lobbying group that is largely 
unopposed, and this imbalance has impacted on policy. ,,!Os 
This imbalance affects smaller producers. They have found 
it very difficult to gain the same access to decision-makers. 
When the stnltegies are drawn up for how a European defence 
should be shaped, and what role the European Unions should 
assume in this process, they tend to find themselves being left 
out. This was the case with the Framework Agreement 
concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and 
Operation of the European Defence Industry from July 2000. 
France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Britain signed the 
agreement which this time was not merely one of many 
documents listing good intentions and praising the benefits of 
closer cooperation, but included explicit commitments on 
cooperation and trade. For instance a signatory must remove 
obstacles to the transfer of defence-related equipment to other 
2')1 I am indebted to Dr. Jocelyn .Mawdsley, Universite Iibre de Bruxclles for 
information on this, See her analytical presentation in The Europeal1 Ul1ion 
and De(ellse Industrial Polic)" Paper 31, 2003, Bono: lnternationale 
Konversionszentrum Bonn, 2003. 
':IF Mawdsley, Tbe Europeall Union and Defel1se Industrial Polic)" p. 14. 
members unless the material in question endangers national 
security; likewise all mergers of defence producers or 
acquisitions that may endanger supply require that all other 
signatories be informed in advance; export procedures will be 
facilitated; the exchange of classified information between the 
signatories will be carried on according to a new set of more 
simplified procedures; the signatories are to harmonize 
national rules for the sharing, transfer and ownership of 
information in order to provide an impetus for the 
restructuring of European defence industry; joint activities in 
research and technology are to be encouraged; and sharing 
procurement plans are to be shared.2(1t, 
In the drafts for an EU constitution drawn up in late 2002, 
proposals were made for a new institution to manage 
weapons procurement and research, leading to a common 
market in weaponry.'''' This is explained as a logical follow-up 
on the already agreed decision to establish a 60,000 man 
strong military capacity under the auspices of the EU. 
The impact this will have on the small member countries is 
not immediately clear. Yet, in the course of negotiations 
following the signing of the agreement, the abolition of offset 
agreements in transfers between the signatories was discussed. 
If implemented, it would undoubtedly benefit the larger 
countries and affect the smaller adversely. A possible 
compromise would have been the application of a system 
bd l ·fd w "·1 ase on w lat IS re erre to as Juste retour ,111eanmg t lat a 
country receives orders comlnensurate with its invesnnents.2(N 
This had been adhered to quite rigidly in the construction of 
the Eurofighter, which delayed the process significantly as 
well as adding extra costs. 
!,;" This presentation is based on the British lVlinistry of Defence's 
Expl.l1wtory AJemOfl.lIIdll11l (or .In Agreement to {adiihlle the Rl!Slrltctlfrillg 
and Operatioll of the European Defe11ce 11ldllstry, London, 2001. and 
.Mawdsley, The EUTOIJCdl1 Unioll alld De{ensc Industrial Policy, pp. '16-17. 
»)1- "\XTcll they're talking", The Eco1lomist, 2 November 2002, p. 32. 
l(h .Mawdslcy, The ElIrolh~j.711 U11ioN dud Delense illdustrial Policy. 
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The Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matiere 
d'Armement (henceforth OCCAR), which was established by 
the defence ministers of France, Britain, Germany and Spain in 
1996, advocates a radical break with the juste retour regime. 
Instead of looking narrowly at just one project where this may 
be difficult to achieve without the detrimental effects seen in 
the case of the Eurofighter, a wider portfolio should be taken 
into account when the national retour is to be defined. This 
may work well for the larger countries, i.e. the signatories to 
OCCAR, but for the smaller ones normally involved only in 
one large-scale project, this will be difficult to accept. 
OCCAR might be only the beginning of greater EU efforts. 
Nevertheless, there are some important limitations that should 
be mentioned to show how cumbersome this process has been. 
The planned agency will be strictly intergovernmental in 
nature and not directed at the EU. This means that the EU as a 
whole can only implement solutions of a limited kind like 
streamlining export controls of dual-use goods. Defence 
procurement will remain a national priority and therefore still 
be subject to budgetary constraints, labour market needs and 
industrial competition. The planned agency is regarded as an 
improvement on the former WEAG. Their basic problem was 
that they always came up against competing national 
programmes, and lacked the clout to break with them to 
achieve genuine coordination. It is far from certain that the 
new agency will be able to complete this task. But according 
to one EU official commenting on the viability of a European 
armaments sector: "The question now is whether we do 
homeopathy through the [Commission] or die slowly. ,,'''-
The test of the agency's viability is not only the issue of 
which countries join and which do not. France and Germany 
have declared their suppOrt and interest in the project, but 
their market is limited to Europe, and not even all of it since 
the new NATO countries seem more inclined to buy American 
2'~" The Economist, 1. November 1002. 
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than European. The pivotal member is Britain. British 
armaments producers have been able to gain a profitable 
foothold on the US market. If Britain joined the armaments 
group, it could serve as a door opener to the US marker. For 
the foreseeable future, European producers will have to rely 
on the European market for the sale of their products. 
Pressure has grown for an increase in defence budgets. The 
prime argument in favour of doing so is the sudden demand 
on the members' forces to engage in international missions 
(Afghanistan, Macedonia, Congo). But at the same time, the 
need to increase budgets in order to maintain procurement 
stability has been underlined. This is an argument that has 
very little to do with streamlining and efficiency, but all the 
more with protecting national interests and maintaining 
employment. 
Likewise, it is important to reduce the rhetorical emphasis 
on a "European" armaments market filled with European 
producers catering to European priorities. First of all, many 
European firms are deeply intertwined with US firms making 
it difficult to draw a dividing line. A case in point is BAE 
Systems which has been portrayed as a British industrial 
champion after the merger of British Aerospace and GEe 
Marconi. Nevertheless, the foreign ownership share with 
American shareholders playing a dominant part, was so large 
that the then British Minister of Defence Geoffrey Hoon asked 
whether the firm was British any more. Ongoing plans for the 
merger of BAE with Boeing only serves to Hoon's suspicion."" 
The point is that the European industry is not as European as 
one might believe, and especially so after reading EU 
documents and the communiques from the industrial lobbies. 
Especially the sub-contractors are found globally. In addition, 
much of the development in RMA is carried out by civilian 
firms in and outside Europe. 
lHi See 1'vlawdsicy, The ElfrotJemJ UUiOI1 dud De(ellse Industrial Polic)" p. 11, 
foornotc 6. 
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There is another, transatlantic aspect that should be 
included here: The si7.e of the US defence budget. This is 
where orders and thus the money are to be found. The degree 
of access to the US market differs greatly from country to 
country. Britain dwarfs all its European allies. BAE Systems is 
the sixth largest US defence firm. l\10reover, numerous 
European firms, Norwegian among them, have benefited from 
the offset system and thus gained access to the US supply 
chain. The EU Commission will have to step gingerly to avoid 
creating any Atlantic divisions in its attempts to promote a 
European defence sector. 
A question of funding 
The amount of papers published on the ESDP is staggering. 
Communiques, statements, articles and books have been 
published on its political virtues, meticulously noting each and 
every comma change.'" But so far, the EU has refrained from 
publishing any form of cost estimate. Moreover, the 
capabilities that the EU has listed as necessary for the Rapid 
Reaction Force to become operational, have been "described 
in verbal rather than quantitative terms.,,212 This is usually the 
case when strategic airlift, enhanced high tech capabilities, 
advanced missile and air defence, with the need to increase 
interoperability with US forces always added, are always 
listed. A topic often glossed over is costs. 
That deficiency is quite understandable not least since the 
final shape of the force remains to be seen. Nevertheless, a 
noteworthy attempt has been made by a group of European 
defence economists assembled for this purpose at the US 
~II Nowhere with more enrhusiasm than at the European Union Institute for 
Security Studies in Paris, formerly affiliated with the \Vest European Union. 
See \\'ww.iss~eu.org. 
W Numbers from Benjamin Zycher and Charles \X'olf, European Military 
Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force, RAND, 
2001, p. xv. 
RAND Corporation. 'Ll The sum they arrived at ranged from 
$24 billion to approx. $56 billion (US 2000 dollars), the 
lower level would imply heavy reliance on NATO capacities 
whereas the maximum would mean development of entire 
ranges of new equipment. Their focus was procurement coSts, 
including research and development. Operations and 
maintenance were not included, although they could result in 
a further 30 to SO per cent increase in the capital costs of 
equipping a European Rapid Reaction Force. 
This begs the question of bow this sum will be provided for. 
Previous comments on the state of the European economies 
should be recalled, as well as the fact that the EU enlargement 
process will represent an extra burden on an already cash-
strapped Union budget. Three alternative answers may be 
given: economic growth resulting in larger military budgets; 
spending more wisely by reallocating means within existing 
budgetary limits; closer cooperation between European 
armaments enterprises and a unified European armaments 
market making wiser spending more possible. 
The probability of any of them being implemented within 
the near future is unlikely. Economic growth in Europe has 
slumped. As shown above, armaments producers now 
cooperate more closely, but this is not according to any master 
plan drawn up in Brussels or elsewhere. The targets agreed in 
Helsinki and at the Capabilities Conference later on have only 
been partly fulfilled. el' In the plans for an independent EU 
force, 2003 was fixed as the target date. According to the 
RAND report, it is unlikely that they will be met by the end of 
this decade unless economic growth resumes and defence 
budgets are increased. But as the report hints, this is bordering 
on the purely theoretical. Moreover, since the report was 
published, growth forecasts have gone through several 
W Ibid. 
w See Oana Lungescu, "Partial Progress on EU Army'\ BBC NE\'V'S, 19 
May 2003. 
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downward readjustmenrs.w Also, the assumption that existing 
funding can be reallocnred 1110re efficiently and thus generate 
extra means that can be used to fund RRF is dismissed by the 
analysts. If defence spending was targeted exclusively to meet 
the need of the RRF, it could become operational within a few 
years. But the obstacles to such a massive reallocation are too 
towering to make this worth considering as anything bur yet 
another theoretical exercise. That does not mean that the 
process within the EU will not impact on NATO. On the 
contrary, but the question is how. The picture of the 
relationship between the EU and NATO is a blurred one. 
Lord Robertson pointed this out during a speech held in 
Sweden in 2001 when he stated that: 
At the political level there is already deep and effective 
practical cooperation between the two organisations, civil and 
military, working to ensure security in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
FYROM. Paradoxically, the EU and NATO cooperate 
rogether better in practice on the ground in 1vlacedonia than 
they do in theory in Brussels.2ln 
But this cooperation is not between equals. The EU's 
stabilisation and democratisation efforts in the civilian sector 
have been considerable. Militarily, input has been limited.'" 
Changing that would require increased financial resources 
from key EU countries, and not least, wiser spending. With 
the exception of France and Britain, this has so far not been 
forthcoming. Lord Roberrson did not overlook this point in 
his speech: 
211 In the report, ir was sripulated rhar the German economy would grow by 
2.4 per cent annually throughout lhe currenr decade. See Table J, Curre1lt 
al1d Ollt}'ear Estimates, 2001-2010, p. 19. So far, growth rateS have been 
hovering around 1.5 per cent. 
2l!, Lord Robertson, "The Transatlantic Link". 
21- See Eitelhuber, "Europiiische Strcitkrafte". 
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The longer picture is much less optimistic. For all the political 
energy expended in NATO to implement the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative, and in the EU to push ahead with the 
complementary Headline Goal process, the truth is that 
Europe remains a military pygmy. 21£ 
But due to the limited budgetary resources available for 
defence, procurement has been strongly politicised. This is 
perhaps more evident in the case of the new NATO members. 
The choice of weaponty, either US-made or European, leads 
to criticism from the loosing party. This was clearly illustrated 
when Poland finally opted for American F-16 fighters. EU 
Commission President Romano Prodi expressed his dismay 
thus: "there is no joy in the fact that a day after signing [the 
EU Accession] Treaty in Athens, Poland signed a huge 
contract for the purchase of American fighters. [ ... ] having 
your wallets in Europe, you cannot entrust to the United 
States the guaranteeing of [your] security."'" 
The Prague Capabilities Commitment 
At the Prague Summit in September 2002, NATO members 
committed themselves to meet a list of priorities deemed 
necessary if the Alliance were to be able to intervene out-of-
afea and counter new threats. This list, called The Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (Pcq represents a departure from 
recommending spending increases or setting generalised 
targets. The political background was aptly captured by the 
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw who claimed that Europe 
was offering an "increasingly inadequate response" in effect 
leaving the US to shoulder a disproportionate share. 
According to Straw, this would prove "a recipe for 
resentment" in the US."o 
11'( Robertson, "The Transatlantic Link". 
!l~ RFE/RL Poland, BelarJIs, Ukraine Report, vol. 5, no. is, 22 April 2003. 
110 "Europe urged to boost NATO spending", BBC News, 16 October 2002, 
htrp:llnews.bhc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/pnlirics/2331943.stm. 
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In Europe, concerns have emerged over the impact of 
increased US spending on military technology. In 1989, i.c. 
well before the additional increases made in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, Admiral Sir Jock Slater, former British 
First Sea Lord, expressed these concerns with the following 
understatement: "the money the US is now spending on 
digitisation is snch that they could get Out of step with their 
allies."ll] Concerns over affordability had led the European 
allies to go for the application of new technology to upgrade 
already existing capacities instead of designing anything 
radically new. The inherent problem is that this incremental 
a pproach reinforced the status quo. 
This was keenly followed in the United States. In a 
bipartisan US commission study from September 1999, the 
following sombre conclusions was drawn: "l ... ] the United 
States will increasingly find itself wishing to form coalitions 
but increasingly unable to find partners willing and able to 
carry out combined military operations.,,212 This was echoed 
in two studies written on the transatlantic gaps, one asking 
which countries could be singled out as having the needed 
"MFC [multinational force compatibility]"; and rhe other in 
much the same vein recommending that the US refrain from 
forming broad coalitions since the European allies are more 
often than not an obstacle to swift decision-making and even 
when rhey join their equipment is not up to the task: "It 
makes no sense objectively or in terms of vital US national 
interests which are territorially rooted in the North American 
continent, not the European continent. ,,213 
!!l Alexander Nicoll 1 "Sea Lord \Varns on Military Technology Gap", 
Pillallcial Times, 7 October 1998, p. 8. See also Lawrence Freedman, "\\far 
Designed for One", The \V/orld Toddy, vo!. 53, nos. 8-9, pp. 217-22. 
m US Commission on National Security, New Wlorld Coming: American 
Security in the Twenty-First Centlll}" \Vashingwn DC: Department of 
Defense, 15 September 1999, p. 64, p. 143 . 
.!13 5zayna et. al., Improving Army Planning /01' PlltJlre Multinational 
Open1tiol1s, p. 3; and Olsen, US National Dc(ense f'or the Tll/ellt)'~First 
Cel1tury, p. 96. 
This bodes ill for the European allies. Without the relevant 
capacities they would be left out not only of the actual 
operations, but from decision-making. Thus, it is no surprise 
that burden-sharing and combat efficiency were at the 
forefront in the attempts undertaken to endow the Alliance 
with the required capabilities to fight new threats. The Prague 
Capabilities Commitments were not the first. The Defence 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) agreed at the Washington Summit 
in 1999, was an important step in this direction. DCI was 
launched by the US as a reply to the lessons learned during 
IFOR and SFOR deployments in Bosnia. The lack of 
interoperability, mainly cansed by US command and control 
superiority, had impeded cooperation considerably. The basic 
idea was to mend this by identifying the problems areas and 
translate them into close to 60 different projects. Once 
completed, they would ensure interoperability. Great 
expectations were tied to DCI, but few allies made the 
financial allocations necessary. Several factors were at play, 
the impending introduction of the Euro forced those 
Europeans that were about to join to reduce spending 
drastically in order to qualify, secondly there was the budding 
rivalry between DC! and the Petersberg Headline Goals. It 
gave politicians a good opportunity to oscillate between the 
two. The lack of specified goals and the impressive number of 
projects is misleading since the projects lacked the specific 
necessary to tie the European members to implementing the 
goals. This opened the way for burden-shedding. 
But DCI suffered from too many targets being set and too 
few priorities being established. This was no secret, and at the 
Prague Sumnlit in 2002, a new agreelnent was reached over 
the exact capabilities needed, and how to attain them. Niche 
capacities and role specialisations were no longer rhetorical 
phrases, insread it was agreed on what capacities and skills 
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were to be allotted to the separate members."~ This would 
prevent the Alliance frolll deteriorating into a Illere discussion 
forum, a kind of OSCE with a stick. It would also retain the 
US interest in maintaining its engagement in European 
secumy. 
The commitments made in Prague are the response to a new 
set of threats linked to terrorism and the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. The Commitments are interrelated so that 
together they will fulfil four key enql1irements: Improved 
defence against weapons of mass destruction; NATO 
superiority in command, control, communications and 
computerisation; interoperability must be improved; finally, 
the troops must be ready for deployment at short notice, and 
they must be sustainable. Today, NATO has problems 
supporting larger units in combat with necessary supplies of 
equipment, food and men engaged in out-of-area operations 
over a longer period of time. 
These recommendations were made in response to identified 
deficiencies. A further problem according to Lord Robertson 
was the dire lack of precision-guided missiles. These missiles 
are already available, it is more a question of the countries 
stocking up more. NATO's European members also had to 
confront the shortage of strategic air- and sea-lift capacity. A 
group of European NATO countries have agreed to procure 
jointly 180 A400M military transport planes. Although this 
agreement predates the Summit, no contract has so far been 
signed. Delays have largely been due to the lack of a final 
financial commitment on the German side. This delay means 
that the airplanes are unlikely to be built before the end of this 
decade."; Thus, an interim solution is being worked out 
whereby the lease of the necessary capacity is suggested. 
!!4 Nicholns Fiorenza, "NATO to Adopt Capabilities Plan") Defcllse News) 
18-24 November 2002. 
2.1' "Struck spricht mit Rumsfeld und Rice", Fn11lk/urter Alfgemeine Zcitlll1g, 
5 May 2003. 
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Germany has been put in charge of the group entrusted with 
the High Level Group "Strategic Airlift" established to work 
out the practicalities of a lease. Closely related to this is the 
European lack of refuelling planes whereas the US disposes of 
approximately 250 transport planes and tank planes, the 
European number is less than 20. 
A further important decision taken in Prague was to 
establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) numbering approx. 
21,000 men. By October 2004, contingents from the force 
should be ready for missions, for the entire force this deadline 
is 2006. It will be equipped with sophisticated armaments."" 
These are to be highly skilled troops trained for combat 
against new threats. In terms of command, the new Allied 
Command Operations (ACO) commanded by SACEUR will 
have the operational lead for NRF. This covers the setting of 
standards, certification procedures for the forces, and 
exerCIses. 
Bur the NRF project is not without clear pitfalls. With 26 
having to be consulted before a go-ahead is given, the 
problems of political inertia and interference will remain. 
Another important hinge here is speed, and the ability of the 
countries to allocate the necessary manpower and resources 
once a crisis emerges. Lord Robertson has been particularly 
adamant on this point in the aftermath of the Prague meeting. 
There is little point in having a force ready to be deployed if 
one member of the coalition will have to await a lengthy 
decision-making process in parliament before a final yes is 
granted. The country Lord Robertson singled out for his 
criticism was Germany. The country is allocated a number of 
key functions, but without them the force will at best be left in 
a vulnerable position or even more likely be unable to go. This 
is a considerable unforeseen problem because the emphasis on 
1:.,; Or to quote NATO's \veb page: "1(!hateuer is required to make it a high 
readiness, credible force. " See "The NATO Response Force - NRF", 
hrrp://www.NATO.int/shape/issues/shape NRF/NRF intro.hul1. 
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niche capacities makes any coalition extremely vulnerable 
when a country Opts out Or delays the decision-making 
process. 
It is necessary to question how much the lack of consensus 
within NATO over how the new threats should be confronted 
will impact the on NRF should it become an operational 
force. If opposition to an American-led coalition force should 
remain as widespread as was evident in the case of the war 
against the Taleban, and even more so over the war in Iraq, 
the NRF will be a lame duck. An even more acute problem is 
the growing popular perception especially in France and 
Germany, that US policies are a threat to global security, and 
not a means of safeguarding it. If this perception takes root in 
these tWO countries, let alone spreads to others, increasing 
defence budgets for NATO purposes will be an uphill battle 
for any government. 
Norwegian 11iches 
The Norwegian armed forces are in the course of 
implementing many of the general recommendations issued at 
the Prague Summit. Improved protection of personnel against 
weapons of masS destruction, and increase of national stocks 
of precision-guided air-to-ground missiles are among these. A 
concrete project has been la unched for the acquisition of 
unmanned aerial vehicles, so-called drones, for improved 
targeting surveillance and battle damage assessment purposes . 
. Moreover, pledges have been made to contribute to the 
development of air-borne radars, refuelling planes and 
strategic lift. 
Norway has been given the role as lead nation in the 
development of strategic sea transport. This is one area where 
Norway as a leading shipping nation already possesses 
considerable know-how and resources. Norway's role is 
further enhanced by the increased attention given to littoral 
warfare, a field where the Norwegian navy has developed 
considerable expertise and may be said to enjoy a competitive 
advantage compared with other NATO countries. As a result 
of the lack of blue water navy opponents and of the war on 
terrorism, both Britain and the US have redrawn their 
strategies for how future conflicts will be fought and won.'" 
One point where their views have a direct impact on the 
relevance of Norwegian assets is their unanimous emphasis on 
littoral warfare. This amounts to a transition from naval 
warfare at sea, to fr0111-the-sea maritinle warfare. 
Littoral warfare is one field where Norwegian priorities fit 
those of our closest allies.'2S In 2000 a decision was made to 
purchase five new frigates."'! Apart from improving 
Norwegian capacities to patrol Norwegian waters and 
enhancing the ability to protect offshore oil and gas 
installations, the frigates will be a central element in NATO's 
naval response forces Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and 
Standing Naval Force l'vlediterranean. When considering the 
sheer numbers of frigates in NATO's navies, one might easily 
get an impression of abundance. But whether it is enough is 
questionable. The countries with the largest number of frigates 
in Europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands, have their 
vessels engaged in areas far away from the Continent and can 
therefore not be automatically relied upon. This was made 
clear during Operation Sharp Guard starting in the summer of 
:l~ Trallsformatio11 ROddmap, Power alld Access (rom the Sea, US 
Department of Navy, 1003; Naual Strategic Plan - the 1lext filtl!cll ),ears, 
Royal Na vy) 1003, hrrp/IW'",\\' .rovai-1l3n' .mod.lJkJsfaric/pall.e!:;11643.hrml, 
accessed 2 December 2003. 
!~" Norway's role may be further enhanced if the US Navy's Littoral Combat 
Ship Project is dropped from the 2005 defence budget. This might be one 
point where the Bush Administration might slash deYclopmem programmes 
to accommodate congressional concerns O\'cr the budget deficit. See Bradley 
Graham, "i\ifi!itary Spending Sparks \X'arnings", WI1Silil1gtOll Post, 8 Marci, 
2004. In 2002, Nonvegi.:lI1 frigates, submarines, divers and special forces 
participated in operarions Actiue f.lldel1l'oltr and Ellduring Freedom. 
2~~ Bonnen and Palosaari have claimed that the decision to purchase frigates 
consriwtes a remnant of cold war thinking, see their "On rhe Road to a 
Nordic Defence Co-Operation?". 
1993. Getting the required number of frigates to participate in 
this limited operation turned out to be an uphill struggle 
simply because the vessels were not available. One of the 
recommendations presented to Norway in connection with the 
pee was the purchase of a new support vessel for the frigates, 
this has already been included in procurement plans.Ho 
Another procurement decision that will enhance the navy's 
ability to participate internationally, was taken in 2003 when 
it was announced that new missile torpedo boats would be 
built." I 
Finally, the geographic proximity to Russia may, once 
again, become an asset for Norway. The energy and fishery 
resources in the Barents Sea tie the two conntries together, and 
these are resources of considerable importance to both Europe 
and the US. Energy deliveries from Northern Africa and the 
Middle East are vulnerable to terrorist acts. Norwegian oil 
and gas are, together with deliveries from Russia, the only 
alternative. This alone implies that the strategic importance of 
Norway, although no longer marked by military tensions, 
nevertheless remains considerable. This importance can be 
turned into an asset provided that Norway maintains the 
military capacities that are requested. If so, Norwegian views 
and concerns stand a much greater chance of being taken into 
account. But this also calls into question to what extent the 
country should concentrate on the development of niche 
capabilities. With limited budgetary means, the ideal of a 
balanced defence sector capable of demarcating Norwegian 
sovereignty and interests will easily suffer. The official reply to 
this quandary is that the need for a strong military presence in 
the North has declined, and that the reduction in militarv 
presence is bur the logical outcome of decreased tensions. The 
!'Ii "Pr<1gue Capabilities Commitmenl - ll10Jerniscring :;n' milirxr cmc i 
NATO og norskc bidr;lg", Forsvarsdepartemcnter, Oslo, 27 November 
2002. 
~11 Efik St)lbakkcn, "Skjold-kontrakt signcrt", Fotsuarsl1ett, 2H November 
2003. 
need to comply with the PCC is based on two arguments: First 
of all pce is the sine qlta 11011 to maintain NATO's future 
relevance, and NATO remains Norway's prime security 
guarantee; secondly, if Norway fails to comply, its credibility 
as an Alliance partner will suffer. 
The North Sea Strategy 
NATO's changed focus, i.e. lack of emphasis on the Northern 
region, combined with a growing security role for the EU has 
placed Norway in a vulnerable position. As a response, efforts 
have been made to develop a more comprehensive framework 
for tying Norway closer to other countries with overlapping 
security interests. The result has been what the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence has labelled 'The North Sea Strategy' 
embracing, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Denmark. The strategy is a Norwegian concept, launched by 
the Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn DevoId at the 
beginning of 2003 for a more integrated approach to the 
numerous bi- and multilateral forms of cooperation between 
Norway and the littoral states around the North Sea."! 
Whereas relations between Norway and Britain go back a 
long way, naval contacts between Norway and Germany only 
started in earnest in the early 1960s. Danish submarine 
officers are educated in Norway. Dutch and British soldiers 
train in Norway. 
Closer security political contacts through formalised 
meetings conld compensate for the loss of relative stature and 
at the same time give Norway a necessary insight into EU 
developments where above all Germany, but also the 
Netherlands has stressed the need to develop a military pillar 
to enhance the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Both have, quite like Norway, traditionally displayed a strong 
At/anticist view of European security. Like Norway, the 
2n Krisrin Krohn DevoId, ".M{il og prioriteringer i forsvurspolitikken i 
2003", lecture given in Oslo !vlilitxre Samfund, 6 January 1003. 
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Netherlands did not support the US war against Iraq but 
refrained from expressing its opposition as vocally as France 
or Germany. 
The countries included in the strategy may all have their 
separate motives for being interested in closer cooperation 
with Norway. Attempts to decode them will not be made here. 
However, it is safe to assume that Norway's role as a major 
gas supplier to Europe, in particular to Germany, has played a 
role.'" Germany has an interest in cooperating with Norway 
in securing the country's energy supplies.,·H On the other 
hand, German vulnerability affects Norway. North Sea 
platforms, terminals or pipelines might be suitable targets for 
an attacker wishing to destabilise the German economy. 
Nevertheless, Norwegian energy is an asset that makes the 
country into a relevant security partner. For both Germany 
and the Netherlands, access to Norwegian training areas has 
probably contributed positively in the decision to open the 1st 
German-Netherlands Corps to Norwegian participation. 
Political considerations notwithstanding, the chief aim has 
been to let operational concerns define the development of 
cooperation. Ambitions are high. In the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between Norway and the Netherlands 
in December 2003, a multinational approach to acquisition, 
maintenance, strategic air and sea lift, logistical support, the 
development of command and control system, exercises for all 
branches of the armed forces is underlined. 
Force integration affects Telemark Battalion, the 
Norwegian unit which has been trained and equipped to meet 
the standards for NATO's Immediate Reaction Force, the 
force that will be deployed at short notice to meet an emerging 
crisis. Together with the German-Netherlands Corps, the 
~,U The Netherlands are a net exporter of gas. 
;.1-4 The other main source of energy is Russia. If unrest were [Q break Out in 
the Ukraine, the transit lines crossing Ukrainian territory might easily be 
blocked. 
battalion will form part of the Response Force agreed in 
Prague. 
~v10st progress has been made in the relations with the 
Netherlands where an agreement on exchange of equipment 
has been entered; a declaration of intent with a view to a 
similar agreement has been signed with German authorities. 
Although it is still early days, the economic potential inherent 
in the strategy is considerable. On the army side, joint efforts 
in ABC protection, procurement of artillery, and ammunition 
is mentioned. For the air force, strategic lift capacity, fuel 
supply planes, the development of new fighter planes, as well 
3S closer operation:11 cooperation, are mentioned as areas for 
possible cooperation. The navies stand to benefit from greater 
iutegration of the countries' frigates, the procurement of 
helicopters, the development of missile technology. Norway's 
expertise in littoral warfare makes it an attractive partner to 
others in this field. 
NATO's Respo1lse Force and the EU's Rapid Reaction 
Force 
When confronted with the issue of upgrading their equipment, 
NATO countries that are also members of the EU may be 
heading for a dilemma. Although the requirements defined in 
the PCC overlap with those desired by the EU, they are not 
identical. Claims have been made that the targets are more 
suited to long-range power projection and therefore US needs, 
than continental requirements.m The countries' choice will 
have an impact on transatlantic burden-sharing. To a certain 
extent, this represents nothing new. During the Cold War, the 
larger allies shouldered a disproportionately large burden of 
the costs. A significant difference concerned threat 
perceptions. The Soviet threat provided 'common glue' 
keeping the members together and resulting in agreements on 
!)~ D. Ochmanek, NATO's Futl/re: Implicatio11s for V.S. Military 
Capabilities and Posture, RAND 2000, 
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how the threat should be countered. This is no longer 
necessarily the case. If perceptions differ between the 
countries, their willingness to contribute to joint operations 
will be influenced. Although dividing lines may run between 
the larger European states, larger countries with strong 
regional ambitions may find their plans opposed by smaller 
members lacking such ambitions. 
It is necessary to underline that although the EU has made 
significant progress towards the establishment of 
multinational forces, support is far from unanimous when 
questions like command structures, extent of supranationality 
and institutional build-up are addressed. This Concerns in 
particular Britain where the Prime Minister's very restricted 
interpretation of the EU's role as supplementary to that of 
NATO, conflicts with the Freuch view where autonomous EU 
decision-making understood as independent from US interests 
relnains a persistent then1e.2..l h 
RMA: transatlantic differences 
As mentioned previously, the US has made strong headway in 
the transition from platform-centric to network-centric 
warfare.'F Further technological development will define the 
exact reach of this transformation, as will the development of 
operational concepts and approaches that can best take 
advantages of RMA. This field is set to benefit considerably 
from the surge in US military spending seen in recent years.'''' 
US supremacy represents a set of challenges to the European 
allies. The basic question is again one 01 perceptions, or rather 
~;." See front page of The Daily Telegraph, 23 November 2000, and equally 
relevant former US Dcfense Secretary CaSPJf \'Veinberger's letter of warning 
against a widening rift between the US and Europe in the same edirion, p. 
29. For a French view, sec Frederic Bozo, Oil cn est /'Alliance at/antique? 
L'im/Jwlwbie parlClUlriat, PariS: IFRl, 19,-)~; and PhiJippe Nloreau Defarge, 
Lcs Etals-Unis et /,1 Fral1ce. La /Jllissdllce cl1tre l11ythes et I'ea/iles, p.lris: 
IFRI, 1999, especially pp. 50-57. 
l.'- See Laird and .Me)" The revolution illll1ilitary affairs, p. 2l. 
!); GrahaJ1l, "lvlilicary Spending Sparks \\?arnings". 
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whether RMA is an adequate reply to new security challenges. 
In the aftermath uf the Kosovo campaign, opinions differed as 
to whether RJ\1A provided any advantages for asymmetric 
operations and military operations other than war.2)' RMA 
remained for long tied to high intensity conflict needs. Many 
Europeans perceived this as a vision of warfare our of step 
with the more likely threats. Instead of attempting armed 
conflict against a technologically superior enemy, adversaries 
would instead opt for asymmetric operations, in particular 
terrorist attacks against civilians and military personnel, 
urban warfare and guerrilla combat. This view had been 
reinforced by the impotence of western air power in Kosovo 
in preventing Serb forces from conducting ethnic cleansing. 
The Serb forces were able to conceal themselves in forested 
areas and to disperse among civilians. Allied planes attacking 
from high altitudes were incapable of discerning military 
vehicles from refugees. 
The US perspective, and it had a strong following on this 
side of the Atlantic, was rather that Kosovo had fully 
displayed the technological gap and that the Europeans had to 
catch up. If not, their ability to undertake operations on their 
own would be limited, let alone to participate in coalitions 
with the US. This conclusion now seems to have been broadly 
accepted as several European countries have defined what 
RMA capacities that are within their reach."" 
This is where the next challenge lies. The European 
countries are confronted with the need to carry out a military 
transformation enhancing both basic force projection as well 
~,)" For a survey of these arguments, see There-se Delpech, La gllerre pdrfaite, 
Paris: Flammarion, 1998, esp. 3-82; the French Ministry of Defence, Les 
Ellseign(!mellts du KOSOI/O, November 1999, internet version, 
http://www.defense.gou\..frlacrua I itcs/uossier/d36!capacircs6.htm p. 2j and 
Robert P. Gram, The RMA Europe Cm Keep ;11 Step, Occassional Paper 
15, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000. 
HI} See [he conclusions drawn by Cl Franco-German-British-US working 
group: Coalition military operations: The \\"la)' Ahead through 
Cooperability, Arlingron, VA: US-Crest, 2000, pp. 13-23. 
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as RMA capabilities, while at the same time ensuring popular 
support for the out-of-area operations the transformation 
aims for. Here the PCC represents a considerable step 
forward. The reason is that the Europeans, simply due ro lack 
of close cooperation, have not been able to come up with an 
integrated concept of which RMA capacities that should 
receive priority. Some countries may to a lesser or greater 
extent, identifv fields that are relevant from a national 
perspective, cross-national cooperation has been missing.'" 
Whereas US comments often will tend to be dismissive of the 
European attempts in this field, here a few illustrations will be 
given ro indicate that the picture is more mixed. 
The European leaders in the adaptation of RMA are Britain 
and France. Already in the 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review 
a combination of advanced sensors and long-range precision-
strike capabilities was recommended. France has already made 
headway in this field with the Apache air-launched cruise 
missile."2 The procurement of Scalp-EG missiles with a range 
exceeding 250 km and one metre target accuracy is on the 
agenda. Italy has bought Storm Shadow missiles (the British 
version of Scalp), and an advanced German air-launched 
missile called Taurus has been developed and procured by the 
German armed forces. 
These efforts were started before the PCC was 'lnnounced. 
They meet one of the key deficiencies identified at the Summit. 
Another priority WaS information, surveillance and 
reconnaissance. France, Britain and Germany have already 
developed significant capabilities in the range of observation 
missiles and reconnaissance drones. France, Italy and Britain 
have developed national airborne ground surveillance 
programmes. German and French UAYs completed more than 
HI Ibid; Grant, The RA4A Europe Cm Keep in Step. 
W This was the direct result of the lessons learned after Kosovo: "French 
participation in the air raids was reduced by the absence of equipment 
whose arrival with the forces is expected in a very short time." French 
l\1inistry of Defence, Les ellscignements du Kosouo, p. 2. 
200 reconnaissance flights over Serbia during the Kosovo 
campaign. France has led the development of a series of 
satellites called H~lios.'" A satellite centre has been established 
in the Spanish town of T orrejon. The Centre has already 
contributed to EU military operations in the Balkans. The 
military benefits of the planned Galileo navigation satellite 
system are even clearer. When completed, it will endow the 
EU with an extremely accurate satellite navigation system not 
subject to the control of the us. 'H 
Likewise, the European allies are investing in digitised C4 
systems. Both Britain and France have implemented a 
formation-level battlefield management system supporting 
units from brigade-size and above.'" The Dutch army has 
developed an Integrated Staff Information System based on 
commercial technology and made it into one of the most 
advanced command and control systems in the Alliance. 
The European efforts in integrating RMA have so far been 
conducted on a national basis, with little cross-border 
cooperation. The PCC may provide the impetus to change 
that. But even if the European countries should do so to a far 
greater extent than today, US superiority will remain a fact. In 
recent years, the US defence budget has been increased at a 
pace that is beyond the combined efforts of its European 
allies. Does this mean that the requirements that have to be 
met for being regarded as relevant will increase? If so, the 
European allies, and above all the smaller countries will find 
that an increasing share of the budget is spent on meeting 
~4\ Spain and Italy have also conrribmcd financially ro the development 
programme. 
~.!.! .lames Hasik and Michacl Rip, "An evaluation of the Military Benefits of 
the Galileo System", GPS W'orld, 1 April 2003. The radical changes in the 
EU's position on this issue can easily be detected when reading the W'orking 
Documents issued by rhe Union's Direcrorarc General for Research, starring 
with the timid Status Report 011 European Union Sth1ce~Satellite Policies, 
published 17 March 1997, and going on ro the European Commission's 
Space Action Pian adopted in November 1003. 
l4, Sce Grant, The RMA EllrD/Je Call Keel' ill Step, p. 13. 
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these requirements. For Norway where a balanced defence has 
traditionally been the desired ideal, this development means a 
move towards greater specialisation. \V'hereas for a COUntry 
like Denmark, political opposition will focus less on the 
capacities forfeited than the political legitimacy of our-oF-area 
. l~" 
operat1oI1s. 
The PCC is in part a reply to these worries. First of all, the 
niche capacities identified are areas where the countries 
already posses comparative advantages. Secondly, PCC 
encourages cross-country cooperation. Many skills and 
capacities are too expensive to develop for one country, bi-, 
tri- or multilaterality makes economic senSe. Finally, this 
cooperation might imbue the Alliance with a new sense of 
cohesion as well. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the division of capabilities has been discussed. 
An important attempt in this respect was the CJTF. It was 
intended both to enhance interoperability and to give the EU 
access to NATO assets. 
Developments overtook C]TF. Within the EU, support has 
been growing for the development of military capacities. This 
is not just a French idea, although advocated most strongly by 
Paris it has gathered support in the other member countries as 
well. The unsolved issue for a long time was how the 
relationship with NATO should be organised. In the end, a 
compromise was reached whereby EU facilities are to be 
placed at SHAPE. This will be done to reduce US and its 
Atlanticist allies' suspicions that the EU will ultimately 
undermine NATO. 
The EU's efforts have been encouraged by the larger 
European armaments producers. European capacities will 
mean new production orders. They have formed lobbies to 
l4h See "Forsvaret slipper for besparelscr", Berlillgskc Tidellde, ·10 March 
2004. 
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influence the European Commission's decision-making. The 
Comnlission has developed into an ilnportant institution 
regulating certain aspects of European armaments. Most 
experts expect it to be just a question of time before the 
Treaty of Rome is changed to permit the EU to regulate all 
aspects of armaments production directly. This is not a 
development automatically welcomed by all the smaller 
countries. The lobby organisations cater to the interests of big 
industry. 
Parallel to the emerging military role of the EU, NATO has 
launched a reform process aimed at retaining the Alliance's 
military viability. To achieve that, a set list of priorities with 
special tasks allotted to each member was agreed at the Prague 
Summit in 2002. The countries will develop a set of 
capabilities that combined with those of the other members 
will provide the Alliance with the ability to react quickly and 
effectively to a broad range of new threats. 
For the smaller countries, this is an opportunity to develop 
assets that make them into relevant partners. But it is also a 
concept with certain, well-known vulnerabilities. One of them 
is the danger that a country can choose to opt out, and thus 
deprive the coalition of a much needed input. This problem 
has been mentioned previously in this study, and as before no 
ready-made answer can be given. The only way this danger 
can be minimised is through a shared perception of security. A 
shared perception will also diminish the potential for rivalry 
between the EU's Rapid Reaction Force and NATO's Reponse 
Force. 
Norway as a non-member of the EU is left with few cards 
to play. It will be barred from participating in the 
development of ED's defence and security policy. Cooperation 
with Germany and the Netherlands, and strengthening the 
bilateral relations with other EU members, may at best yield 
information about the EU's current process. In order to 
remain a relevant partner, Norway must adapt to these 
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changes. But this will hardly be a reciprocal relationship; EU 
will influence Norway but not vice-versa. 
The Norwegian authorities have come out strongly in 
favour of the PCe. Compliance with the decisions made in 
Prague is emphasised in numerous official documents and has 
also played a decisive role in defence planning. This is done in 
order to show that Norway is a trustworthy ally. Moreover, 
NATO remains not only Norway's ultimate security 
guarantee, bur also an indispensable channel for influence. 
How a small country can hope to influence a larger partner 
will be discussed in the next, and final chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Summin.g Up: Size Matters 
Size matters. \X/hereas large states can count on military 
strength, or economic strength as indicators that grant them a 
place at the table when decisions are made, a small country 
cannot, that is unless it possesses assets that make it a relevant 
partner for a multinational coalition. 
How to achieve relevance was pointed out in the 
introductory chapter as a key challenge confronting small 
countries. This is not a quest without costs, and concentrating 
resources in one field that might increase their relevance to 
partners will easily mean forfeiting others. In a nutshell, this is 
the problem small countries like Norway face when asked to 
specialise in a specified set of skills or equipment that might 
not be needed for territorial defence. 
A member of an alliance expects to draw upon the joint 
pools of strength in the pursuit of its own security interest. 
Yet, as has been pointed out here, relying tOO closely on your 
partners carries a risk as well. They might choose to opt out 
from measures that are of considerable importance to you. As 
pointed out in chapter 3, Norway's reservations against 
certain aspects of Alliance policies during the Cold War 
illustrate this. Norway's predicament was not limited to its 
policy of "screening", but also included the problems 
experienced by a small country cooperating with a larger ally. 
Here, Norwegian conditions over command and control issues 
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ran contrary to American desires. Solutions satisfying to both 
parties were found. Deployment in times of crisis or war 
would, however, most likely have been carried out according 
to US concepts and requirements. Another issue concerns the 
loss of relevance. Throughout the Cold War, Norway had a 
strategic position giving it a stronger voice within NATO than 
its size should indicate. In the 1990s, the relevance of 
Norway's assets declined. This triggered a process of 
exploring new forms of cooperation with allies and 
neighbours. 
The end of the Cold War meant that the divide between 
Denmark and Norway as NATO members and Sweden and 
Finland as non-aligned lost much of its distinctive character. 
Although notable successes have been made in the field of 
peacekeeping, and a few in the field of joint procurement, it 
would however be wrong to claim that the Nordic countries 
are driven towards each other on security issues. 
The cha pter on burden-sharing starts out highlighting how 
touchy this issue has been for NATO. One of the reasons has 
been the lack of a commonly agreed standard for how 
national contributions should be measured. The agreement 
reached at the Prague Summit in 2002, whereby the members 
comJllitteu themselves to develop specific capacities, is 
designed to avoid this problem. If successful, it could limit the 
endless discussions over national inputs and burden-sharing. 
During the Cold War, the US had few efficient tools that 
could be applied to pressure the Europeans to spend more. 
Threatening to reduce the US military presence was not 
regarded as credible simply because European security 
problems were US problems as well. Not so in the post-cold 
war climate. At the beginning of the 1990s, the relevance of 
NATO was questioned. Much foclls was at that time given to 
the impact the possibility of membershi p had 011 democracy 
and stability for Eastern Europe. The military aspects of 
enlargement figured less prominently. 
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This changed radically with the new focus given to 
international terrorism. Terrorisn1 ll1eant that ne\\' military 
capabilities had to be developed, and this was a possibility for 
Europeans ro prove their relevance. At the Prague Summit in 
2002, a commitment was made by all the members to 
concentrate on what had been designated as the most relevant 
capacities required if NATO was to meet the new threats 
effectively. This was an opportunity to the small countries to 
concentrate on a few select niches. 
But the commitments made at the Prague Summit are 
challenged by the emerging security role of the ED. The 
challenge is expressed in two ways: the ED's future military 
role which is set to go beyond the current emphasis on 
peacekeeping; and growing cooperation between armaments 
producers within Europe. The developments in this field have 
been characterised by mergers and acquisitions leading to 
increasingly larger units. Moreover, the armaments producers 
have formed lobbies influencing ED decision-making. This has 
left small countries in a squeeze. As far as can be ascertained, 
little is done to alleviate their situation. 
In lieu of a conclusion ending with a customary optimistic 
keynote, it might be enlightening to ponder on the 
relationship between a country's size and its influence within 
an alliance. Throughout this study, scant reference has been 
made to the research literature available in this field. It might 
be appropriate to do that now, and at the same time compare 
some of my findings with conclusions drawn by others. 
Size and influence 
There is no unanimous definition of what a small state is.'" 
The easiest may be to state it in the number of inhabitants. 
lr I-Ieinz Gartner and Alien G. Sens, "Small States and the Security 
Structures of Europe: The Search for Security After the Cold \X'ar", in Ingo 
Peters (cd.), New Secllrity Challenges: The Adaptation of Internatio1Jal 
Institutions. Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE since 1989, New 
York: St . .f...1artin's Press, 1996; W. Bauwens, A. Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen 
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But since our focus has been on power, such an approach 
yields little. Instead, one might state that a 5n1<111 state is One 
with considerably less power than at least one of its 
neighbours."" A third definition, by no means excluding the 
former, includes perception: the smaller is fully aware of its 
inability to uphold its own security, a fact recognised by the 
I '<' ot ler states.-
The Finnish security expert Karoliina Honkanen has 
claimed that in the post-cold war climate, even this definition 
remains problematic. A country measured as small according 
to all the indicators suggested here, may still have resources 
that enable it to play a powerful role. Norway's vast energy 
and fishery reSources mean that in certain forums, the country 
is a large power. The reason being that in these settings, 
Norwegian assets are relevant. 
Alliances like NATO and the EU have institutionalised 
safeguards to protect the rights of the smaller members. 
Formally, influence over decisions within NATO is divided 
equally by granting each member one vote, the USA does not 
differ from Luxemburg. But this equality cannot hide the very 
obvious fact that the USA has played a leading role all along 
simply because this country was the sole guarantor of the 
others freedom during the Cold War. On key issues, the USA 
either alone or in coalition with other large countries has 
framed the decisions as well as the outcome. The question 
then is, what scope of influence is there for smaller countries 
in such an alliance? Many experts agree that the answer has 
(eds.), Small States and the Security Changes ill the New Eurot)e, London: 
Brassey, 1996; Ryan C. Hendrickson, "NATO's Northern Allies: 
Conrributions in the Post-Cold \Vac Era", European Security, vol. 8, no. 1, 
1999. 
Nil See Olav F. Knudscn, Sharing Borders with a Great Power: An 
EX,l1Jlillatiol1 of Small St.ate Predicaments. Oslo: NUPI Report 159, 1992. 
L~9 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances a11d Small Power, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968, pp. 21, 29. 
been a surprisingly large scope."" A recent example is 
Denmark, since the end of the Cold \Var, Denmark has 
pursued a very active role in the Baltic region not least thanks 
to its status as a NATO member. Sweden made some efforts 
to increase its standing in the region, but Denmark's added 
bonus of being a NATO member quickly outshone Sweden's 
attempt to promote non-alignment as a viable option. 
The proclaimed equality of all NATO's members is 
circumscribed by the undisputed leadership role of the USA; 
and by the emergence of informal groupings of the bigger 
members. From the perspective of the smaller partners, it is 
especially the latter constellation that has been perceived as a 
limitation to their influence. During the early years, the 
importance of France, Britain and the USA was expressed in 
the membership of the Military Committee's executive organ 
called the Standing Group. Once Germany joined, the 
membership was expanded and the four were labelled "the 
Quad". The Standing Group played a decisive role at an early 
srage. Yet, the key decisions on military strategy, e.g. Massive 
Retaliation and Flexible Response, all originated in 
Washington. French dissatisfaction over the US role, 
prompted an attempt by president de Gaulle in 1958 to set up 
a directorate within the Alliance consisting of the USA, Britain 
and France. This directorate was to be responsible for military 
planning and its execution. The smaller allies disapproved 
vehemently. Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary General, 
claimed this would mean that the smaller members would 
leave NATO and instead opt for neutrality.'H President 
11n See Tamnes, The United States ill the High Nortb, Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 
1991. For <1 comparative analysis; Ruyan C. Hendricksol1, "NATO's 
Northern Allies; Contributions to the Post-Cold \Var Era", European 
Security, vo!. 8, no. 1, 1991; and Karoliina Honkancn, The Influence of 
Sl1wll States on NATO Decisiol1w Makillg . 
.cll Robert S. Jordan and Michael \V. Bloome, Politicalleadershif1 ;'1 Nato: a 
study in multinational diplomacy, Boulder: \Vcstview Press, 1979, pp. 71-
n. 
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Eisenhower rejected the French proposal not least because of 
the impact it would have on the smaller members. In this 
study, the apprehensions voiced against the Franco-German 
concept of a vanguard, and the plans drawn up by the large 
countries' armaments lobbies should be included as recent 
cases where the small fear they are being left out of important 
forums. 
Despite Norwegian worries over lack of influence, like 
other smaller members of NATO Norway has been able to 
exert influence over NATO policies in areas of particular 
relevance to Norway; by developing strong links with 
countries with similar security interests and concerns, NATO 
has functioned as a force multiplier for the smaller 
countries."2 According to one security scholar, this means that 
NATO should not be seen as the US instrument for promoting 
American interests, but just as much as a means for a small 
state to promote its own views and strategies.2B 
There have been cases when the smaller members have 
preferred to enter reservations, fearing how it would affect 
their international standing and domestic audience had they 
taken part. The Danish policy of footnote reservations against 
NATO plans pursued in the 19805 partly belongs here, as 
does the Norwegian reservations against certain forms of 
Allied presence in Norway. Nonetheless, in general the culture 
of persuasion and compromises, including regular 
consultations, consensus-building and the norms of equality, 
have all made it possible for the small allies to exert 
influence. !5~ 
l;l See Guillaume Parmentier, "Redressing NATO's Imbalances", Suw/Llal, 
no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 96-112. 
H,; Sec David B. Haglund, "Allied Force or Forced Allies? The Allies' 
Perspective", in Pierre IYbrtin and i\1ark R. Brawley (eds.), AlIiancc Politics, 
KOSOI/O and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?, New York: 
l'algrave, 2000. 
lS1 One of the most thorough analysis remains Thomas Risse~Kappen, 
Coopcration Amollg Democracics: Tbe EUtO/}CI111ill/7uel1cc 011 US Foreigll 
Policy, Princcton N.J.: Prince ton University Press, 1995. 
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The a bility to do so depends on the extent to which the 
parties share the same view on securiry. Although 
multinational units are presented as the new and stronger 
bond reinforcing Alliance cohesion, the motives for 
participation differ according to which side of the Atlantic 
you are on. The arguments presented above in favour of 
multinationality applies, bur with differing emphases in the US 
and in Europe. The Europeans are keen to participate to gain 
influence over decision-making. For the US side, the motives 
are different. They need the European allies in order to 
achieve greater legitimacy, but also to share the economic and 
hnman costs involved. Although the US is militarily far 
stronger than the Europeans they have had to rely on the 
European for overflight rights, bases, supply harbours, as well 
as other forms of logistical support for the operations against 
the Taleban in Afghanistan. 
Relevance 
If the other members perceive the assets a country contributes 
to an alliance as relevant; it will gain influence in return. 
Influence is different from power. The latter is usually defined 
in terms of military might and/or economic strength that can 
be applied to enforce a change, whereas influence is the ability 
to have an effect on the behaviour of others. 
Small countries can pursue a number of strategies to achieve 
this. Here, only two rather general directions will be sketched. 
One is to become a member of an international alliance. 
Although this means access to decision-making, it can also 
mean decreased autonomy. Once you have joined, you cannot 
shy away, if so you will be regarded as a free rider and soon 
find that your advice or opinions carry little weight. But 
countries that value influence higher than autonomy will be 
eager to promote the cohesion of the alliance.'·;; These states 
:5_, See Honkanen, The Il1fluence of Small States 011 NA TO Dedsioll-
Makillg, pp. 16-17. 
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will, as a rule, attempt to gain influence and advance its own 
security interests by advocating the common values of the 
international organisation. Indeed, the Norwegian Support for 
NATO, and the "common values that tie the USA and Europe 
together" so often repe'lted in official statements, fully fits this 
line. 
The other strategy is for a country to exploit the common 
commitments of an alliance for its own purposes. A country 
pursuing this strategy will be reluctant to support a common 
position without concessions. Norway tried this strategy when 
it offered troops to the EU's planned military force in the 
wake of the 1999 Helsinki Summit in return for command 
influence.'''' NATO's history abounds with examples of this 
kind. But the degree of success depends on at least two 
factors, one is that the country must be regarded as 
sufficiently relevant to make the other countries willing to 
accept a concessionary solution, the other being a strong need 
for consensus. At such times, small states can extract 
concessions more easily than when the need for cohesion is 
less. 
In a US study of the countries that are the most likely partners 
for the USA in case of multinational operations, countries 
unable to send at least one battalion were omitted; 
considering that a state is unlikely to send over 25 per cent of 
its ground troops, only states with a standing army above 
5000 soldiers in peace time were included in the analysis.';' 
1.1" The Norwegian condition was rejected in no uncertain terms by the 
Finnish hosts. 
!F Szaynl.l et ai., Improuillg Army Planning for Future Multinational 
Operations, pp. 46-47. To pre~empr any curiosity from Norwegian readers, 
Norway is not ranked among the first tier of likely coalitIon partners for the 
US in any future multinational operations. This group is small, consisting 
only of Great Britain, France and Germany. But Norway is not even 
Moreover, only countries with a technological level 
sufficiently advanced to enable cooperation with US forces 
were on the list. The main indicator to delineate this group is 
spending pr. soldier. Only those countries where this level 
reached 50 per cent of the US level were listed as potential 
allies in a multinational operation. But this is an indicator 
fraught with pitfalls; above all the fact that it reveals nothing 
about how the money allotted to defence is being spent. The 
current debate on the costliness of maintaining large conscript 
armies in all the European countries where this is still the 
norm, is a case in point. 
Since the debate on burden-sharing started, committees 
have been established to work out schemes to overcome 
burden-sharing problems; once agreed the schemes often failed 
to be implemented. The problem today is that there is no 
longer one transatlantic gap created by the discrepancy in 
military technology, but there is also a political fissure to 
boot. Any attempts to overcome the former will be dependent 
on the efforts undertaken to overcome the latter. The stakes 
are high. Especially so for the smaller countries. This is not 
only because the US has traditionally been their security 
guarantee, but because US leadership has meant that the 
influence of the small has increased relative to that of their 
larger European neighbours.'" 
In this study, the economic and political driving forces 
behind multinationality have been outlined. Alone, they might 
give the reader the impression that multinationality will enable 
the participant to continue much in the same way as before, 
included in the second tier of cOllntries consisting of C::mada 1 Australia , 
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Spain. The report notes that although 
Norwegian participation in multinational operations has been high, the size 
of the ground troops is too low ro expect sizeable contributions. Szayon cr. 
al., Impwl'il1g Army PIL1l1JliJ1g lor Fflture Multil1atiollal OIJcraticms, p. 53. 
~\;, This has been an implicit part of the Dutch strategy of sing the US as a 
counterbalance to resist domination by a big regional power, especially 
France, sce Alfred van Staden, "Small State Strategies in Alliances: The Case 
of the Netherlands", CoojJeratioll l..1I1d COllflict, no. 1, .1995, p. 32. 
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bur now splitting the costs more efficiently. That would be 
\vrong. Instead, mllltinationality is about developing the 
capacities needed to retain NATO as a viable military alliance. 
If not, we might be faced with what was once referred to as 
the Dorian Grey Syndrome: "the danger is that NATO will be 
dead before anyone notices, and we will only discover the 
I .. d J,,1,9 corpse t 1e n101nent we want It to fIse an respono .--
l5'; Stephen \XTalt, "The Tics That Fray: \X/hy Europe and AnH~ri.:a Me 
approaching;] Parting of the \Xlay", The National I11terest, \X1inrer 1998-99, 
p. 11. 
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One Size Fits All? 
After the end of the Cold War, multinational solutions 
play a growing role within NATO. Rising costs of 
equipment combined with reductions in troop numbers 
have forced member states to pool their resources. 
Development and procurement of new equipment, as 
well as the integration of military units from two or 
more countries are being implemented. If successful, 
multinational solutions may prove instrumental in 
redressing the transatlantic imbalance in military 
capacities. 
Whereas the political and economic benefits are 
easily detectable, multinational solutions mean 
increased dependence on others. The scope for 
autonomous decision-making is reduced. Smaller 
countries will be more affected by this than their larger 
partners. Exactly how is discussed here with particular 
emphasis on the chanllenges confronting Norway. 
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